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In this dissertation, I develop an approach to philosophical critique of morally relevant science 
and apply this approach to a new branch of evolutionary psychology called “feminist 
evolutionary psychology.” Morally relevant science is science that produces knowledge that has 
the potential to risk harm to humans, non-humans, or the environment. For example, a science 
that produces claims about women that reinforce prejudicial beliefs about women is a morally 
relevant science. The approach I develop, what I call the “social-dimensional approach,” is 
designed to assess a science’s epistemic and ethical dimensions which makes it ideal for the 
assessment of morally relevant science. My development of the social-dimensional approach is 
informed by an analysis of the philosophy of biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary 
psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of human psychology and behaviour. I apply the 
social-dimensional approach to feminist evolutionary psychology and show that this new science 
has serious epistemic and ethical flaws. I address the implications of these flaws and offer 
recommendations for how feminist evolutionary psychologists can amend them. I argue the 
social-dimensional approach has use beyond evolutionary psychology and can be used for the 
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Evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of human behaviour and psychology, 
claims to be the science of human nature. Who humans are biologically, they say, sheds light on 
who we are socially. This leads many evolutionary psychologists to purport that their science is 
immediately relevant to how we understand and manage issues such as our well-being, morality, 
relationships, and even our social governance (e.g., Buss 2006; Fisher et al. 2013; Thornhill and 
Palmer 2000). Reinforcing their programme and their confidence in the claims they make, this 
research has been enthusiastically received by the public and select academic forums. Their papers 
have been published in prestigious psychology journals and some interdisciplinary science journals 
such as Personality Processes and Individual Differences, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Human Nature, Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences. Their theories are talked about on radio and TV shows such as The Today Show, 
CNN, and NPR Talk of the Nation.1 They are even talked about by celebrities. For example, 
Gweneth Paltrow cites EP research on her blog to explain and justify her separation from her 
husband Chris Martin. 2 In the post, Paltrow credits research by two evolutionary psychologists 
who theorize, because humans are living much longer now than they were in the upper Paleolithic 
                                                          
1 For example, see evolutionary psychologist David Buss’s interview with Matt Lauer on The Today Show about the 
evolutionary significance of jealousy: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4qsgiGbZpKo; Jennifer Pozner’s (2000) 
coverage of the media attention evolutionary psychologists Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s research on rape 
received. Also see Reason TV’s interview with evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_WrKno972U. 
2 See, http://www.goop.com/journal/be/conscious-uncoupling.  
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period, they are not evolved to be in the long-term relationships that are expected in many cultures 
today. Some evolutionary psychologists are even celebrities themselves, having sold thousands of 
books to the general public. Thornhill and Palmer's Natural History of Rape, for instance, sold 
over 10,000 copies, and an extra 10,000 copies were ordered, just in the first week of its publication 
(Pozner 2000).  Because of its public sway and its power to influence our policies and our beliefs 
about people, it is important that EP be under constant scrutiny.  
 Philosophers of biology have stepped up to develop critiques of EP (e.g., Buller 2005; 
Dupré 2001; 2012; Meynell 2012; Richardson 2007). Philosophical criticisms have exposed EP’s 
flawed use of evolutionary science and its harmful social and political implications. Feminist 
critics, in particular, have taken serious issue with evolutionary psychology theories on sex and 
sex roles (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 1997; Lloyd, 2003; Meynell 2012; Martin, 2003). These feminist 
critics problematize the essentializing and biologically deterministic nature of EP theories about 
sex, and call EP out on the androcentrism and sexism that’s evident in its topics of study, 
experimental designs, and data interpretations. 
 What is curious, then, is the recent development of a feminist evolutionary psychology 
(FEP). FEP researchers incorporate feminist values and practices into their science in order to 
come to grips with the sexist values that are so explicit and pervasive in traditional evolutionary 
psychology. In particular, they are critical of traditional sexist practices and assumptions in 
evolutionary psychology that lead to a hyper-focus on males and provide unwarranted support 
for the notions that females are passive and coy. Feminist evolutionary psychologists incorporate 
research practices that highlight the importance of females and women for evolutionary change.   
 On the face of it, this development of a feminist evolutionary psychology seems like a 
good thing. It appears to be evidence that evolutionary psychologists are taking feminist 
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concerns about androcentrism and sexism in EP seriously. This promises epistemic benefits as 
prejudices such as androcentrism and sexism can distort how a scientist collects and understands 
their data. FEP scholars’ efforts to do away with such prejudices in EP can enhance their ability 
to produce knowledge that accurately depicts sex and gender. What is more, attempts from FEP 
scholars to introduce feminist values and practices into their science can stimulate interest in a 
broader set of research questions, and lead to the development of new methods and theories. For 
instance, FEP scholars’ interest in increasing the focus on women as subjects in human 
evolutionary study has led to new questions about how women compete with one another over 
mates and resources (e.g., Fisher 2013; Liesen 2013). Feminist evolutionary psychologists’ 
concerns about sexism in evolutionary psychology theories and methods has also required that 
FEP scholars develop new theories and methods that can more impartially conceptualize and 
measure evolutionary phenomena (e.g., Gowaty 2013; Heywood 2013). This kind of 
improvement in the scope and quality of our knowledge about women could have social benefits 
as it might better inform how we approach the complexity of women’s issues.  
 It is, however, important to carefully assess FEP for several reasons. First, because 
feminist evolutionary psychologists still conduct their research broadly within the disciplinary 
framework of EP, their epistemic practices (e.g., theories, assumptions, data practices) may be 
flawed in similar ways that EP practices are. Second, because feminist evolutionary 
psychologists still operate within an EP framework, the sexism embedded in EP might also be 
present in FEP. In EP research, men are often attributed qualities and roles that pertain to 
leadership and selfishness, and women qualities and roles that pertain to servitude and 
nurturance. These qualities are often claimed to be innate and hard to change. For example, 
evolutionary psychologist Robert Wright once theorized that because men evolved to be more 
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competitive than women, "women will never break through the glass ceiling because, 
biologically, they have less of men's innate ambition and willingness to take the risks necessary 
for success" (Fausto Sterling et al. 1997, 404). Even though FEP purports to be feminist, if FEP 
scholars’ research is guided by canonical assumptions about sex differences in EP, their theories 
and claims about the nature of men and women might reproduce the kind of sexism found in 
non-feminist EP. Third, if it turns out that FEP scholarship produces false sexist claims about 
women, then this also happens under the title of “feminism.” This is problematic as the title 
could play a role in justifying the sexism in FEP research even more so than it otherwise would 
be in non-feminist EP research. For example, a theory that claims women’s natural role is to 
nurture might already play into some people’s pre-existing intuitions about women. But if this 
theory was also then interpreted as good for women somehow because it is “feminist,” then 
people might also feel good about believing the theory. There is much psychological literature on 
how feelings and emotions affect our belief systems (see especially the collection of essays in 
Frijda et al. 2000).  Finally, FEP has the potential to produce science that is both socially 
progressive and epistemically rigorous, assuming that whatever epistemic and ethical weaknesses it 
may have can be addressed. FEP scholars come from a wide range of disciplines and so bring new 
perspectives, theories, and methods to the evolutionary study of humans in general and women in 
particular.. They demonstrate a consciousness of some past critiques of EP and make efforts to 
address them. Their efforts to conduct evolutionary research on women from a feminist 
perspective also shows attention to the ethical dimensions of their discipline. A critical 






My assessment of FEP in this dissertation is divided into five chapters (Chapter 2 – Chapter 6). 
Chapter 2 is a descriptive chapter about FEP. I lay out its history, feminist disciplinary aims, and 
theories, as well I identify the literature sample of FEP scholarship that I will assess in later 
chapters. In Chapter 3, I develop the methodological approach, what I call the “social-
dimensional approach,” that I need to assess FEP. This chapter is an adaptation of Weaver 
(forthcoming). My development of the social-dimensional approach is situated in the 
philosophical literature on socially relevant philosophy of science. Scholarship in this domain 
argues that philosophers of science are opportunely situated within scientific discourse to offer 
valuable deconstructions of and guidance in the production of scientific knowledge so as to 
promote socially responsible science. Informed by this argument, I develop an approach to 
scientific critique that is designed to assess a science’s epistemic and social/moral dimensions. 
The development of this approach is based on my analysis of the philosophy of biology literature 
on the criticism of EP. From this literature, I categorize two different methods of scientific 
critique. The first I call the “truth-detectional” approach. Those who take this approach are first 
and foremost concerned about the truth of EP claims as that truth can be determined by evidence. 
The second I call the “social-dimensional” approach. Those who take this approach talk about 
the production and truth of EP claims but within a social framework. On this account, the 
legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of EP claims are not separate from the institutional and 
social processes and values that lend to their production. I argue that the truth-detectional 
approach risks harms to society and to the philosophy of science, but that the social-dimensional 
approach avoids these harms. I therefore commit to using the social-dimensional approach for 
my assessment of FEP.  
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In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 I apply the social-dimensional approach from Chapter 3 to FEP. 
In Chapter 4, I show that FEP remains hobbled with its use of a thoroughly criticized 
problematic theoretical paradigm that is commonly used in EP. I recommend alternative, more 
successful theoretical platforms for evolutionary study that FEP scholars can use instead. In 
Chapter 5, I argue that FEP scholars offer the wrong data, or do not offer enough of the right 
kinds of data to support the evolutionary hypotheses they advance (i.e., adaptationist 
hypotheses). To make my assessments, I develop a category of critique, what I call the 
operationalization of evolutionary phenomena (OEP) check. This new category concerns the 
success of feminist evolutionary psychologists’ attempts to operationalize evolutionary terms in 
the context of studying humans. I develop and apply this critique in the first section of this 
chapter. I go on to show how past and well-known criticisms of EP data practices remain 
relevant to FEP. This reproduction of errors in FEP data practices is concerning, I point out, as 
the mistakes are fundamental errors that evolutionary biologists and philosophers have cautioned 
against since the 1970s and 1980s. I offer recommendations for how FEP scholars might address 
the weaknesses in their data practices. 
In Chapter 6, I assess the role of social values in FEP and FEP’s social impact. I 
demonstrate that harmful and distorting social values remain part of FEP knowledge claims and 
risk harm to especially women. I reveal how these social values guide FEP research in terms of 
how FEP scholars understand the relationship between feminism and evolutionary psychology, 
their topics of study, and how they interpret data. I argue that these values (1) compromise the 
quality of FEP research, and (2) jeopardize FEP’s feminist aims. I provide recommendations for 




In the conclusion, I summarize the work I present in this dissertation and make a case for 
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Chapter 2: The Literature Under Investigation, Feminist Evolutionary Psychology 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a descriptive overview of feminist evolutionary 
psychology (FEP). In this chapter, I lay out FEP’s history, feminist disciplinary aims, theories, 
and identify the sample of FEP research that I will be conducting my analysis on. It is important 
that I note here at the outset that I will not be conducting any sort of assessment of FEP in this 
chapter. I intend my presentation of FEP scholarship to reflect only the views of its practitioners. 
I do not intend to be either laudatory or critical of it. Many of the theories and studies I present in 
this chapter will be critiqued later in this dissertation.   
   
2.1. Integrating Feminism with Evolutionary Psychology: A Brief History  
  
Feminism and evolutionary theory have been crossing paths since even as early as Darwin's own 
feminist contemporaries, Antoinette Brown Blackwell (1875) and Clémence Royer (1862). The 
relationship between feminism and evolution has long been antagonistic. Feminists have been 
critical of evolutionary theories about human behaviour that are based on unjustified 
deterministic assumptions, or are essentialist or sexist in nature. And some evolutionary 
researchers have, in turn, been critical of feminists for overemphasizing cultural or 
environmental causes of human behaviour, or for mixing "ideology" with science.  A second, 
less talked about relationship between feminism and evolution is the union of feminism and 
evolutionary science. While this second relationship is also old, feminists working as 
evolutionary biologists, for example, have been around since at least the 1970s (e.g., Altmann 
1974; Haraway 1978a; 1978b), and feminists have even talked about developing a feminist 
evolutionary biology (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, Gowaty and Zuk 1997; Smuts 1995). Interestingly, 
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conversations about incorporating feminism with evolutionary research have surfaced in 
evolutionary psychology. This is surprising as evolutionary psychologists and feminists have 
been especially vocal about their disagreements (Gannon 2002).    
 Early attempts to integrate evolutionary psychology and feminism are found in David 
Buss and Neil Malamuth's (1996) edited volume, Sex, power, conflict: Evolutionary and feminist 
perspectives. Scholars in this volume grapple with the cross-fertilization between feminism and 
evolutionary psychology which, they purport, is accomplished in three different ways in the 
volume (Buss and Malamuth 1996, 5). Barbara Smuts (1996) combines EP and feminism by 
applying EP perspective to a feminist issue (i.e., male aggression). Neil Malamuth (1996) and 
Felicia Pratto (1996), on the other hand, apply both EP and feminist insights to a single topic, 
i.e., sexual aggression and sexual politics, respectively. Finally, David Buss (1996) offers a 
metatheory for how evolutionary psychology and feminism can be integrated more generally. 
 The 10 years following Sex, Power and Conflict saw a few more attempts to integrate 
feminism and evolutionary psychology (Campbell 1999; 2006; Peters et al. 2002; Vandermassen 
2005). Beginning her work around this time, Anne Campbell has done extensive research on the 
evolution of female aggression. Her work shows that women use aggression, as do men, as a 
means to compete for reproductive and survival advantages. For a long time, much evolutionary 
theory on humans assumed that women predominantly had a "passive" role in evolution. 
Scientists assumed that the variation and competition associated with evolution by natural 
selection was primarily associated with males rather than females. Work such as Campbell’s, 




 Griet Vandermassen's (2005) book, Who's Afraid of Charles Darwin: Debating Feminism 
and Evolutionary Theory, is a thorough extension of David Buss's (1996) call for a metatheory for 
feminism and evolutionary psychology. Both Vandermassen (2005) and Buss (1996) are critical 
of the feminist scholarship that has either ignored or critiqued evolutionary psychological accounts 
of sex and social issues pertaining to sex. They argue that feminists are mistaken to conclude that 
evolutionary psychology is irrelevant or antithetical to feminist ends. They demonstrate how 
various evolutionary psychological accounts of sex can augment feminist scholarship. For one, 
they point out how EP accounts can offer insights into the nature of men and women that have 
liberatory implications. For example, Vandermassen and Buss both discuss how evolutionary 
psychological accounts of women's sexuality counter patriarchal notions that women are naturally 
"coy." One popular EP account they highlight (i.e., Buss and Schmitt 1993) predicts that it 
sometimes benefits women to have a promiscuous mating strategy. Such benefits might include 
immediate extraction of resources, using short-term mating to evaluate long-term prospects, and 
gaining increased protection.  
Second, Buss and Vandermassen suggest that evolutionary psychology can help feminism 
by providing a more complete account of the phenomena feminists study. In particular, they draw 
attention to the distinction between ultimate or evolutionary causes of behaviour and immediate 
or proximate causes. Ultimate causes, in EP research, are attributed to natural selection, and they 
are said to answer overarching "why" questions (e.g., why are most societies patriarchal?). 
Proximate causes in EP, on the other hand, are said to answer “how” questions (e.g., how can 
patriarchies be subverted?). Proximate causes are psychological, physiological, or environmental, 
and they are the more immediate causes for phenomena. Buss (1996) and Vandermassen (2005) 
suggest that evolutionary psychology and feminism, respectively, specialize in explaining 
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behaviour from each of these two levels of causality. They point out that the feminist focus on 
cultural explanations for phenomena is essentially a type of proximate explanation. For example, 
the explanation that sexual coercion is motivated by male dominance and control is an explanation 
that taps into a psychological motivation, which is a proximate cause. On the other hand, because 
evolutionary psychology is more interested in answering overarching why questions, the 
evolutionary psychological account that sexual coercion is a manifestation of male-male 
competition for mates is intended to explain why men have the psychological motivations that they 
do for sexual coercion. In this sense, Buss and Vandermassen argue that evolutionary psychology 
and feminism, together, can offer a more complete account of the phenomena the two areas are 
mutually interested in. 
 Discussions on and research embodying the integration of feminism and evolutionary 
psychology have surfaced more strongly over the last five years. A special issue in Sex Roles in 
2011 was dedicated to exploring whether feminism and evolutionary psychology are allies or 
adversaries. Work in this volume includes (1) scholarship of feminists who are critical of 
evolutionary psychology, (2) scholarship by evolutionary psychologists who argue in favor of 
integrating feminism and evolutionary psychology, and (3) scholarship by evolutionary 
psychologists that, without explicit discussion of the debate, approaches feminist-relevant issues 
from an evolutionary psychological perspective. In 2009 through 2011 Maryanne Fisher, Rose 
Sokol-Chang, and Sarah Strout formed the Feminist Evolutionary Psychology Society (FEPS) 
(Sokol-Chang and Fisher 2013). This society's mission is to promote and bring together feminist-
orientated EP research. Since the formation of this society, FEPS has held numerous conferences 
and a number of its members have published an edited volume, Evolution's Empress: Darwinian 
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Perspectives on the Nature of Women (see Fisher et al. 2013), which is meant to describe and 
present representative FEPS work (Sokol-Chang and Fisher 2013).  
 The advent of FEPS marks the establishment of an official branch of evolutionary 
psychology that brings into practice past discussions that encouraged the integration of feminism 
and EP. Researchers who align themselves with FEPS follow Anne Campbell's lead by 
explaining how women are active evolutionary agents. Similar to Malamuth's (1996) and Pratto's 
(1996) work, FEPS researchers also frequently combine feminist and EP insights on a single 
topic. And, finally, some FEPS scholars follow in Buss (1996) and Vandermassen's (2005) 
footsteps and continue to develop metatheories for integrating feminism and evolutionary 
psychology. 
 
2.2 Research Sample for My Assessment of FEP 
 
It is challenging to determine the boundaries of a field, particularly a new one. For the purposes 
of this dissertation, the formation of the FEP Society is important as it is the self-recognition of a 
group of scholars as doing a particular sort of research. So, the scholarship that I analyze is all 
produced after that event. As well, in order to work from a sample of research that is clearly 
FEP, I draw my analysis from sources that have made the integration of feminism and EP 
explicit. A sample of FEP scholarship that both follows the formation of FEPS and makes the 
integration of feminism with evolutionary psychology explicit are the following papers: all 22 
papers in the (2013) volume Evolution's Empress: Darwinian Perspectives on the Nature of 
Women, and a specific collection of works from the 2011 issue in Sex Roles. The papers from 
Sex Roles that I am including in my analysis are the papers that belong to the second and third 
topics of the issue, (2) scholarship by evolutionary psychologists who argue in favor of 
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integrating feminism and evolutionary psychology, and (3) scholarship by evolutionary 
psychologists that, without explicit discussion of the debate, approaches feminist-relevant issues 
from an evolutionary psychological perspective. These papers include: (1) works by Buss and 
Schmidt (2011) and Eagly and Wood (2011) who provide metatheoretical discussions for the 
integration of feminism and EP; (2) papers by Ellis (2011), Frisby et al. (2011), and Sylwester 
and Pawlowsky (2011) who apply EP theory to feminist issues; and (3) papers by Singh and 
Singh (2011) and Vandermassen (2011) who combine feminist and EP insights on a single topic. 
Importantly, all of the papers just mentioned also purport to study women as active evolutionary 
agents. From here on, unless otherwise stated, the works from these two sources are the works I 
mean when I talk about “FEP” research.  
 
2.3 FEP’s Feminist Disciplinary Aims 
 
This next section spells out in more detail how the FEP scholars in my sample conceive of their 
work as feminist. I discuss two feminist aims purported by these FEP scholars.  
 Aim 1: As stated by members of the Feminist Evolutionary Psychology Society (see 
FEPS 2016; Sokol-Chang and Fisher 2013), FEP aims to study how females and women are 
active evolutionary agents. This refers to the study of how female variation has shaped the 
character, or major parts of the character, of a species. Areas of research in this regard include, 
though are not limited to: sex roles, competition, cooperation, mothering, parenting, health, 
reproduction, mating, and communication. For each of these areas, researchers highlight how the 
behaviours, preferences, tendencies, etc. of females create sites of selection. For example, 
Kathryn Coe and Craig Palmer (2013), in their research, try to show how the evolutionary 
advantages that cultural traditions afford are due to mothers' and grandmothers' tendencies to 
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pass on skills (e.g., cooking) to younger women. Studying how females and women are active 
evolutionary agents is meant to correct for male bias in EP. Traditionally, EP has been very 
focused on males and how selection acts on their phenotypes. Females in EP have historically 
been ignored (Hrdy 2013), downplayed as agents of evolutionary change (Fisher et al. 2103), or 
given credit for evolutionary change in only a few select areas (e.g., their choices of mates) 
(Sokol-Change and Fisher 2013).  
 Aim 2: to study women from an evolutionary psychology perspective in order to (i) better 
understand women and women's issues like gender inequality, and (ii) offer solutions to these 
issues. In terms of the first of these, consider two examples of how FEP scholars imagine this 
working. Nancy Easterlin (2013) criticizes the feminist "dogmatic insistence on constructionism, 
the perspective that [sex] differences are socially produced rather than the result of innate 
predispositions" (391). Easterlin thinks that, when it comes to the study of gender inequality, 
understanding sex differences from an evolutionary perspective provides a more accurate picture 
of how differences between the sexes promote inequality and why such inequality is harmful. By 
providing an analysis of a classic mimetic (i.e., "realistic") piece of fiction literature, Charlotte 
Brontë's Jane Eyre, Easterlin teases out a snapshot of male-female power dynamics in 19th 
century British patriarchal society. Then, by applying an evolutionary psychological theory on 
sex-differential mating strategies to the story, she purports to show how men "typically seek to 
control women as a part of a psychological profile derived from their normative reproductive 
strategy,"3 and that this is harmful to women because it compromises women's evolved desire for 
                                                          
3 By “normative reproductive strategy,” Easterlin seems to mean adaptive reproductive strategy. 
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autonomous individuality.4 Thus, she says, EP theory on evolved sex differences can help 
illuminate why certain sex differences promote inequality by pinpointing the sex-specific 
motivations and behaviours that contribute to patriarchal social organization. 
 Also consider how Julie Seaman (2013) draws on an evolutionary link between "power" 
and ornamentation in the animal kingdom in order better understand the harms of sexist dress 
codes in the workplace. Seaman points out how the most elaborately "dressed" sex (e.g., the 
most colorful plumage) in non-human animals is often the sex with the least amount of "power," 
where power specifically refers to choice in mating. This observation is based on sexual 
selection theory which holds that elaborate plumage, colouring, weaponry, or other kinds of 
“dress”. in males is usually the result of female choice. That is, because females, can choose 
freely with whom to mate,, the "dress" of the male will become honed to her preferences. Hence, 
according to Seaman, the female in this scenario holds the power since it is she who has 
control—has all the choice—in the mating arena.  
                                                          
4 She develops this latter part of her argument in the following passage: “Like much simpler organisms, through 
control over ourselves as physical entities we seek to negotiate our survival and reproduction, but as human beings, 
we do so through a complex sense of autobiographical selfhood and evolved culture (Damasio, 1999; Donald, 1991). 
If simple organisms require only a sense of organismic integrity as a fundamental point of reference, then humans 
need a far more elaborate sense of self to facilitate prospective planning and retrospective memory through the 
agency of narrative thought. All of these integral functions evolved within men and women and promoted bonding 
mechanisms within the kinship group in the ancestral past; over the long term, they contributed to the development 
of a profound sense of autonomous individuality, out of which all human beings, women and men, provide order, 
control, and meaning over their lives” (394). Men’s proprietary attitudes and behaviours towards women are 
therefore harmful, according to Easterlin, because they thwart women’s evolved desires to establish their own 
control and meaning over their lives.      
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 Seaman suggests that this observation in sexual selection theory can inform how we 
understand and deal with the power dynamics between the sexes in the human world. She notes 
that a similar phenomenon exists in humans, but that instead of it being the females who are the 
powerful ones, it is the males. Women are the more elaborately dressed, and are so precisely 
because men have the power to demand it of them. She explains how requiring women to be 
more elaborately dressed constrains their choices and has consequences for their reproduction 
and fitness: 
When such constraints take place in an arena of resource acquisition—for example, in the 
form of workplace rules that enforce social gender norms—these consequences may be 
especially pernicious. Moreover, female within-sex competition often takes the form of 
competition over resources rather than competition for males, which suggests women are 
particularly susceptible to negative gender stereotyping surrounding dress...And 
competition in the workplace may also take the form of between-sex competition, 
whereby constraints on female dress are likely to put women at a disadvantage relative to 
men where the dress code exacts financial, time, or energy costs. (419)   
She concludes that, by viewing cultural dress through this evolutionary lens, it is clear that 
"enforcing cultural dress norms, particularly those that involve color, decoration, status, and skin, 
on men and women in the workplace reifies gender stereotypes, decreases female agency and 
autonomy, and amounts to unlawful sex discrimination" (419).   
 FEP scholars also use their research as a way to develop solutions to the social and 
political issues women face. For example, Devendra Singh and Dorian Singh (2011) promote an 
evolutionary account of female body fat distribution as a way to contribute to issues surrounding 
women's body image. The account (developed by Devendra Singh 1993) suggests that a low 
17 
 
waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) of fat distribution on women's bodies (i.e., <0.8) is non-arbitrarily 
attractive to men because it is also an indicator of health and fertility. Throughout the paper 
Singh and Singh present cross-cultural findings that demonstrate how changes in male judgments 
of female attractiveness track changes in the size of women's WHR such that men tend to prefer 
a ratio lower than 0.8. They also present empirical evidence which suggests WHR is predictive 
of risks for major diseases, an optimal hormonal profile, and reproductive capacities. They 
suggest that knowledge of this evolutionary account of female attractiveness can be 
"empowering" to women because it promotes a normative body image that is healthy, unlike the 
hard-to-obtain thin ideal often portrayed in the media. On this they reason, 
If women were made aware of the link between health and beauty, such awareness could 
potentially minimize the oppressive search for becoming beautiful. Instead of seeing 
beauty as a tool of oppression, understanding how health and beauty overlap can, in fact, 
be empowering to women. Additionally, since mass media does not promote the idea that 
health equals beauty, this evidence may help to reduce the power of the media and its 
ability to incite body weight and shape dissatisfaction in women. (729)  
 
2.4 FEP Theoretical Foundations 
 
As a subdiscipline of EP, FEP researchers make use of theories that are commonly used in EP; 
but as a feminist subdiscipline, FEP researchers are also conscious that some traditional theories 
in EP are laden with false and sexist assumptions about females. Because of this, FEP scholars 
also make efforts to use or develop theories that are free of these assumptions. I will discuss, in 
turn, examples of theoretical foundations in traditional EP that are used in FEP scholarship, and 




2.4.1 Theories FEP Shares with EP 
 
In this section, I will briefly discuss three minor but common aspects of the theoretical 
foundations of FEP that are borrowed from traditional EP, then I will move on to discuss in 
greater detail the prominent theoretical paradigm that plays a significant role in FEP theorizing 
about human sex differences.  
As is the case in EP, FEP research is almost exclusively focused on evolution by natural 
and sexual selection, so a focus on adaptations is central to much FEP investigations. That is, 
generally speaking, when FEP scholars talk about “evolution” or taking an “evolutionary 
perspective,” they mean specifically evolution by natural/sexual selection, and the study of 
adaptations, respectively. Broadly, this tendency to be exclusively focused on adaptations has 
been referred to as “adaptationism” (Gould and Lewontin 1979). Like EP, FEP research also 
considers the human “environment of evolutionary adaptedness” to be the Pleistocene (the 
geological epoch that spanned about 2,588,000 to 11,700 years ago). This is the time period FEP 
and EP scholars assume most human-specific adaptations evolved. As such, FEP scholars do not 
discuss any possible ongoing adaptations. For their purposes, the adaptive traits we see in 
humans today are the result of selection on human phenotypes during the Pleistocene.  
Another theory FEP scholars share with EP is "massive modularity." This is the theory 
that the mind is made up of genetically programmed, domain-specific computational modules 
that were selected for during the Pleistocene to solve specific evolutionary problems of the past. 
This theory is supposed to explain how behaviours, preferences, tendencies, and so on can be 
encoded in the genes such that they can be selected for. While massive modularity isn't referred 
to explicitly in the FEP literature I am assessing, its principles underlie much FEP reasoning 
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about the mechanisms of the evolution of behaviour. For instance, evolved behaviours in FEP are 
often characterized to be caused by specific “innate mechanisms” in the mind that evolved to 
solve certain problems. This is essentially to assume massive modularity (Downes 2014).  
Many FEP theories on sex differences are grounded in a particular theoretical paradigm, 
also commonly used in EP, that's been attributed to work by Angus Bateman, Geoff Parker, and 
Robert Trivers (Gowaty 2013). I will refer to this paradigm as the Bateman-Trivers-Parker 
paradigm (BTP paradigm) throughout this thesis. This paradigm has come under fire from 
feminist and non-feminist scholars for its flawed and sexist assumptions and ill success in some 
non-human animal research. I will talk more about these criticisms in Chapter 4. For now, I will 
just lay out the paradigm’s tenets and describe how it is used in FEP.  
The BTP paradigm is used mainly to explain the origins of sex differences and the nature 
and persistence of these differences in sexually reproducing species. There are three parts to this 
paradigm. The first part of the paradigm starts with our primordial ancestors. In their respective 
contributions to the paradigm, Bateman, Parker, and Trivers all include some reference to the 
evolution of anisogamy, which is a theoretical account of the evolution of differently sized 
gametes. This account looks something like the following: 
The ancestral state in eukaryotes is likely to have been a unicellular organism with 
isogamy, i.e. where the fusing gametes are of similar size, and hence contribute equally to 
the zygote (Fig. 7.1). However, it is clear that under many conditions isogamy is 
unstable... and in such cases soon after the evolution of gametes and sexual re-
combination, selection is likely to have favoured a drive for anisogamy from the ancestral 
isogamy. (As described in Parker and Pizzari 2015, 137-138) 
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This move from isogamy (similar-sized gametes) to anisogamy (large and small gametes) is 
assumed to result from the possibility that more total "fusings" between gametes within the 
population could take place if there were more mobile micro-gametes ("males") that could fuse 
with the few immobile macro-gametes ("females"). Thus, a drive toward a population with two 
types of gametes (mobile small and immobile large) was highly likely. 
 The early origins of anisogamy is central to Angus Bateman's famous principle of sexual 
selection which can be stated: due to the intensity of male-male competition over the 
insemination of females, there is higher reproductive variance among males. Through a series of 
experiments that went on to become some of the most well known and highly cited experiments 
in the sexual selection literature, Bateman (1948) attempted to explain the alleged "general law" 
(first articulated by Darwin 1871), that males are eager and indiscriminating, and females coy 
and discriminating (352) when it comes to mating. His observations of Drosphila led him to 
report that, after one generation, the number of progeny males could produce was more variable 
than the number of progeny females could produce. By this he meant, whereas the number of 
offspring females could produce was relatively similar across females, there were some males 
who significantly out-reproduced other males. To explain this intensity of intra-male selection, 
he noted that male-male competition was more dependent on frequency of insemination. He 
therefore marks a distinction between how male versus female Drosophila can enhance their 
fertility. For females, maximizing their fertility is limited by the costs of egg production, whereas 
for males their fertility is limited by the opportunities available to inseminate females. As a 
result, maximal female fertility (during any one reproductive period) ends at a single batch of 
eggs, but maximal fertility for males can extend beyond a single batch of eggs since there is the 
potential to inseminate more than one female. This difference between male and female 
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reproductive potential, said Batman, is what explains the differences in male and female mating 
behaviour. Because he thought number of mates and matings is linked to number of 
inseminations, he reasoned it is beneficial for males to maximize the number of mates they have. 
For females, however, he reasoned that number of matings and mates is only optimal until their 
eggs are fertilized. Females, then, according to Bateman, are better off to focus less on quantity 
of partners and more on partner quality (e.g., partners' fitness enhancing traits). And so, Bateman 
develops the idea of the ardent promiscuous male, and the passive discriminating female.   
 Bateman of course saw this distinction between the relative reproductive potentials of 
male and female fruit flies (and their respective behaviours) to reflect a more universal sex 
difference. For this he refers to the origins of anisogamy:   
The primary feature of sexual reproduction is to be sure the fusion of gametes 
irrespective of their relative size, but the specialisation into large immobile gametes and 
small mobile gametes produced in great excess (the primary sex differences), was a very 
early evolutionary step. One would therefore expect to find in all but a few very primitive 
organisms, and those in which monogamy combined with a sex ratio of unity eliminated 
all intra-sexual selection, that males would show greater intra-sexual selection than 
females. This would explain why in unisexual organisms there is nearly always a 
combination of an undiscriminating eagerness in the males and a discriminating passivity 
in the females. Even in derived monogamous species (e.g. man) this sex difference might 
be expected to persists as a relic. 
 
  Bateman's data and theoretical work inform the next part of the paradigm. More than 
twenty years later, Robert Trivers (1972) reformulated Bateman's argument regarding the 
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limitations of male and female reproductive success (i.e., cost of sperm and eggs, respectively) to 
develop his Parental Investment Theory. Trivers (1972) defines parental investment as, "any 
investment by the parent in an individual offspring that increases the offspring's chance of 
surviving (and hence reproductive success) at the cost of the parent's ability to invest in other 
offspring" (55). Such kinds of effort would include investments in sex cells, feeding, and 
guarding, but would not include mating efforts such as searching for a mate or competing with a 
member of the same sex for a mate. For Trivers, understanding relative parental investment 
between the sexes in a species is key to understanding how sexual selection will operate in that 
species. He reasons, 
the sex whose typical parental investment is greater than that of the opposite sex will 
become a limiting resource for that sex. Individuals of the sex investing less will compete 
among themselves to breed with members of the sex investing more, since an individual 
of the former can increase its reproductive success by investing successively in the 
offspring of several members of the limiting sex... The potential for sexual competition in 
the sex investing less can be measured by calculating the ratio of the number of offspring 
that sex optimally produces...to the number of offspring the limiting sex optimally 
produces.  (1972, 57) 
Citing Bateman, Trivers suggests that the least investing sex will be the male, save for a few rare 
exceptions (e.g., seahorses). In his paper, Bateman (1948) noted the costliness of the energy 
investment required for female gametes versus that for males'. He says egg production "causes a 
severe strain on [female] nutrition" (364). Likewise, in mammals, females are burdened with 
"uterine nutrition and milk production" (364). Males, however, he says are not burdened by these 
high energy investments, but merely by the cost of sperm, which he says is cheap. This initial 
23 
 
difference in energy expenditure, according to Trivers, is what makes females, generally, the 
"limiting resource" for males.  
 Trivers goes on to make a number of predictions regarding how sexual selection should 
act on the sexes given differential parental investment. In particular, he predicts an evolutionary 
arms race between the sexes where each is expected to evolve adaptations and 
counteradaptations in their efforts to maximize their conflicting fitness goals. For males, he 
expects they will develop adaptations that enhance promiscuity (e.g., forced copulation, 
desertion) and counteradaptations to prevent cuckoldry since females might try to entice males to 
invest in parental care, meanwhile choosing a male of higher genetic quality to do the actual 
fertilizing. For females, he expects them to develop adaptations to be able to detect genetically 
high-quality males that will invest, and counteradaptations to prevent desertion. This type of 
evolutionary conflict in the form of sexually selected adaptations and counteradaptations has 
since been referred to as "the battle of the sexes" by Richard Dawkins (1976), and "sexual 
conflict" by Geoff Parker (1979) who talks at length about the phenomenon.  
 Together, theories about anisogamy and those put forward by Bateman, Parker and 
Trivers make and promote the following assumptions about males and females: 
(a) females are the higher investing sex because of the cost of their gametes, (b) males are 
generally more eager to mate and more indiscriminate than females, (c) male 
reproductive success is more variable than that of females, (d) males gain more in 
reproductive success from repeated matings than do females, (e) these differences in 
males and females will lead to sexual conflict (adaptations/counteradaptations). (a – d 
from Dewsbury 2005, 831) 
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 Applying these assumptions to the study of human sex differences is the third part of the 
paradigm. Theoretical work in early sociobiology and evolutionary psychology (e.g., Thornhill 
and Palmer 2001; Tooby and Cosmides 1995) almost invariably start with the BTP paradigm to 
explain alleged human sex differences. Assumptions (a), (b), and (c) are apparent, for instance, 
in theories that characterize men as more "promiscuous" than women (Thornhill and Palmer 
2001), women as more "emotional" than men (since emotionality helps pair-bonding and 
nurturance) (e.g., Wilson 1975), and men as natural-born oppressors of women (e.g., Cosmides 
and Tooby 1995), since, through oppression, men can control women’s reproduction. 
It is interesting to see explicitly feminist scientists continuing to use the BTP paradigm’s 
assumptions as a starting point for predicting or interpreting human sex differences. Consider 
two examples where FEP scholars have leaned on the paradigm's assumptions to either predict or 
interpret human mating behaviour.  
 Fisher (2013), a founding member of FEPS, relies on assumptions (a) and (b) to predict 
how women’s competitive strategies reflect whether they seek a short-term or long-term 
relationship. To describe men's and women's basic mating strategies, Fisher lays out the 
following. 
Women have faced sex-specific reproductive circumstances during evolutionary history; 
in contrast to men, women have energetically costly gametes that are comparatively few 
in number [assumption (a)]. Once fertilization occurs, it involves a substantial 
investment in terms of energy and time. Due to this differential in required reproductive 
effort, men's optimal reproductive strategy may be to seek as many matings as possible 
and invest little in any resulting children, while women's optimal strategy may be to 
carefully seek a mate and invest heavily in any children [assumption (b)] (as based on 
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mammalian parental investment strategies as elaborated by Trivers, 1985). It is probable 
that these differences in reproductive strategy have influenced methods of competition. 
For example, men may compete for access to fertile women, while women may compete 
for access to men with resources and who are willing to provide paternal care (Buss, 
1989; Cashdan, 1998). (24) 
 
Fisher then adds to this account by discussing some literature that marks a distinction between 
male and female long- vs. short-term mating strategies. For women, she says, 
 
When seeking a brief interaction, women are thought to prefer a mate with high "gene 
quality" given that the man will presumably not invest any resources or parental care in 
any resulting children (see for example, Gangstad & Simpson, 2000). (24)  
 
And for men's long-term strategies, she cites Kenrik et al. (1993) who suggest, 
 
when considering women for relationships of various durations, men place more 
importance on female attractiveness as the expected duration increases. In other words, 
men have lower standards for a woman's attractiveness (which is an important element of 
male mate preference) when seeking a mate for a one-night stand, as opposed to steady 
dating or marriage. (24) 
 
Considering men's and women's short and long-term strategies together, Fisher makes a 
prediction regarding the types of behaviours women can be expected to engage in when 
competing for men. She hypothesizes that women’s competition should track the kind of 
relationship they are seeking. If they are seeking a brief interaction, women will compete in ways 
that help them advertise their physicality, sexuality, and lack of commitment. On the other hand, 
26 
 
if they are seeking a long-term partner, women will compete in ways that help them advertise 
their parenting abilities and fidelity. 
 
 Another example of a FEP scholar making use of Parental Investment Theory in their 
research is Frisby et al. (2011) who study flirting behaviour in American university 
undergraduate students.5 When interpreting their results, Frisby et al. (2011) make use of an 
extrapolation of assumption (a) that is present in Trivers's parental investment theory. Recall, 
Trivers's (1972) suggestion that because females are the higher investing sex, they should be 
selective of who they mate with since it pays for them to have a mate who will provide some 
investment and not abandon them. Frisby et al. (2011) make use of this assumption in parental 
investment theory in the following way:  
when men’s flirtatious behaviour was motivated by fun, women’s perceptions of their 
physical attractiveness decreased in comparison to initial evaluations of the men’s 
physical attractiveness. According to [parental investment theory], women are most 
attracted to potential mates who have resources they can, and will, invest in partner and 
                                                          
5 Frisby et al. (2011) actually test predictions about human flirting that are based on both parental investment theory 
and a psychological theory called Relational Framing Theory. RTF holds that all human social interactions are 
interpreted by individuals in terms of affiliation and dominance. Connecting this with parental investment theory, 
Frisby et al. suggest that, while it may be that individuals interpret messages through an affiliative or dominant 
frame, parental investment theory is "important in driving the final evaluations of individuals" (691). Their results, 
however, don't really demonstrate a connection between the two theories, which made trying to present their results 
as making the connection quite confusing. Since my aim in this section is just to give examples of how FEP scholars 
base predictions of human behavior on the paradigm's assumptions, I thought I would keep the discussion of Frisby 
et al. to their use of parental investment theory, but flag that they also make use of another theory.       
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offspring protection. Men who are perceived as simply flirting for fun may not be seen as 
sufficiently serious and available to invest these resources in a potential partner. (691)  
Like Fisher (2013), then, Frisby et al. (2011) draw on the paradigm directly for the study of 
contemporary humans. Other FEP scholars who similarly make direct use of the paradigm's 
assumptions include Betzig (2013), Buss and Schmitt (2011), Ellis (2011), Frederick, Reynolds, 
and Fisher (2013), Moscovice (2013), Oberzaucher (2013), Pridmore-Brown (2013), Sylwester 
and Pawlowsky (2011), Vandermassen (2011), and Wilbur and Campbell (2013). These scholars 
make up 40% of my sample. 
 There are, however, noteworthy theories in my FEP sample that differ from those 
commonly used in EP. What makes these theories different is largely due to the influence of 
FEP's feminist aims.  
 
2.4.2 FEP Alternative Theories about the Evolutionary Study of Sex 
 
Patricia Gowaty (2013) and Leslie Heywood (2013) argue that traditional theoretical frameworks 
used in EP are structured in ways that result in a biased evolutionary study of the sexes. They 
offer alternative frameworks that guard against this bias.  
 Gowaty (2013, but also Gowaty and Hubbel 2005; 2009) lays out a theoretical starting 
point for studying reproduction in an evolutionary context that does not assume traditional 
principles (as established by Bateman) of the ardent, promiscuous, and aggressive male, and the 
coy, reticent, and choosey female. Gowaty contends Bateman's own experiments were flawed, 
and her own work presents over 100 animal studies that defy his principles. 6  In her work on sex 
                                                          
6 Other reviews of research on parental investment theory (a theory built on Bateman's principles) also reveal 
"contentious" support across animals species (e.g., Sheldon 2002; Westneat 2003).        
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as a reaction norm, she says one way to abandon Bateman's principles is to switch the focus from 
the fixity of specific adaptations of the sexes to the "adaptive flexibility" of individuals. That is, 
instead of assuming that males similarly faced certain environmental challenges, and females 
similarly faced certain environmental challenges, one should assume that "selection acted so that 
all individuals sense and respond to the changing environmental and social circumstances that 
affect their options for reproduction and survival" (2013, 93). Thus, when one observes a female 
being "choosey," one should not assume she is being choosey because the size of her gametes 
make it so, but because she has inferred from her environment (hence the adaptive flexibility of 
individuals) that such behaviour is beneficial. If her environment were to change, she might very 
well evolve to be promiscuous. Gowaty and Hubbel's model has been supported mathematically 
(Hubbell and Johnson 1987 and Gowaty and Hubbell 2009).  Importantly, the take home 
message of Gowaty's (2013) article is that a "sex-neutral science of sex-differentiated behaviour 
and psychology is possible" (108). She argues, if Bateman's principles are flawed, lead to messy 
results, and are politically biased, we ought to explore alternative, more neutral theoretical 
avenues.     
 Leslie Heywood (2013) also criticizes theoretical trends in EP that encourage male bias. 
Among others, such theoretical trends she criticizes include: (1) an exclusive focus on genes and 
anatomy as the primary determinants of behaviour. This, she says, makes behaviour seem 
instinctual and hard to change, and deemphasizes the role the environment and learning have on 
behaviour; (2) an emphasis on the idea that contemporary behaviours are adaptations that 
evolved to solve the different reproductive problems of human males and females. Heywood 
points out how this leads to a fixation on women as caretakers and mothers since the 
reproductive problems evolutionary psychologists assume women solved mostly had to do with 
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mothering and trying to keep a mate. Men, on the other hand (according to evolutionary 
psychologists), needed to solve problems regarding competition over mates and resources. The 
adaptations that are presumed to result from having to solve these problems are conducive to far 
more versatile and socially valuable roles. 
Heywood is among an army of scholars who think these theoretical assumptions are 
outdated and harmfully politically charged. She encourages a switch in FEP to embrace theories 
from what she refers to as "the extended synthesis."  This theoretical paradigm incorporates 
insights from neuroscience, genetics, developmental psychology, and paleoecology to show 
"how biology and culture are inextricable, and how human behavior...incorporates cultural 
developments, and the way that humans actively shape their environmental niche and hence their 
own evolutionary process" (456). Such a switch, she says, would allow FEP researchers to 
abandon talk of the "stone age mind" and all the harmful politics it brings with it. 
 
2.4.3 Theories about Females as Active Evolutionary Agents 
 
FEP scholars tell how, since Darwin, males have occupied centre stage in evolutionary theory as 
the drivers of evolutionary change. Since it is possible for some males to leave more offspring 
than others (because males vastly outnumber non-pregnant females), then it follows that their 
genetic and phenotypic variation can cause variable reproduction, and if that variation has a 
genetic basis, then evolution by natural selection becomes possible. If females, on the other hand, 
are all reproducing at capacity, then there is no differential reproduction and so even if there is 
genetic or phenotypic variation it cannot be subject to natural selection. Hence, females were 
assumed to occupy a largely passive role in evolutionary change. While such a view is explicitly 
rejected by many evolutionary scientists today, some FEP researchers insist the evolutionary 
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sciences still have a lot of catching up to do since females have simply been left out of so much 
evolutionary research, or have been unjustifiably presented as evolutionarily passive. FEP 
scientists have taken on the project to update knowledge about the ways in which differential 
female behaviour, cognition, and physiology across females create variance in reproductive 
success. Some new areas of research that FEP scholars have undertaken to develop accounts of 
women's active role in evolution include work on the evolutionary significance of mothering, 
women's aggression and competition, and the importance of female mating strategies and choice.  
FEP research on the evolutionary importance of mothering is one way FEP scholars 
attempt to show how non-human females and women can have variance in terms of reproductive 
success. Because how one mothers can affect how many offspring one has or how healthy one’s 
offspring are, differential mothering strategies can lead to differential reproductive success. FEP 
scholars in my sample provide examples of how differential mothering strategies have led to a 
variety of adaptations in women (and in humans generally) including certain forms of human 
communication (Oberzaucher 2013; Sokol Chang 2013) and socialization (Liesen 2013; 
Moscovice 2013).  
FEP research on mothering also responds to what FEP researchers see as an undervaluing 
of mothering in the context of evolutionary research (Fisher et al. 2013). They note that the topic 
of mothering made a splash in the 1990s but has seen a steep decline ever since. Maryanne 
Fisher, Rose Sokol-Chang, and Justin Garcia (2013) see this to be disturbing given that "[h]uman 
survival depends on the strategies that women employ for mothering" (11). Quite a few articles 
in Evolution's Empress respond to this concern that more evolutionary research on mothering 
ought to be conducted. For example, Kathryn Coe and Craig Palmer (2013) suggest that mothers 
play an adaptive role in transmitting traditions, and Nicole Cameron and Justin Garcia (2013) use 
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secondary resources to show that mothers have specific, though flexible, depending on the 
environment, behavioural adaptations to enable the adaptive development of their children. 
FEP literature on female aggression points out that while female aggression might be 
overall less physical in nature than men’s and take different forms (e.g., women are said to take 
more indirect or subtle forms of aggression, such as manipulation, as opposed to more overt 
forms that are more typical of men, like physical aggression, see Fisher 2013), female aggression 
nonetheless has adaptive functions like male aggression. In particular, scholars in this area have 
talked about how female aggression is often used to secure mates (Fisher 2013), secure or obtain 
resources or status (Liesen 2013), protect offspring (Campbell 1999), and secure an offspring's 
social status (Betzig 2013). Indeed, such uses of aggression would appear to have direct or 
indirect fitness benefits. 
 Overlapping with research on female aggression, FEP scholarship on female competition 
also proposes that women like men compete for fitness enhancing purposes. Here it has been 
suggested that women compete for mates (Fisher 2013; Liesen 2013), social status and resources 
(Liesen 2013; Meredith 2013). And similar to the aggression scholarship, women are theorized 
to compete differently from men. Whereas men are discussed to compete overtly and often in 
risky ways (e.g., use of physical aggression; overt hostility, see Fisher 2013, 22-23), women are 
discussed to compete in indirect ways that only rarely involve physical aggression (e.g., dressing 
up, gossip, social manipulation, prosocial strategies that enhance their likeability/popularity). 
With that said, however, the FEP researchers in Evolution's Empress who talk about female 
aggression and competition are sure to cite literature which documents that although physical 
aggression among women is not the tactic of choice, it most certainly does occur and may also be 
used for fitness enhancing purposes (e.g., obtaining/securing mates, social status, or resources). 
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 Finally, FEP work on female mating strategies and choice responds to under-informed 
and politically charged assumptions about female passivity in the context of mating. It used to be 
widely assumed that females were "prizes" in male competitions for mates, suggesting that 
females do not do much in the way of choosing who to mate with but more accept the champions 
(Wilbur and Campbell 2013). Although progress has been made in evolutionary research toward 
a broader understanding of particularly female choice (i.e., it is now accepted that many females 
don't simply "accept" the champion but also have mate preferences), some FEP researchers argue 
that not enough attention is paid to how female mating efforts and choice really influence 
evolutionary change. In this regard, Evolution's Empress presents a number of articles that 
highlight the significant impact female mating and mate choice has on the evolution of a species. 
Just to mention a couple of these, Wilbur and Campbell (2013) propose that women's preferences 
for humour in a mate have contributed to shaping men's psychology, and Frederick et al. (2013) 
suggest that women's various resistances to socially enforced constraints on their mate choices 
have shaped human sexuality. For instance, because women have mate preferences, it is 
necessary that men make efforts to attract them. Male jealousy is also suggested to be shaped by 
non-monogamous female mating strategies.  
 Taken together, FEP scholars have done much work to show that women and females are 
active evolutionary agents. Their research highlights the ways in which women and females are 
objects of selection. From who a female chooses to mate with, to how she mothers her children, 
to how or whether she can acquire resources and protection, she can do so in ways that affect her 
reproductive success relative to other female conspecifics. As such, FEP scholars bring to light 






FEP history reaches back to the 1990s beginning with discussions about integrating feminism 
with evolutionary psychology, and follows these discussions until the establishment of the 
Feminist Evolutionary Psychology Society (FEPS), a subdiscipline in EP. There are, broadly, 
two feminist aims in FEP scholarship. These are (1) to study how females and women are active 
evolutionary agents; (2) to study women from an evolutionary perspective in order to (i) better 
understand women and women's issues, and (ii) offer solutions to these issues. I reported that 
these aims are meant to be feminist as they counter male bias in EP that privileges the study of 
how males contribute to evolution, and provide a richer understanding of women as a way to 
contribute to gender equality and the bettering of women's lives. As I discussed, these feminist 
projects inform much FEP theory (though FEP also retains much theory from EP, especially the 
BTP paradigm). FEP scholars have developed theories about the active role women play in 
evolution, for instance, theories about the adaptive importance of human mothering, women’s 
aggression and competition, and women’s mating efforts and choices of mates.  
On the face of it, FEP's emergence as a subdiscipline seems paradoxical. Feminism and 
evolutionary psychology have historically been at odds with one another, with feminists taking 
issue with poorly supported and harmful conclusions evolutionary psychologists make about 
humans, and evolutionary psychologists often being up in arms about feminists bringing their 
"ideology" into science. It is curious indeed, then, to see a branch of evolutionary psychology 
emerge that has explicit political aims—political aims that seem contrary to the political 
messages typically associated with EP. Looking closer, however, as I will do in Chapter 6, 
reveals this paradox to be only surface level. By applying the social-dimensional approach to 
FEP, an approach to science assessment I develop in the next chapter, I demonstrate how 
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harmful values are embedded in many FEP theories and assumptions. I will also discuss the 




























In this chapter, I develop the methodology I need to conduct a feminist philosophy of science 
assessment of feminist evolutionary psychology (FEP). Much of what is written in this chapter is 




Feminist and non-feminist philosophers of science who use their work to aid science in 
developing and conducting epistemically rigorous research that is sensitive to the ethical and 
political needs of local and/or global publics are those who are said to do "socially relevant 
philosophy of science" (Fehr and Plaisance 2010, 302). There has been much discussion 
regarding the benefits of this kind of work (see especially essays in Synthese 177(3); Douglas 
2009; Katikireddi and Valles 2015; Kourany 2003; 2010; Longino 2002; 2013; Tuana 2013). 
These discussions have pointed out that philosophers of science are opportunely situated within 
scientific discourse to offer valuable criticisms of and guidance in the production of scientific 
knowledge so as to promote socially responsible science. This benefits society as rigorous, 
ethically and socially-focused science is a valuable social good (Fehr and Plaisance 2010; 
Kourany 2010; Tuana 2010; 2013). It has benefits for science because philosophical methods and 
insight are well-suited to tackle the metascientific issues scientists often don't have the means or 
time to address (Reiss 2010; Shrader-Frechette 2010; Tuana 2010; 2013). It also benefits the 
philosophy of science; because science is a social process, philosophers gain a broader 
understanding of science when they know in more detail about its social dimensions (Gannett 
2010; Kourany 2003; 2010; Richardson 2010). Moreover, because philosophers of science are 
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also contributing to science as a social good when they do socially relevant philosophy of 
science, they also promote the philosophy of science as socially valuable (e.g., Shrader-Frechette 
2010). Because of these benefits there has been concerted effort on the part of especially social 
epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science to encourage philosophers of science to pay 
closer attention to how science is a social process that's historically situated and value-laden. 
This chapter contributes to this effort. However, rather than focusing on the epistemological and 
social benefits that come from the practice of socially relevant philosophy of science, I also 
emphasize the harms philosophers of science risk when they neglect recognizing or engaging 
with the social nature of the sciences they discuss. I argue that philosophers of science have an 
obligation to recognize and engage with the social nature of the sciences they assess if those 
sciences are morally relevant. Morally-relevant science is science that has the potential to risk 
harm to humans, non-humans, or the environment.7 Throughout this chapter, I develop an 
approach to science criticism that has recognition of and concern for the social dimensions of 
science built into it. I offer this approach as a way for philosophers who engage with morally 
relevant science to avoid the harms I discuss.  
My argument and the approach I develop are informed by an analysis of the philosophy 
of biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution 
of human psychology and behaviour. From the philosophy of biology literature, I tease out two 
different methods of scientific critique. The first I call the “truth-detectional” approach. Those 
                                                          
7 Because the normative thrust of my argument imposes obligations on philosophers of science for how they ought 
to conduct their research, I limit the scope of my argument to morally-relevant science. When harm is at issue, the 




who take this approach are first and foremost concerned about the truth of EP claims as that truth 
can be determined by evidence. The second I call the “social-dimensional” approach. Those who 
take this approach talk about the production and truth of EP claims but within a social 
framework. On this account, the legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of EP claims are not 
separate from the institutional and social processes and values that lend to their production. I 
show that the truth-detectional approach risks harms to society and to the philosophy of science, 
but that the social-dimensional approach avoids these harms. Tallying up the points against the 
truth-detectional approach, I conclude that philosophers ought to abandon approaches like truth-
detectionism especially in their assessments of science that risks harm, that is, morally relevant 
science. I therefore commit to using the social-dimensional approach for the assessment of FEP. 
 
3.2 The Truth-Dectectional Approach 
 
In this section, I will outline an approach to EP criticism that I call the "truth-detectional 
approach." In the particular philosophical works I focus on, evolutionary psychologists are 
criticized for (1) conducting substandard evolutionary research, (2) harbouring problematic 
epistemic values, and (3) conducting research with pernicious social implications. As I will 
discuss, what ties these three categories of critique together is a principal concern about the truth 
of EP claims as that truth can be ascertained by the evidence evolutionary psychologists can and 
do offer. When philosophers raise truth-detectionist concerns, they are raising doubts about the 
objectivity of EP and so attempt to invalidate the knowledge claims evolutionary psychologists 
make. Directly below, I provide a brief outline of these criticisms as they have been put forward 
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by David Buller (2005), Robert Richardson (2007), and Stephen Jay Gould (1997a and b).8 
Following this I offer a more thoroughgoing characterization of the truth-detectional approach. 
  
3.2.1 Substandard Evolutionary Research: Problems with Theory, Methods, and Data Analyses 
in EP 
  
Theory. Buller (2005), Richardson (2007), and Gould (1997a; 1997b) have dedicated much 
discussion to the problematic or wrongful application of evolutionary theory in EP. In particular, 
these scholars take issue with the tendency among evolutionary psychologists to overemphasize 
natural selection as an explanation for specific human behaviours—a tendency often referred to 
as "adaptationism" (Gould and Lewontin 1979). Buller, Richardson, and Gould's criticisms of 
adaptationism are aimed mainly at the various hypotheses in EP that are grounded in the 
“massive modularity thesis,” a theory considered by many evolutionary psychologists to be 
foundational to EP (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1995; Buss 2008; Shackelford and 
Liddle 2014). According to this thesis, much of human behaviour is under the influence of highly 
specified organ-like modules in the mind. These modules, we are told, were shaped by natural 
selection during the Pleistocene when humans were faced with strenuous survival and 
reproductive challenges. Evolutionary psychologists who adopt the massive modularity thesis 
advance that, because mind modules are genetically based (and so are heritable), natural 
                                                          
8 Despite Gould not being a philosopher by profession, I think these particular works of his are ideal for my analysis. 
Gould's criticisms of EP are nothing short of philosophical and they are familiar works in philosophy of biology. 
What's more, Gould has taken a more social-dimensional approach in other works (e.g., Gould 1996). This 
demonstrates nicely that the two approaches I discuss in this paper are methods and need not be identified with a 
particular philosopher's whole corpus of work.  
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selection could favour some modules and, therefore, some behaviours, over others (Buller 2005; 
Richardson 2007). As such, they offer an account for how behaviours can be adaptations. 
 Putting aside the neuroscientific plausibility that the mind can be explained in terms of 
"modules" (but for criticisms see Buller 2005; Sterelny 1995; 2012), Buller, Richardson, and 
Gould think the privileging of adaptation explanations for human behaviour (as is entailed by the 
massive modularity thesis) is too narrow. For one, it neglects the competing, and quite 
successful, explanations of behaviour that have come out of the social sciences. Many of the 
behaviours evolutionary psychologists posit to be adaptations have also been explained in terms 
of developmental and social causes—causes that cannot always be traced back to the adaptive 
environment in the Pleistocene. Second, undue focus on adaptation explanations blocks research 
into other mechanisms of evolution. Gould (1997b), for example, stresses the importance of 
“spandrels.” A spandrel is a “byproduct” of natural selection, a trait whose current usefulness is 
not the direct result of natural selection (1). For instance, reading and writing are useful 
behaviours, but one cannot say that the neurological machinery necessary to execute them 
evolved specifically for them. Gould suggests that many of the behaviours evolutionary 
psychologists conceptualize as adaptations might in fact be spandrels.  
 Methods. Buller, Richardson, and Gould also take issue with the kinds of methodology 
many evolutionary psychologists employ to test their hypotheses. In particular, they 
problematize uses of comparative approaches and evolutionary functional analysis, also known 
as "reverse engineering."9 Considering uses of comparative approaches in EP, evolutionary 
psychologists are most interested in studying the kinds of behaviours that are uniquely human, 
                                                          
9 Reverse engineering is when an evolutionary psychologist "attempts to reconstruct the mind's design from an 
analysis of the problems the mind must have evolved to solve" (Buller 2005, 92). 
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behaviours that are not expressed by most species that are considered for comparisons. This, of 
course, limits whatever inferences evolutionary psychologists can draw from behavioural 
comparisons. Nevertheless, as Buller and Richardson point out, many evolutionary psychologists 
are incautious with regard to the certainty they claim from their comparative work and can be 
overly liberal concerning the species they choose (e.g., Thornhill and Palmer 2001 draw on data 
from scorpion flies to support their conclusions about human rape).  
 Looking at reverse engineering in EP, Richardson (2007) reminds us that "adaptive 
processes and their results do not correspond one-to-one" (59). For instance, just because the 
Archaeopteryx (a bird-like dinosaur) had feathers and bird-like feet, it does not mean that those 
feathers were needed for flying, or the feet needed to perch in trees. Because of this, Richardson 
explains it is important that reverse engineering explanations of adaptation be "supplemented and 
augmented in a variety of ways," including being provisioned with independent evidence and 
evidence that is directly historical (52).10 These extra evidential steps, however, are often ignored 
by evolutionary psychologists.    
 Data Analysis. Buller, Richardson, and Gould also criticize evolutionary psychologists 
for their problematic interpretations of data. They discuss instances where they have found 
evolutionary psychologists to fail to report relevant complications or contradictions in their data 
(e.g., Buller 2005, 228-252, 370-410), and overgeneralize their conclusions (e.g., Buller 2005, 
210-228; Richardson 2007, 174-183).  
 
                                                          
10 Historical evidence in the context of EP would require information about "the sort of environmental 'problem' 
[human] cognitive mechanisms are responding to, the phenotypic and genotypic variation present, the structure of 
the relevant social groups, the gene flow between them, and other population parameters" (Richardson 2007, 84).  
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3.2.2 Problems with Epistemic Values 
 
Epistemic or cognitive values are those values in a science that are thought to be truth conducive. 
Ultimately, epistemic values are supposed to provide objective grounds for theory choice 
(Longino 1996). Buller and Gould point out ways that epistemic values in EP fail to be truth 
conducive.   
 Gould criticizes evolutionary psychologists' overly simplistic understanding of 
evolutionary theory. A simple theory, defined in ontological terms, is one that posits few causal 
entities or processes (Baker 2013; Longino 1996). Simplicity has been considered to be 
epistemically valuable for a priori reasons (e.g., intrinsic rational value), naturalistic reasons 
(e.g., complex theories depend too much on ad hoc explanations to deal with anomalies), and 
reasons pertaining to probability and statistics (e.g., simpler laws have greater prior probability) 
(Baker 2013). Gould (1997a) criticizes evolutionary psychologists for holding an overly 
simplistic account of evolution: adaptationism. According to Gould, underlying adaptationism is 
the "dream" that an "enormously complex and various world" can be underpinned by a single 
mechanism: evolution by natural selection (3). He says this "dogmatism" hurts evolutionary 
research since it "threatens to compromise the true complexity, subtlety (and beauty) of 
evolutionary theory and the explanation of life’s history" (5). 
 Buller (2005) discusses problems with a second epistemic value in EP work, an 
explanatory value he thinks evolutionary psychologists overemphasize: design. Specifically, 
Buller argues that the value many evolutionary psychologists place on discovering and 
explaining design in organisms is outdated. On this he cites Peter Godfrey-Smith (1999) who 
refers to the emphasis on adaptation in EP as a "theoretical vestige" of natural theology's 
argument from design. The argument from design was originally put forward in the early 1800s 
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by William Paley who proposed nature to have a creator since it has design (as cited in Buller 
2005, 472). To Godfrey-Smith (1999), both Paley's natural theology and adaptationism wrongly 
accord the problem of design a central status in our investigations of organisms. But, as Buller 
adds, "There is nothing in the nature of things that mandates that we should explain complex 
design as being more important than,” for example, nonadaptive evolution, extinction, or 
organismic diversity. Interests in these others have advanced evolutionary theory and are crucial 
for the study of life (475). An over-valuing of design, then, according to Buller, limits what 
evolutionary psychologists can learn about the nature of organisms. 
 
3.2.3 Pernicious Social Implications 
 
Gould and Richardson dedicate some discussion to the pernicious social implications that are 
associated with some EP claims. In different ways, both theorists suggest to their readers that the 
many harmful claims in EP can be dismissed since they are not backed by appropriate evidence. 
In his discussion, Richardson brings up Philip Kitcher's (1985) normative point that "when the 
negative consequences of accepting some conclusion are great, and the conclusion is itself 
uncertain, then we should demand higher standards of evidence before we embrace it" 
(Richardson 2007, 34). Taking this seriously, Richardson argues that, given the social costs of so 
many EP claims, 11 EP should at the very least be held to the same standards as non-human 
animal evolutionary biology.  He goes on to conclude that given these appropriate standards, 
most EP claims will be found to be unsupportable, and so too their pernicious implications.  
                                                          
11 On this he mentions Thornhill and Palmer's (2001) theory of rape and how some see it to justify rape and “give 
support to rapists” (36). 
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 Gould (1997b) also notes a potential for social harm if some EP hypotheses are accepted. 
And like Richardson, he appeals to the scientific inadequacy of EP to reassure that such harms 
are an unlikely threat: 
If evolutionary psychologists continue to push [their program] as a central 
dogma, they will eventually suffer the fate of the Freudians, who also had some 
good insights but failed spectacularly, and with serious harm imposed upon 
millions of people (women, for example, who were labeled as 'frigid' when they 
couldn’t make an impossible physiological transition from clitoral to vaginal 
orgasm), because they elevated a limited guide into a rigid creed that became 
more of an untestable and unchangeable religion than a science. (6)  
Thus Richardson and Gould's concerns about harmful claims in EP hinge on a concern about the 
evidential status of such claims. Although Richardson acknowledges that non-truth-relevant 
factors (such as a concern about harm) should inform our standards for accepting EP hypotheses, 
he nonetheless maintains that evidence and its connection to truth should have the final say. 
Accordingly, this would mean that regardless of how pernicious an EP claim might be, we are 
required to accept it if the evidence provided passes our (albeit heightened) standards. Gould 
(1997a), as well, is counting on the empirical inadequacy of EP for the rejection of its pernicious 
claims. Like the Freudians, he says, evolutionary psychologists are pushing theories that are 
harmful but also “untestable” and “rigid” and so will likely fail (6). 
 In sum, analysis of specific works by Richardson, Buller, and Gould yields a critical 
approach to EP that I call the truth-detectional approach to science criticism. In these works, EP 
researchers are criticized for their (1) substandard scientific work with evolutionary theory, 
methods, and data analyses, (2) problematic epistemic values, and (3) pernicious social 
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implications. What ties these three categories of critique together is a concern about the truth of 
EP claims as it can be ascertained by the evidence evolutionary psychologists can and do offer. 
In these specific works, Gould, Richardson, and Buller are concerned about substandard theory, 
methods, and data interpretations in EP because issues in these domains compromise the 
evidence evolutionary psychologists offer. They are concerned about problematic epistemic 
values because they guide EP research in ways that compromise its potential for objectivity. 
Even their criticisms of the pernicious social implications in EP center on truth. As I showed, 
both Richardson and Gould dismiss the pernicious claims in EP, anticipating that such claims are 
largely not adequately supported by evidence.  
 
3.3 The Social-Dimensional Approach  
 
When philosophers recognize the social nature of science and assess scientific theories, methods, 
knowledge claims, etc. as part of a framework of social processes and values, they are engaging 
in what I call the social-dimensional approach to science criticism. In this section I outline 
criticisms of EP by John Dupré (2001; 2012), Letitia Meynell (2012), and Cheryl Brown Travis 
(2003a) who, in these specific works, take a social-dimensional approach. I highlight three social 
dimensions of EP research that these critics take into consideration in their assessments of EP: 
social values, dissemination, and social implications.  
 
3.3.1 Social Values 
 
In their critiques, Dupré, Meynell, and Travis take seriously the social values that motivate and 
guide much EP research. Social values as I mean them in this paper are values that reflect what is 
deemed socially important (e.g., economic welfare, power, equality). They may or may not be 
truth conducing. Taking from Dupré, Meynell, and Travis's discussions, uncovering social values 
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in science, and learning about the various roles they play throughout the scientific process, is 
important for at least three reasons. First, uncovering guiding social values can help explicate 
why a scientist or community of scientists might be conducting science in the ways that they are. 
Second, understanding the values in a science can help explain why a given research program 
might be attractive to others—if those values are widely shared for instance. Third, talking in-
depth about how values in a science can lead to harmful social consequences can help show why 
that science is not valuable to society and so should be ignored. The two social values I will be 
discussing from Dupré, Meynell, and Travis's discussions I call "Social Order" and "Authority." 
In this section, I define these values and discuss the ways in which they have been said to 
motivate EP research, which is the first reason, listed above, for why uncovering social values in 
science is important. I will address the second and third reasons respectively in sections 3.3.2 and 
3.3.3. 
 Social Order. To value Social Order is to value an organization of people into social roles 
that are conducive to a certain end state of society. One can have progressive values of Social 
Order such that the social roles you advocate for are conducive to an egalitarian end state. 
However, one can also have non-progressive or harmful values of Social Order if the social roles 
you advocate for promote an end state of society in which certain groups of persons are 
oppressed or otherwise systematically mistreated (e.g., racial or class hierarchies, patriarchy). 
Problems with Social Order in EP are indicated in Dupré, Meynell, and Travis's discussions 
about essentialism and biological determinism. Here these critics lay out the ways in which EP 
research harbours harmful values of Social Order when they define, reify, and ground the 
differences between social categories in biological causes. 
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 To be essentialist about human categories (e.g., sex, class) is to assume that there are sets 
of necessary and sufficient conditions that must obtain for individuals to count as members of 
some category or another (Grosz 1994). Dupré, Meynell, and Travis discuss ways in which EP 
hypotheses are embedded with essentialist assumption about sex (but also class as I will talk 
about later). Evolutionary psychologists often cast human sexes as starkly dichotomous 
categories that have been shaped by natural selection. Men, we are told, have particular physical, 
mental, and behavioural characteristics that correspond non-arbitrarily to the specific problems 
they needed to solved in their evolutionary past. Because they needed to compete against one 
another for access to women, they evolved adaptations that make them fierce competitors: 
strength, leadership, selfishness, sexual prowess, promiscuity, desire for power. Women, as well, 
have characteristic behaviours, psychologies, and behavioural tendencies that map onto the 
adaptive problems they needed to solve, many of which were different from the problems men 
faced. Because women needed to raise offspring and land a mate to help raise those offspring, 
they evolved adaptive traits that make them good caretakers, choosy about their mates, and able 
to retain a male mate for long enough to raise offspring: sociability, empathy, emotionality, 
sexual coyness. Not coincidentally, this kind of essentialism about sex is conducive to a Social 
Order that requires men to be the leaders and breadwinners in society and women the caretakers. 
Essentialism allows for the categories of "men" and "women" to be characteristically different 
(e.g., men are leaders, women are caretakers) and separate (e.g., it is difficult for men to caretake 
and difficult for women to lead). Evidence that essentialism about sex in EP is motivated by a 
valuing of Social Order, and not the result of impartial observations of society, is put nicely by 
Meynell who explains that essentialism in EP can only be maintained by "willful ignorance" 
(2012, 21). She says,  
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Although it is clear that behavior is variable and that [sex] dimorphism, when found, is 
typically moderate, [EP] must sideline variance in such a way as to mask the similarities 
between the sexes and the variety within the sexes. (21)     
 
 Issues surrounding essentialism about human categories are often closely linked with 
discussions about biological determinism. Biological determinism is a mode of explanation of 
causation that assigns biological factors primacy or, in some cases, totality over the causal space 
of a given characteristic. For example, a biologically deterministic view of mothering sees 
mothering first and foremost as a biological or "natural" inclination of women (Birke 1986, 13). 
Two important assumptions that often accompany biological determinism are the views that 
traits which are biologically determined are immutable (or at least very hard to change) and/or 
are desirable (Birke 1986). Along these lines, Dupré, Meynell, and Travis point out the ways in 
which many evolutionary psychologists root the essential characteristics of sex, and other 
categories in biological (evolutionary) causes. Such a move inevitably, either implicitly or 
explicitly, acts to ground the alleged characteristics of the social category as inherent to that 
category, making them seem permanent and expected. In her discussions about the tendency 
among many evolutionary psychologists to root gender stereotypes and differences in 
evolutionary causes, Travis (2003a) points out how such a tendency is a symptom of a desire to 
uphold social orderliness. She says, 
Western, occidental views of sex and sexuality are built around categorical 
dichotomies, where the creation and celebration of sex differences are understood 
to be crucial to social order. One gains the impression from this dichotomous 
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view that society would pretty nearly collapse without the oderliness derived 
from these differences. (10)    
Thus, biological determinism picks up where essentialism leaves off in regards to supporting a 
harmful Social Order. Where essentialism establishes the existence of social hierarchies across 
categories, and norms of membership within categories, biological determinism naturalizes the 
existence and justifies the persistence of these categories.    
 One reason that understanding the social motivations (i.e., Social Order) underlying 
essentialist assumptions in EP is important, according to Meynell, Dupré, and Travis, is because 
it sheds light on why evolutionary psychologists hold onto them despite criticism and 
contradictory evidence. As I will discuss in more detail, this draws an important point against the 
truth-detectional approach. If values are motivating a certain pattern of mistakes in a program, 
then it is crucial that these values be addressed because this means they are in part a cause of 
those mistakes. Attacking particular theories on account of their evidence is only part of the job 
if the researchers behind the theories have values that will continue to influence future research. 
  
 Authority. To value Authority is to value one’s own or one’s group’s positions as 
positions of far-reaching epistemic influence. The scope of one’s influence, however, ought to be 
bounded by one’s resources (tools, data, methods, theory, etc.), expertise, knowledge, and 
professional/social position. Problems can arise if one either underestimates (wimpiness, unused 
expertise) or over estimates (imperialism, false confidence) the scope of their influence. 
Problems with Authority in EP are indicated in Dupré's (2012) concerns about monism. He 
explains, one way evolutionary psychologists illegitimately garner epistemic authority for their 
theories is by exploiting ideas of a reductionist "scientific unity" (e.g., 2012, 35). Dupré 
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problematizes the pervasive monistic assumption in science that explanations of the different 
phenomena across scientific disciplines are organized along hierarchical levels such that 
phenomena at higher levels can be explained by reducing them to phenomena at lower levels. So, 
for example, this would be to assume that neuroscience and psychology can be unified because 
the human behaviours psychologists study can be reduced to the neurological processes that are 
the subject of neuroscience. Part and parcel with assumptions of such scientific unity is that 
explanations at the lower levels are superior—i.e., they explain more about a given 
phenomena—to higher-level explanations. According to Dupré (2012), evolutionary 
psychologists are keen to emphasize the superiority of their discipline given where in the 
hierarchy of scientific explanations they take their own explanations to occupy. For example, 
Dupré (2001; 2012) cites Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1995) doing just 
this. Propounding a version of physical reductionism, these evolutionary psychologists 
emphasize the importance of scientific explanations that appeal to the internal structural 
properties of phenomena, as opposed to explanations that highlight context and environment. 
This, of course, is meant to epitomize EP (a science of genetics and "mind modules") as a hyper-
scientific account of human behaviour, over and above the more traditional human behavioural 
disciplines that must contend with "chaotic" phenomena like culture (as cited in Dupré 2001, 73).  
    Dupré's discussion of the ideology of reductionistic scientific unity and how 
evolutionary psychologists can gain from this sheds valuable light on the ways in which 
problematic values of Authority permeate EP research. By assuming a reductionistic unity of 
science and claiming to occupy a crucial part of this unity, evolutionary psychologists enhance 
the epistemic authority of their discipline. This authority is then used to discredit other 
disciplines' theories of human behaviour (especially those disciplines that do not appeal to the 
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supremacy of endogenous causes) that they claim do not fit as tightly within the science unity 




Contrary to what many philosophers of biology might assume, EP is in fact widely received 
across public and academic contexts. While there are certainly many scholars across the 
humanities, social sciences, and biological sciences who reject much EP research, evolutionary 
psychologists are not without their allies. Evolutionary psychologists publish widely in 
prestigious journals,12 receive large grants from some of the biggest granting agencies,13 and are 
employed at the top universities in the world.  
 Dupré, Meynell, and Travis point out that the wide receipt of EP and the connections its 
scientists have are a nontrivial part of its knowledge production process. The institutional support 
evolutionary psychologists receive enables their research (e.g., through funding) but also 
promotes it if those institutional bodies are reputable, which, as I pointed out, they often are. This 
                                                          
12 Psychology journals include: Personality Processes and Individual Differences, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Interdisciplinary journals include: Human Nature, Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences. 
13 For example, one or more of the four largest EP labs in the United States (i.e., Evolutionary Psychology Lab, co-
directed by Todd A. Shackelford & Viviana A. Weeks-Shackelford; The Buss Lab, directed by David Buss; Center 
for Evolutionary Psychology, co-directed by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby; Evolution and Human Behaviour 
Laboratory, directed by Michael McCullough) have received funding for their research from, among others, the 
following major agencies: National Institute of Mental Health, National Institute of Health, National Science 
Foundation, Hogg Foundation, Gordon P. Getty Trust, John Templeton Foundation, Air Force Office of Scientific 
Research, The Fetzer Institute. 
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support in turn contributes to the dissemination and legitimization of the knowledge EP 
produces. According to Meynell (2012), this recognition from reputable institutions, especially 
prestigious journals, can act as artificially confirming the truth of EP claims. She says, EP's high 
volume of publications contributes to "an appearance of significant empirical success" (18).  
 Dupré, Meynell, and Travis connect dissemination with social values. This connection 
provides a second reason why talking about social values is important for the assessment of 
morally relevant science. They mention how EP research that is embedded with widely held 
social values (particularly those of Social Order) can make EP attractive to broad audiences. 
Research that expresses deeply held values resonates with what people already believe about 
categories of people and so makes EP seem intuitively true.    
   
3.3.3 Social Implications 
 
Meynell, Dupré, and Travis, like Gould and Richardson in their truth-detectional approach, also 
voice concern about the social implications of EP. However, their approach to discussing these 
implications differs from Gould's and Richardson's in that they connect their discussions of 
implications to social values, and talk more at length about what the implications actually are and 
why they are harmful. For instance, in connection with their discussions about social values, 
Dupré (2001; 2012) and Meynell point out some dire ethical problems that arise from essentialist 
views of sex and class. Meynell points out that typifying members of a category implies that 
there is only one general type of person in that category and therefore erases the real differences 
between members of that category. This often epitomizes a paradigmatic "normal" person for 
that category and casts others as abnormal. Dupré (2001) shows that, when sets of characteristics 
assigned to the token members of a category are pejorative relative to the assumed characteristics 
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of other categories, this acts to marginalize the entire category. For example, he points out how 
the view that men of low socioeconomic status are violent instills an unnecessary fear of them 
and contributes to their unequal treatment before the law. Travis talks about some harmful 
implications associated with biological determinism. She explains how grounding sex 
differences in biological causes provides "reassurance about the natural, and therefore rightful, 
divisions of labor," and a reassurance about a "natural basis for unequal privilege" (2003,11). 
 This richer discussion about the harmful implications of EP research, and their 
connection to values, does two things for the assessment of EP that Gould and Richardson's 
criticisms cannot. For one, it does more to demonstrate the riskiness that is associated with 
accepting pernicious EP hypotheses (a goal that, recall, is in fact important to Gould and 
Richardson). The mere one sentence that Gould (1997b) and Richardson (2007, 36) each allocate 
to describing the implications of EP might not be enough to convince their readers that the 
implications of EP do indeed make accepting certain EP hypotheses risky. As I discuss below, 
losing a reader on this aspect of one's critique is not inconsequential if the reader has in fact 
determined that rejecting the theory is what is risky. Second, and referring to the third reason 
talking about social values is important for the assessment of morally relevant science, 
discussing in more detail the harms in science does work to devalue that science as a social good. 
As a practical enterprise, science is in the business of producing knowledge that can be used for 
human ends. Within such an enterprise, knowledge that thwarts our ends is therefore less 
valuable (see Kitcher 2001 for more in-depth discussion of this point). Talking at length about 
the harms in a science gives philosophers an opportunity to talk about the pragmatic dimensions 




 In brief, the social-dimensional approach is an approach to science criticism that sees 
science, especially morally relevant science, as embedded in and so intimately affected by social 
processes and values. As such, taking this approach requires that the social dimensions of a 
science such as its social values, dissemination, and social implications be given serious 
consideration in connection with things like evidence. On this point, it bears emphasizing that the 
social-dimensional approach is not just about values, dissemination, implications or any other 
salient social dimension of science. By no means would taking the social-dimensional approach 
prohibit a philosopher from being concerned about evidence, theory, methods, or even truth. It is 
just that these latter aspects, to a social-dimensionalist, cannot be disconnected from social 
dimensions and so must be considered alongside them.  
 
3.4 The Truth-Detectional Approach and Harm 
  
In this section I discuss some of the ways using the truth-detectional approach can cause harm. 
For the purposes of this discussion, I mark a distinction between facilitating a harm and harming. 
By facilitating a harm I mean contributing in some way to a harm that has been initiated by 
someone or something else. One can contribute to a harm by adding to it (an active action) or by 
failing to try to prevent it (a passive action) when given the opportunity. For instance, consider 
the scenario of a sports team that is currently losing a game. A teammate on the losing side can 
facilitate their team losing by actively doing something like scoring in their own goal, or by 
passively not doing something like making no attempt to block scores from the other team. In 
both cases, the teammate acts in ways that help rather than hinder their team losing. Someone 
who harms, on the other hand, is an initiator of a harm. Harming, in this sense, can also be active 
or passive, but the subject must be the initiator of the potential harmful outcome. In this section I 
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consider the different ways using the truth-detectional approach can cause harm in these two 
senses. I show that because the truth-detectional approach is not equipped to address harms 
connected to science, using the approach can passively facilitate certain harms connected to 
science. I also discuss how the truth-detectional approach harms the philosophy of science in part 
because it promotes an impoverished understanding of the production of scientific knowledge. In 
contrast, the social-dimensional approach avoids these harms.  
 
3.4.1 Social Harm  
 
Two characteristics of Gould, Richardson, and Buller's approach to the criticism of EP risk 
facilitating harms to society. These characteristics are (1) a lack of  discussion about EP's harms 
and (2) an implicit assumption that a harmful hypothesis that is shown to be false will be 
rejected.  
 First, remaining silent on or talking only minimally about the harms connected to EP, 
when one is in a position to do so, can passively facilitate those harms because such silence 
protects evolutionary psychologists from having to account for the harms they cause or risk. 
Criticizing a sexist programme in EP, for instance, because its theories are weak, its experiments 
are flawed, or its conclusions are too broad, allows the sexism itself to remain in the program 
unaccounted for. A seemingly unshakable image of the scientist depicts someone who is 
impartial, or at least profoundly limited in their passions by the rigidity of the scientific method. 
This image remains supported when scientists are continually assumed to not have partiality—
especially partiality about social matters. When Gould, Richardson, and Buller dig up flaws in 
EP theory or methodology but ignore its harmful social dimensions, they lend support to the idea 
that while evolutionary psychologists can make technical mistakes, their work and actions are 
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irrelevant to or disconnected from issues of social harm. In the eyes of Gould, Richardson, and 
Buller's readers, this removes accountability on the part of EP for the harm it causes. Thinking 
about this on a larger scale, a broad application of the truth-detectional approach among science 
critics contributes more generally to the relaxing of science's accountability for harm. Less 
accountability can create a climate of incaution in science such that there is little incentive to be 
mindful of how scientific practice might effect social harms.  
 Not talking about harmful social dimensions in science passively facilitates social harms 
in another way. As I mentioned earlier, values can be embedded in scientific practice such that 
they guide the development of theories, assumptions, and methods, or guide how scientists draw 
their inferences. This idea that social values can be embedded in the prior developing conditions 
of theories, sets of assumptions, etc. reveals that they need not be specific to any one research 
instance but can carry forward to the development of subsequent theories, methods, and so on. 
For instance, if a prejudice is motivating a certain set of assumptions, critiquing that set of 
assumptions for reasons precluding the prejudice risks the next set of assumptions also being 
prejudiced. But if the prejudice is a part of the critique, like it would be in a social-dimensional 
critique, this gives scientific practitioners or institutions a chance to guard against it specifically 
in subsequent research. Philosophers of science are well situated to alert scientists to these more 
systemic kinds of harms.     
 When philosophers of science take the truth-detectional approach to their discussions 
about morally relevant science they can also passively facilitate harming their own readers.14 
When philosophers  report on socially harmful science, they share that science, its claims, values, 
assumptions, implications, and so on with their readers. This makes their readers, who might 
                                                          
14 Thank you very much to an anonymous reviewer for their insights on this discussion. 
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never read EP otherwise, vulnerable to any harmful content that might be embedded in the 
science being presented. A philosopher can passively facilitate harming their readers if they 
remain neutral about the harms they are exposing their readers to. Regardless of the philosopher's 
intentions, being neutral can give implicit support to the harms. To illustrate, consider how a 
philosopher who takes a truth-detectional  approach to an EP "mating strategies" theory could 
facilitate this type of harm.  
 Evolutionary psychologists David Buss and David Schmitt (1993) predict sexual 
dimorphism regarding human promiscuity. Drawing on the BTP paradigm, which assumes that 
because men are the lower investing sex and so are more competitive with one another for access 
to females, Buss and Schmitt make four predictions about men. They say men: 1) should express 
greater desire for, or interest in, short term mates than will women, 2) should desire larger 
numbers of sex partners than will women, 3) should be willing to engage in sexual intercourse 
after less time has elapsed than will women, and 4) should relax their mate preference standards 
in short-term mating contexts more than will women (Buss and Schmitt 2011). Someone reading 
about this theory in philosophy of science could easily pick up on any one of the theory's many 
implications: e.g., it is more natural/normal/expected for men to be promiscuous than women; 
when a man expresses romantic interest in a woman, he most likely just wants to have sex with 
her. These implications are of course harmful because they reinforce prejudicial norms and 
assumptions about men's and women's sexualities. They affirm beliefs that women are sexually 
prudish, only wanting sex when it will get them something (e.g., intimacy, protection, financial 
support, a child); they also paint men as sex-obsessed and sexually unemotional. 
 As this train of reasoning (i.e., theory – implications – cultural beliefs) reminds us, more 
can happen in the mind of a reader of science (or philosophy of science) than mere understanding 
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of linguistic phrases. Readers bring their own assumptions, experiences, and beliefs to their 
interpretations and understanding of science. This is why, as discussants of science, it is 
important for philosophers to know their readers and to seriously consider how a piece of 
knowledge might resonate with them. Certainly we can't know the minds and idiosyncrasies of 
everyone, but when there exist widespread prejudices, we can expect that many of our readers 
will either have them or will be susceptible to them given the right "information." Buss and 
Schmitt's theory counts as just this kind of information. It mimics the kind of knowledge that is 
necessary to justify the prejudices I mentioned above. Philosophers who disseminate this kind of 
information to their readers are in a privileged position. They have the option to name and try to 
mitigate the harms the information can cause, or to remain neutral. If philosophers use their 
privileged position to remain neutral, they passively facilitate the harm the information can 
cause.  
 Building on this, trying to mitigate harms in science by simply showing that the science is 
"untrue" is unlikely to be effective for a couple of reasons. First, philosophers have to assume 
that not all of their readers will be on board with their criticisms of science. When this happens 
in a context where a philosopher is presenting research with prejudicial implications, the 
philosopher succeeds at nothing other than exposing their reader to a theory that gives them 
reason (or more reason) to hold a prejudice. Second, even if a philosopher succeeds in 
persuading their reader that a certain theory is flawed, theories that speak to culturally sensitive 
subject matter could be hard for readers to reject if rejecting them seems personally risky. For 
instance, readers of philosophy that presents Buss and Schmitt's theory might wager that it is 
better to believe the theory and apply it to their own lives, despite the flaws the philosophers talk 




3.4.2 Harm to the Philosophy of Science 
 
The truth-detectional approach, as it is applied by Gould, Richardson, and Buller in the specific 
works discussed, can also harm the philosophy of science. For one, these theorists' use of the 
truth-detectional approach assumes an impoverished understanding of the production of 
scientific knowledge. This in turn leads to lower quality philosophy of science research than one 
could otherwise offer with a richer understanding of science. Much philosophical scholarship 
over the last decades has moved beyond the idea that science is asocial. Lessons from especially 
social epistemology and feminism have taught convincingly that few if any aspects of the 
scientific process are free of social dimensions like social values (Bluhm 2013a; 2013b; Douglas 
2009; Dupré 2012; Haraway 1989; Keller 1985; Kitcher 1985; Kourany 2010; Longino 1990; 
2002; 2013; Richardson 2013; Solomon 2001). For instance, because of this research, we now 
know that social values motivate what gets studied and what gets funded (Douglas 2009; 
Solomon 2001). We know social values motivate theory and method choice (Douglas 2009; 
Richardson 2013). For instance, a scientist who values career success can be motivated to choose 
their own method or theory for research. Social values guide what scientists pay attention to, 
emphasize, or deemphasize in their data (Bluhm 2013a; 2013b; Longino 2013). They are buried 
in the assumptions that traverse the gap between hypotheses and data, and so play a role in 
scientists' decisions about how well data support hypotheses (Longino 1990; 2002). Social 
values, recall from section 2.2, also influence the kind of scientific knowledge that people pay 
attention to. This can have a significant impact on theory acceptance as popular opinion can give 
the illusion of empirical success (Dupré 2001; 2012; Longino 2013; Meynell 2012). But all these 
lessons are lost when philosophers continue to take approaches to science like the truth-
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detectional approach. The truth-detectional approach assumes a direct line between evidence and 
truth. Such an assumption prevents inquiry into the ways in which social processes and values 
disrupt this line or otherwise guide the production of scientific knowledge. The truth-detectional 
approach, therefore, narrows a philosopher's focus in their assessments and so compromises the 
quality and accuracy of their assessments.  
 By simply taking the truth-detectional approach, Buller, Richardson, and Gould risk 
compromising the quality of their assessments as described above. Buller, however, risks 
additional harms to the philosophy of science when he makes a pointed effort to delegitimize 
social-dimensional critiques of science. Consider Buller's treatment of those who have taken 
issue with the political dimensions of EP. 
...as my research progressed, I became disheartened over the scarcity of reasoned 
intellectual exchange regarding evolutionary psychology. [...] it was too easy to 
find critics attacking evolutionary psychology for its ‘directly political 
dimension’ and its ‘culturally pernicious’ political claims. And, when 
evolutionary psychology wasn't being attacked on political grounds, it was easy 
to find critics dismissing evolutionary psychology for being built on a single 
‘fatal flaw.’ [...] Thus dismissing evolutionary psychology for its corrupt politics 
or being based on ‘one big mistake’ enabled critics to deflect attention from the 
evidence that evolutionary psychologists present and to avoid altogether any 
serious engagement with evolutionary psychology. (Italics original 2005, 4) 
As is clear from this excerpt, to Buller critiquing a scientist for the politically pernicious 
implications of their theory is not "reasoned intellectual exchange." This sends a clear message 
that addressing at least the political dimensions of a scientific theory is unsophisticated.     
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 This message is harmful to the philosophy of science because it delegitimizes discourses 
that are in fact very valuable to the philosophy of science. Science is social and political, and 
addressing these dimensions can shed important light on the knowledge productions processes of 
science. Moreover, saying that discourses that address political values in science are unreasoned 
suggests that only those discourses that refrain from talk of values are reasonable. But never 
talking about values in science will inevitably result in peddling the very unreasonable notion 
that science is value free. 
 The message from Buller's excerpt is also unduly harmful to feminist philosophers who 
have criticized EP. Indeed, the one political analysis of EP that Buller footnotes in the quote 
above is a work that is co-authored by Hilary Rose (see the Introduction in Rose and Rose 2000), 
a feminist sociologist, and is very feminist in its content. Sarah Richardson (2010) discusses the 
myriad of ways in which feminist philosophers are a marginalized group within the philosophy 
of science. She explains that feminist perspectives of science are often simplified, caricatured, 
and thought to have little philosophical import beyond their diagnoses of “bias.” Feminist critics 
of science are often villainized, she says, to have "anti-science" aims such as diminishing and 
limiting the influence of science, flat-out denying scientific findings (that don't uphold feminist 
values), and rejecting scientific values wholesale, such as objectivity, empirical verification, and 
logical reasoning (in favor of feminist ideology) (353). Buller's caricature of those who concern 
themselves with the political issues in EP contributes to this villainized image of feminist work.  
 Importantly, however, neither Buller's accusations nor those mentioned by Richardson 
(2010) are well grounded. Most feminist critiques of science aim to promote better science, not 
to get rid of it. It is true that feminists argue that there should be more feminist values in science, 
but these arguments are nuanced and take careful consideration of the ways in which science is a 
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social process and a social good. Contrary to how Buller characterizes feminist or political 
discussions about EP, feminists have provided their fair share of "serious" analysis. Over and 
above their extensive work on the specifically political dimensions of EP, feminists have also 
combed through EP studies to see how they measure up to the standards of evolutionary biology, 
have applied rigorous feminist analyses to the inappropriate assumptions evolutionary 
psychologists make, and have offered superior methods, theory, and data that evolutionary 
psychologists can and should make use of (see especially Dupré 2001; 2012; Eagly and Wood 
1999; Fausto-Sterling 2000; Fausto-Sterling, Gowaty and Zuk 1997; Gannon 2002; Lloyd 2001; 
2003;  Lloyd and Feldman 2002; Meynell 2012; Rosser 1997; Sork 1997; also see discussions in 
Fehr 2011). 
 In sum, ignoring the social dimensions of science is harmful to the philosophy of science 
because doing so promotes an epistemological approach to science that is no longer tenable and 
compromises the quality of one's philosophical assessment. Effortfully delegitimizing social-
dimensional approaches to science criticism in one's truth-detectional approach is also harmful to 
the philosophy of science because it acts to delegitimize an epistemological approach to science 




I've presented two philosophical approaches to the assessment of EP that stand as a case study 
for the assessment of morally relevant science more generally. The first approach, the truth-
dectectional approach, is hyper-focused on the evidence provided by a science and how that 
evidence supports the truth claims of that science. The second approach, the social-dimensional 
approach, also considers the production and quality of a science's evidence but does so within a 
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framework of social processes and values. I pointed out that the truth-detectional approach is 
socially harmful since it ignores or cannot adequately address those dimensions of science that 
cause harm and so is unintentionally complicit with them. I also showed how the truth-
detectional approach harms the philosophy of science because it assumes an epistemological 
approach to science that is no longer tenable and compromises the quality of one's philosophical 
assessment. The social-dimensional approach, in contrast, does not risk harms to society because 
it exposes and mitigates social harms embedded in science. Nor does it harm the philosophy of 
science because it engages a rich epistemological approach to science. I conclude, then, that the 
truth-detectional approach should be abandoned in favour of a social-dimensional approach for 
the assessment of morally relevant science. To avoid the pitfalls of the truth-detectional 
approach, philosophers of science ought to engage with and emulate the philosophical literature 
that sheds light on and emphasizes the importance of the various ways science is a social process 
and value-laden (for additional resources see, Brigandt 2015; Brown 2013; Hankinson Nelson 
and Nelson 1996; Kincaid et al. 2013; Longino 1990; Machamer and Wolters 2004; Solomon 
2001).  
 I therefore commit to using the social-dimensional approach for my assessment of FEP. 
FEP is a morally relevant science that makes claims about women that could cause them harm. 
For instance, because FEP is a science that studies the “nature of women” (Fisher et al. 2013), 
many FEP scholars make claims about what women are like generally. But given that there are 
over three billion women in the world, living in a wide range of contexts, it is very difficult to 
make claims about women generally, and FEP scholars risk creating or perpetuating false 
stereotypes about women if their research is inaccurate. What is more, FEP scholars also risk 
causing harm to women who do not fit the “women-in-general” image FEP creates. These 
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women could be made to feel, or others could come to treat them as not “real” women. I revisit 
these concerns in a later chapter. In the next two chapters, Chapters 4 and 5, I apply use the 
social-dimensional approach to assess FEP theoretical foundations and data practices, 
respectively. I point out weaknesses regarding FEP’s use of the BTP paradigm in Chapter 4, and 
show how FEP scholars too frequently offer the wrong data or not enough of the right kinds of 
data to support their adaptationist hypotheses. In both chapters I give recommendations for how 
FEP scholars can address the concerns I raise. In Chapter 6, I apply the social-dimensional 
approach to FEP to assess its values and social impact. I find evidence of values of Authority and 
Social-Order in FEP that are harmful in ways similar to the concerns I mention above. I offer 
recommendations for how FEP scholars can address my worries about their values.  
  






















Chapter 4  




As the last chapter highlighted, evolutionary psychology (EP) has been criticized over the last 
decades by philosophers, scientists, and other scientifically concerned scholars for its 
substandard evolutionary science. Because feminist evolutionary psychologists still conduct their 
research broadly within the disciplinary framework of EP, their epistemic practices (e.g., 
theories, assumptions, data practices) may be flawed in similar ways that EP practices are. Over 
the next two chapters I assess FEP to see if this is the case and analyze the adequacy of FEP 
theory and data. I explore philosophical and scientific critique of EP theory and apply the themes 
from these critiques to FEP.  
 In this chapter, I focus on specific problems with the theoretical paradigm FEP scholars 
lean on to explain the behaviours they study, the Bateman-Trivers-Parker paradigm (the BTP 
paradigm) that I outlined in Chapter 2. Like other evolutionary psychologists, FEP scholars 
borrow heavily from this theoretical platform to initiate inquiry regarding and to explain sex 
differences in human behaviour. In recent decades, however, critics have pointed out serious 
problems with this paradigm. I explore three of the major criticisms from this literature in this 
chapter and discuss their relevance to FEP research.   
 To readdress the problems with the BTP paradigm that I outline throughout the chapter, I 
offer alternative theoretical platforms FEP scholars could explore. These platforms provide 
compelling evolutionary models for studying the kinds of human behaviours FEP scholars are 
interested in but are not limited in the same ways that the BTP paradigm is. For instance, unlike 
the BTP paradigm, which is restricted to explaining behaviour in terms of highly specific 
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adaptations, these models are designed to take into account a multiplicity of causal factors. This 
wider scope would help FEP scholars anticipate and make sense of, especially, human variation, 
including within-sex variation, variation across temporalities, environments, development, and 
individuals. The study of human behaviour is messy due to the ubiquity of variation. FEP 
research ought to be appropriately equipped for the task.          
 
4.2 Problems with the BTP-paradigm 
 
Recall from Chapter 2, the "Bateman Trivers Parker paradigm" (or BTP paradigm) that 
evolutionary psychologists often rely on to explain human sex differences. According to this 
paradigm, as laid I laid out on p. 23: 
(a) females are the higher investing sex because of the cost of their gametes, (b) males are 
generally more eager to mate and more indiscriminate than females, (c) male 
reproductive success is more variable than that of females, (d) males gain more in 
reproductive success from repeated matings than do females, (e) these differences in 
males and females will lead to sexual conflict (adaptations/counteradaptations). (a – d 
from Dewsbury 2005, 831)  
 
In this section, I discuss criticisms that have been levelled against this paradigm and how some 
of these criticisms are relevant to FEP scholarship. As I will discuss more in the conclusion, 
there are ready alternatives to the BTP paradigm that are far more appropriate for FEP. These 
alternatives are not vulnerable to the criticisms I discuss in this chapter.    
 A first major issue with the BTP paradigm is that its supposedly universal generalizations 
about male and female mating behaviour are too often wrong. Many scholars have come forward 
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with evidence from species across the animal kingdom that contradict or complicate BTP 
descriptions of males and females. For instance, Ah-King and Gowaty (2015) report data from 
over 100 sexually reproducing species that suggest few to none of the species studied express the 
sex-typical, and presumably genetically determined, patterns of mating behaviour that the BTP 
paradigm describes. According to this data set, the sexes in the species examined appear to 
change their mating strategies depending on ecological or social demands. Thus, while males and 
females may sometimes appear to conform to the paradigm’s assumed patterns, such conformity 
is superficial. Males and females may “swap” strategies or modify them in response to 
environmental demands.  
Along similar lines, other scholars have offered reviews of wide varieties of species to 
see if male and female mating strategies corroborate, specifically, Trivers’s parental investment 
theory. These scholars present much data on male and female behaviour that is contentious or 
inconclusive with regard to predictions based on Trivers’s theory (Alonzo 2009; Kempenaers 
and Sheldon 1997; Sheldon 2002). For instance, Suzanne Alonzo (2009) reviewed 62 studies 
across 46 different species that addressed Trivers's prediction that males should decrease paternal 
care in response to paternity uncertainty. This prediction is based on the assumption that, because 
it is not in a male’s interest to care for young, males should be especially careful to only care for 
those young that are in fact theirs, if and when they do care for young. Hence, when a male is 
uncertain that certain young are his, then he should invest less in those young.  Alonzo, however, 
found that less than half of the 62 studies found support for this prediction whereas the majority 
found no significant effect of paternity uncertainty on paternal behaviour. Alonzo also reviewed 
206 articles that tested the BTP prediction that females should choose mates with traits that 
indicate "the expected quality of male care" (101). Across these studies as well, only in 14 out of 
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the 27 species surveyed did females demonstrate a preference for males with traits that indicate 
paternal care. In the other 13 species, paternal care indicator traits were either negatively 
correlated with female choice or there was no relationship between the two. Data such as that 
presented by Alonzo and Gowaty and colleagues suggest the BTP paradigm should by no means 
play an a priori role in our reasoning about the natures of males and females (Alonzo 2009). The 
evidence suggests that BTP descriptions of male and female behaviours infrequently and only 
inconsistently obtain across and/or within species. 
 As a second criticism, some scholars have pointed out that strongly held BTP 
assumptions limit the scope of sexual strategies research. Critics in this domain argue that the 
BTP paradigm constrains the kinds of research questions that can be asked, and how 
observations can be interpreted. Regarding research questions, Ah-King and Gowaty (2015) note 
how leading up to the 1980s, most researchers of mating strategies simply wouldn’t even explore 
questions that challenged BTP assumptions. Ah-King and Gowaty point out how loyalty to the 
BTP paradigm retarded for a long time consideration of, especially, “multiple mating in females, 
sources of variation in female reproductive success, the cost of sperm production, male mate 
choice and sexual selection in females at large" (219). Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (1988), in her critiques 
of BTP assumptions, argues something similar. She notes how BTP assumptions about females 
led researchers to overlook the different ways females competed with one another. The BTP 
paradigm assumes that it is predominantly males who compete over mating and resources. But 
loyalty to this assumption led researchers to neglect studying the many and important ways in 
which females also gain fitness benefits through within-sex competitions (e.g., competition over 
mates, number of mates, resources, social status).  
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Regarding interpretations of observations, Tang-Martinez and Rider (2005) suggest that 
an over-reliance on the BTP-paradigm has compromised how many researchers are able to 
"interpret reality with regards to male and female sexual behaviour" (822). They explain how 
unchecked acceptance of the BTP paradigm has led researchers to “ignore,” “disregard,” or 
“misinterpret” findings about male and female mating behaviours that are contrary to BTP 
expectations. Tang-Martinez and Rider report that some areas of research had difficulty being 
taken seriously by mainstream evolutionary biologists because findings within them contradicted 
BTP assumptions. These areas included studies about the costs of sperm production, the 
importance of male mate choice, and the ubiquity and importance of female activity in soliciting 
sexual encounters. On male mate choice, for instance, they report how because the BTP 
assumption that sperm production is unlimited was so widely accepted, “pioneering papers 
emphasizing the potential importance of male mate choice… were largely ignored” (824). They 
note a similar issue surrounding early studies that noted females to be sexually assertive, to 
actively seek multiple copulations, or to routinely mate with more than one male. These studies 
were often disregarded or misinterpreted. On this Tang-Martinez and Rider say, 
The stereotype of sexually restrained, highly discriminating females did not provide a 
theoretical framework that could make sense of these reports unless males were forcing 
unwilling females to mate. A common assumption was that EPCs [(extra-pair 
copulations)] were initiated by males intruding into neighboring territories and that 
females passively and reluctantly acquiesced to males’ sexual advances. EPCs…were 
regarded as male reproductive strategies that were probably detrimental to females. (825) 
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Sarah Blaffer Hrdy recounts her own difficulties interpreting observations of female 
solicitations. Early in her career Hrdy was studying langurs and noticed how some females 
would actively solicit males who were not “harem leaders.” She says,  
At the time, I had no context for interpreting behaviour that merely seemed strange and 
incomprehensible to my Harvard-trained eyes. Only in time, did I come to realize that 
such wandering and such seemingly ‘wanton’ behavior were recurring events in the lives 
of langurs. (1988, 126) 
 A third problem with the BTP paradigm is that heavy reliance on it leads researchers to 
neglect the role that environment and sociality play in shaping behaviour. Beginning with 
Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979), evolutionary scholars have taken issue with 
how the paradigm downplays the importance of individual flexibility and variation (see Buller 
2005; Dupré 2001; Emlen and Oring 1977; Fausto-Sterling et al. 1997; Kitcher 1985; Lloyd 
1999; 2003; Richardson 2007). Individual flexibility and variation are necessary for a species' 
survival and propagation in ever-changing social and environmental conditions. Thus selection 
must favor individuals who can adaptively respond to a variety of environmental challenges. The 
BTP paradigm is poorly suited to deal with individual flexibility and variation – particularly 
within-sex variation. Its focus on genetically determined, sex-specific adaptations, a focus, recall, 
that is referred to as “adaptationism” by BTP critics, provides only a highly generalized and rigid 
perspective of sexual strategies (Gould and Lewontin 1979). Questions about the ways in which 
organisms navigate and respond to their social and ecological environments are largely beyond 
the scope of the BTP paradigm. Critics in this area have noted that EP research, especially, is 
often void of any consideration of alternative non-adaptation explanations for 
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psychological/behavioural phenomena even when alternative explanations are quite obvious 
(Buller 2005; Dupré 2001; Gould 1997a; 1997b; Lloyd 1999; Richardson 2007). 
 In summary, three categories of critique of the BTP paradigm reveal (1) that its 
supposedly universal generalizations about male and female mating behaviour are often wrong, 
(2) and that depending on it can limit or distort the kinds of research questions one asks, how one 
interprets their observations, and (3) whether or how one considers other important causes of 
behaviour like environment and social factors. 
 
4.3 Problematic use of the BTP-paradigm in FEP 
 
It is surprising that, like in other areas of evolutionary psychology, many FEP scholars work 
within the BTP paradigm to study and explain human sex differences. This is surprising given 
the extent of criticism the paradigm has received. In a few ways, at least, the scholars in my FEP 
research sample who work from within the BTP paradigm, are sensitive to some of the criticisms 
of the BTP paradigm that I cited earlier. For instance, theoretical discussions by Buss and 
Schmitt (2011), Fisher (2013), and Moscovice (2013) acknowledge and emphasize the 
evolutionary importance of female intrasexual competition and strategic female promiscuity. 
Such discussion demonstrates that these FEP researchers (but also others) do not follow Bateman 
and Trivers in erroneously assuming that female reproductive success is relatively unaffected by 
number of mates or that sexual selection acts mainly on males. Nevertheless, many FEP scholars 
still rely on the BTP paradigm to an extent that compromises their research. Below I outline how 
some FEP research is vulnerable to the three criticisms I outlined earlier.  
 Regarding the first criticism, that the assumptions/descriptors regarding universal male 
and female behaviours based on the BTP paradigm are often wrong, some FEP scholars proceed 
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in their research as though said assumptions/descriptors are unquestionably true. One false 
assumption that many FEP scholars unwittingly take as fact, is the assumption that females have 
an evolved strategy to prefer males with lots of resources. Much FEP scholarship supports the 
hypothesis that because women are the higher investing sex, they should be choosey about whom 
they mate with and should specifically seek out partners who can provide resources for them and 
their offspring. Largely, this hypothesis translates into the expectation that women, by and large, 
prefer wealthier men. As was discussed earlier, however, evolutionary biologists have had a 
difficult time finding empirical support for the hypothesis that non-human females by and large 
prefer males who promise investment (Alonzo 2009; Ah-King and Gowaty 2015). Given this 
difficulty, one would assume that any researcher who wanted to extend this hypothesis to 
humans would have to do a fair amount of empirical ground work. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case in FEP. Eight of the 29 FEP articles in my research sample embrace the adequacy of this 
particular assumption without adequate empirical verification. For instance, Maryanne Fisher’s 
(2013) hypothesis regarding women’s mating strategies does just this. To describe men's and 
women's basic mating strategies, Fisher lays out the following: 
Women have faced sex-specific reproductive circumstances during evolutionary history; 
in contrast to men, women have energetically costly gametes that are comparatively few 
in number. Once fertilization occurs, it involves a substantial investment in terms of 
energy and time. Due to this differential in required reproductive effort, men's optimal 
reproductive strategy may be to seek as many matings as possible and invest little in any 
resulting children, while women's optimal strategy may be to carefully seek a mate and 
invest heavily in any children (as based on mammalian parental investment strategies as 
elaborated by Trivers, 1985). It is probable that these differences in reproductive strategy 
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have influenced methods of competition. For example, men may compete for access to 
fertile women, while women may compete for access to men with resources and who are 
willing to provide paternal care (Buss, 1989; Cashdan, 1998). (24) 
Fisher then adds to this account by discussing some EP literature that marks a distinction 
between male and female long- vs. short-term mating strategies. For women, she says, 
When seeking a brief interaction, women are thought to prefer a mate with high "gene 
quality" given that the man will presumably not invest any resources or parental care in 
any resulting children (see for example, Gangstad & Simpson, 2000). (24)  
Based on these BTP-derived theories about short-term and long-term strategies, Fisher 
hypothesizes that women should seek wealthier, higher investing men in long-term contexts and 
men with "good genes" in short-term contexts. What Fisher doesn’t do, however, is provide or 
discuss any evidence to support the possibility that women have evolved to have these 
preferences. She cites correlational data that suggests women have these preferences, but this is 
not the same as establishing a link between a preference and an evolved tendency. There are all 
kinds of reasons for human behavioural patterns—even patterns that appear to exist across 
cultures (as the Buss 1989 study that Fisher cites suggests). Simply finding robust patterns 
(granting for the moment that the patterns found in the research she cites are actually robust, but 
see Eagly and Wood 1989 for a critique) in human behaviour does not in itself prove that the 
pattern is the result of selection. More needs to be done in the way of establishing genetic 
linkage, or positive fitness outcomes associated with the behaviour (Lloyd 1999; 2002). Given 
the lack of empirical support for the BTP paradigm in relevant non-human evolutionary research 
and the lack of empirical support offered in the human research she cites, Fisher in unjustified in 
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using the BTP paradigm as a launching point for her investigations into women’s mating-related 
behaviours.  
 In their studies on men’s and women’s flirting behaviours, Frisby et al. (2011) also make 
use of the BTP assumption that females prefer mates with resources to hypothesize that women 
“are attracted to men’s resources and dominance, which are sought for personal and offspring 
protection” (685). They also hypothesize, based on the BTP assumption that, if and when males 
are choosey about mates, they will prefer physically attractive mates who appear fertile. As such 
they suggest “men are attracted to physical beauty and youth as characteristics that signal fertility 
and health, essential features for women to produce offspring.” Connecting these BTP 
assumptions with Relational Framing Theory (RTF), which holds that all human social 
interactions are interpreted by individuals in terms of affiliation and dominance, Frisby et al. 
(2011) predict that men will prefer women who appear affiliative when they flirt and women will 
prefer men who appear dominant when they flirt. They reason that affiliation in a woman should 
signal caretaking qualities, and so be attractive to men, and dominance in a man should signal 
ability to protect and to accrue resources, and so should be attractive to women. They tested 
these hypotheses by having participants rate an individual of the opposite sex’s photo before and 
after they watched a video of that same individual in a flirtatious encounter. Participants rated the 
individuals in the videos according to whether they thought the individual was physically 
attractive, socially attractive, dominant, affiliative, flirting for fun, flirting for sexual purposes, 
flirting to explore a relationship, flirting for self-esteem enhancing purposes, was 
conversationally effective.  
 They found that men’s physical attraction for a woman in a photo increased if they 
perceived the woman to be affiliative when she flirted in the video. However, they found no 
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relationship between women’s perceptions of men’s physical attraction and how dominant they 
thought their flirting was. Thus, the expectation that women are attracted to dominant men 
because they can protect and provide resources is undermined. Curiously, however, when they 
later bring up another finding from their study that suggests the women participants are least 
attracted to men who they perceive to be flirting just for fun, they say the following: 
when men’s flirtatious behavior was motivated by fun, women’s perceptions of their 
physical attractiveness decreased in comparison to initial evaluations of the men’s 
physical attractiveness. According to [parental investment theory], women are most 
attracted to potential mates who have resources they can, and will, invest in partner and 
offspring protection. Men who are perceived as simply flirting for fun may not be seen as 
sufficiently serious and available to invest these resources in a potential partner. (691) 
I have two concerns with what Frisby et al. (2011) are doing in this excerpt. First, in no way are 
they justified in explaining the finding they mention in the excerpt by appealing to a BTP 
assumption very related to the assumption that was just undermined by an another finding of 
theirs. If, as they found, women’s attraction to men does not track dominance, then perhaps 
women do not have an evolved disposition to partner with men who are resourceful and 
protective after all. Given this very real implication of their very own research, Frisby et al. 
should not be so quick to turn around and explain another finding by suggesting that it’s because 
women have an evolved disposition to partner with men who are resourceful and protective.  
 Second, it is worth pointing out that what is missing from the discussion following the 
excerpt is an explanation for why some of the other findings regarding women’s preferences also 
did not support the hypothesis that women should be attracted to resourceful and protective 
mates. For instance, Frisby et al. found that flirting for sexual purposes, flirting to explore a 
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relationship, or flirting for self-esteem enhancing purposes had no significant effect on the 
women’s attractiveness ratings. But this is curious. Why is it that flirting for fun should make a 
man seem less likely to share his resources than a man who flirts just to have sex, or to enhance 
his self-esteem? There isn’t any obvious promise of resources attached to these latter motivations 
either. Moreover, why weren’t women most attracted to those men who flirted for the purpose of 
exploring a relationship? Surely, this motivation would be most connected to the possibility that 
a man would share his resources. Overall, this treatment of parental investment theory in Frisby 
et al. (2011) strongly suggests that the authors take much of its tenets to be simply true and 
generalizable to humans. Even in the face of their own evidence that undermines a certain aspect 
of parental investment theory, they are still quick to draw on that very aspect to explain women’s 
behaviour in another but related context.  
 The widespread application of the assumption in FEP that women prefer men with 
resources is also problematic because it suggests an ignorance of the reproductive consequences 
that would come along with such a preference—i.e., a preference for older men. FEP scholars 
admit that men with resources are likely going to be older as the acquisition of resources takes 
time (Buss and Schmitt 2011; Low 2013). Despite this concession, FEP scholars do not discuss 
men's fertility in this respect or entertain the possibility that it might affect women's reproductive 
success. In contrast, FEP scholars talk at length about the significance of the limitations of 
women's fertility, limitations associated with, for instance, pregnancy, lactation, age, stage of 
reproductive cycle, weight, and activity levels (Buss and Schmitt 2011; Cameron and Garcia 
2013; Escasa-Dorne et al. 2013; Johow et al. 2013; Low 2013; Meredith 2013; Pridmore-Brown 
2013; Reiber 2013; Singh and Singh 2011). If men's fertility is ever discussed at all, it is usually 
mentioned as a means to emphasize women's higher investment. That is, because women's 
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fertility is so limited, they should be expected to be choosier with whom they mate than men who 
are assumed to not have such limitations. Men are even supposed to have adaptations for 
determining women's fertility. They are hypothesized to be attracted to women with "clear skin, 
smooth skin, facial adiposity, lustrous hair" because these features presumably indicate high 
fertility. Thus, fertility and being able to detect fertility (via youthful appearance) is generally 
said to be important in men's mate choices, but not for women's.15 This seems to be based on the 
assumption that male fertility is not an issue so women do not need special adaptations to be able 
to detect it. What is more important, according to FEP scholars, is that women are able to detect 
traits in men that are conducive to acquiring resources.   
 The problem, of course, is that there are certainly limitations to male fertility, and there is 
no good reason to assume these limitations would not have evolutionary consequences. We know 
that men's fertility decreases quite sharply with age (e.g., Ford et al. 2000; Pennington 1988). 
Buller (2005) discusses this data and reports that among the !Kung of the Kalahari Desert and a 
large British sample, men's fertility peaks at about 30 and declines slightly until 40 but rapidly 
after that. Only 3% of fifty-year-old !Kung men were still able to have children, and men over 35 
in the British sample were only half as likely to be able to impregnate their partners as were their 
25 year-old-counterparts. I argue that this data has serious implications for FEP scholars' 
assumptions regarding women's evolutionary preferences for men with resources in particular. 
This consequence of women's alleged attraction to wealthier men is unproblematic if men's 
                                                          
15 An exception to this is Frederick et al. (2013) who cite two articles that discuss the possibility that females may in 
fact have adaptations that facilitate an attraction to males with high fertility. However, these discussions are focused 




fertility remained relatively stable into old age. But if it doesn't, as the !Kung and British data 
suggest, then it would in fact be evolutionarily disadvantageous for women to be attracted to 
older men. Focusing on choosing a man with resources to provide for you and your offspring is a 
futile strategy if that man cannot also provide you with offspring in the first place. In response, a 
FEP scholar might point out that it would still be evolutionarily advantageous for women to be 
attracted to older men with resources if they could also, on the side, utilize a short-term mating 
strategy to mate with men with "good genes.” This way, women would get the best of both 
worlds, resources from their "cuckolded" older mate, and good quality offspring from their mate 
with good genes. The problem with this, however, is that the "good genes" hypothesis does not 
explicitly connect "good genes" traits to fertility or even to youth. Older men can also have 
features such as "bodily symmetry" or "masculine facial appearance," which are traits that 
supposedly signal "good genes" (Wilbur and Campbell 2013, 333). As such, this adaptation also 
does not do well to help women pick fertile mates. In sum, basing their discussions about human 
mating on the oversimplified assumptions about mating from the BTP-paradigm, leads FEP 
scholars to overlook important complexities about human reproduction. Contrary to FEP 
assumptions, male fertility does in fact have limitations and, like men, women might therefore 
need to know how to choose fertile mates. Relying on, without rigorously testing, the assumption 
that women are most concerned about finding a mate with resources, leads FEP scholars to miss 
this.     
 FEP research is also vulnerable to the second criticism of the BTP paradigm discussed 
earlier, that the paradigm constrains the kinds of research questions that can be asked, and how 
observations can be interpreted. Regarding the first of these, while FEP researchers have made 
substantial strides to direct evolutionary psychology research to focus on women and their 
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significance for evolution, just how they focus on women and which women they study remain 
narrowed by BTP assumptions. For example, because FEP researchers assume women are the 
higher investing sex they assume women are primarily caregivers, social supporters, and 
preoccupied with finding a long-term provisioning mate. As a result, FEP research reflects a 
hyper-focus on women in domestic contexts. In general, there is a dearth of discussions or 
studies of women in professional, political, technical, or competitive contexts (except for 
discussions of women’s competitions over men). This is surprising especially in cases where 
FEP research is supposedly focused on women's aggression or competition (e.g., Fisher 2013; 
Liesen 2013). Even in these studies, discussions are limited to ways that women aggress or 
compete at home and over men. The lack of research questions about women's competitive 
performances and strategies outside of the home is alarming when we consider how often women 
compete, even aggressively, in non-domestic contexts (e.g., sports, at work, in academics). It is 
important to ask why women's competitive performances in these kinds of contexts are not 
relevant to FEP scholars. In non-domestic settings women are often competing over resources 
and social status. It is not obvious that these types of competitions are evolutionarily irrelevant. It 
appears, then, that BTP assumptions about sex roles—i.e., the competitive male and the 
discriminating, dependent female—are constraining how FEP scholars approach their topics of 
study. I will discuss the political issues regarding this in Chapter 6. 
 Regarding the criticism that the BTP paradigm constrains how observations can be 
interpreted, I have noticed some FEP scholars jump through hoops to try and fit their data to BTP 
expectations. For example, consider Wilbur and Campbell’s attempts to explain, using parental 
investment theory, why men and women have different preferences regarding humour in a mate 
(reported in Wilbur and Campbell 2013 but based on studies from Wilbur and Campbell 2011). 
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Using survey data and data from dating websites, Wilbur and Campbell (2011) found evidence to 
suggest that women prefer a funny mate, but that men prefer a mate that finds them funny. To 
explain these findings, Wilbur and Campbell make use of the good genes hypothesis that is 
connected to parental investment theory. According to this hypothesis, the traits females find 
attractive are oftentimes "signals" to underlying genes that enhance fitness. Applying this to their 
finding that women prefer humorous men, Wilbur and Campbell reason that perhaps humour in a 
man is a signal to a woman that he possesses fitness enhancing traits such as cognitive flexibility, 
theory of mind, and social adroitness. To explain the finding that men prefer women who find 
them funny, they suggest, “Men’s reported preferences for women who appreciate their 
humorous attempts likely stem from humor appreciation signaling substantiation of men’s mate 
value” (2011, 10). 
 This latter interpretation regarding men’s preferences, however, is in fact quite contrary 
to a parental investment framework. There are three reasons for this. First, according to parental 
investment theory, because males are the lower investing sex, it pays for them to be less choosey 
and to focus on number of mates. If and when they are choosey, they will prefer mates that signal 
fertility and high offspring investment. Hence, if Wilbur and Campbell wish to connect men’s 
preferences for women who appreciate their humour to parental investment theory, they need to 
connect humour appreciation to fertility and/or offspring investment. But they make no attempt 
to do this. Because Wilbur and Campbell make no attempt to make this connection, their 
interpretation faces a second problem. It is unclear how men’s preferences for humour 
appreciation is any help to them fitness-wise. In fact, such a preference should be a hindrance. 
This is because men who are not found funny by women, according to Wilbur and Campbell's 
theory, are already at a disadvantage. If women are selecting men based on how funny they are, 
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then this means only a limited number of men—the funniest men—will be chosen. It does not 
make sense, then, to assume that the losers of this competition would be in any position to turn 
down the women who, despite not finding them funny, would be willing to mate with them 
anyway. Such a preference should all but destroy non-humorous men’s chances at finding a 
mate.  
Explaining men’s preferences for humour appreciation in terms of parental investment 
and sexual selection flies in the face of another well-known aspect of sexual selection theory, the 
cheat. Cheats are individuals or species who have devised ways to obtain particular fitness 
outcomes without expending the amount of energy that is generally required for the outcome. 
For example, in cuttlefish, some males have figured out how to disguise themselves as females 
by changing their colouring to match typical female patterns. These males sneakily pass females 
their sperm sacs while other males are distracted, expending enormous amounts of energy, 
fighting over mating opportunities (Norman et al. 1999). With this in mind, if humour really is a 
type of mating effort, and men need to compete over women by using humorous tactics, then it 
should be in a man’s interest to not use humour if he can get away with it. Having a preference 
for only women who find them funny, however, would preclude this. Thus, such a preference is 
irrational from a sexual selection vantage point for yet another reason. 
 Shoehorning their data to fit the BTP paradigm compromises Wilbur and Campbell’s 
ability to adequately make sense of their data. On close analysis of Wilbur and Campbell’s 
findings, it is apparent that the finding that men prefer women who find them funny is 
nonsensical within a BTP framework. Unfortunately, however, Wilbur and Campbell don’t seem 
aware of this, perhaps because they are too committed to the BTP paradigm. As a result, they 
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settle for a highly dubious explanation, missing an opportunity to explore other more likely 
explanations.      
 Regarding the third criticism, FEP research often neglects to engage social, 
developmental, or ecological causes of behaviour. This shortcoming appears also to be a result of 
FEP reliance on the BTP paradigm as the paradigm is largely concerned about the ways in which 
sex-specific adaptations shape behaviour. The following examples illustrate some problems that 
arise when FEP scholars neglect to consider certain likely causes of behaviour because they are 
overly focused on possible adaptive causes. As I'll point out, FEP neglect of social, 
developmental, and ecological causes of behaviour leads to an oversimplified or even mistaken 
understanding of the behaviour in question.  
 Some FEP scholars make some effort to consider causes other than adaptation in their 
studies of human behaviour. Unfortunately, however, sometimes this effort amounts to little 
more than lip-service to these other possible causes. Elizabeth Lloyd (1999) criticizes this 
tendency among other evolutionary psychologists. Because evolutionary psychologists have been 
so frequently criticized for completely ignoring other factors that might influence behaviour, 
they have responded by building in minimal discussions about other factors like culture or 
environment. However, as Lloyd (1999) points out, these discussions are often so minimal that 
they do not really count as genuine attempts to explore or eliminate competing hypotheses. It is 
as though evolutionary psychologists only include them to say that they did. An example of this 
from FEP scholarship is Karolina Sylwester and Bogusław Pawłowski's (2011) brief treatment of 
social factors in their evolutionary account of risk taking.  
 Sylwester and Pawlowski (2011) report survey data which indicates that men and women 
are similarly attracted to risk takers in short-term mating contexts, and provide an adaptationist 
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explanation for this finding. Specifically, they posit different evolutionary motivations across the 
genders for the similar preferences. To explain women's preferences, they apply theory from 
Belsky et al. (1991) that suggests women, in short-term mating contexts, will prefer men with 
"good genes" (i.e., genes that will enhance the fitness or survival of their offspring). Sylwester 
and Pawlowski point to some evidence to suggest that certain forms of risk taking in men, such 
as taking physical risks that require strength, are indicative of good genes. Thus, they say, from a 
sexual selection vantage point, women should be attracted to risk-taking men in short-term (non-
committal) contexts. They reason, what the females' offspring may lose in investment in a short-
term context, they will make up for in good genes. Their reasoning for men's mating preferences 
for female risk takers, however, differs quite drastically. They suggest that men prefer risk-taking 
women in short-term contexts because risk taking signals sexual access. For this they provide 
evidence that suggests women who take risks such as binge-drinking are more likely to engage in 
casual sex. According to sexual selection, then, they suggest that it pays for men to be attracted 
to women who take risks as it reduces men's "mating effort" (703).16 
 At the beginning of their study, Sylwester and Pawlowski briefly introduce an alternative 
account for men's and women's mating preferences, one that highlights the effects that social 
structures (i.e., gender-specific "social roles") have on mate preferences. They, however, quickly 
dismiss this theory on account that it does not offer a theoretical picture for preferences in short-
                                                          
16 An unstated assumption here is that women's adaptive mating strategies are not similarly concerned about mating 
effort since there are always eager males willing to mate with them. There are more problems with how this study 




term contexts. They also report some evidence which suggests risk taking behaviour to be more 
under the control of "biological determinants" rather than social ones (670).17   
 This brief treatment of "social role theory" (as the theory is called) as a means to address 
environmental/learning factors as an alternative explanation for their data is unsatisfactory. In 
particular, the content of social role theory does not adequately encompass the more obvious 
social factors that seem to be at play in Sylwester and Pawlowski's data. The immediate 
alternative non-evolutionary explanation for their results seems to have more to do with general 
social expectations about romantic short-term encounters and relationships. The stimuli in 
Sylwester and Pawlowski's study defined a short-term partner as "one with whom a participant 
would have casual sex or an affair" (700). Given that "casual sex" and "affairs" are already 
culturally loaded as exciting or risky types of relationships, it makes sense that people would 
imagine being in such a scenario with someone who would likewise be willing to be in an 
exciting, risky relationship. This, by definition, would make their imagined partner a risk taker. It 
is surprising that Sylwester and Pawlowski do not explore alternative accounts like the one I've 
given here that consider obvious non-adaptive causes for their findings. And bringing up social 
role theory as a way to deal with objections regarding social causes is a red herring. If the 
authors really wanted to get to the bottom of why people prefer to have casual sex or affairs with 
risk takers, they would allot more time to contending with the most relevant and likely 
competing explanations.  
 There are FEP scholars who, yet, do even less than Sylwester and Pawlowski in terms of 
taking into consideration causes of behaviour other than sexual selection. Remember Wilbur and 
                                                          
17 This is actually quite confusing, though, since being biologically inclined to risky behavior is not the same thing 
as wanting to mate with someone who is a risk taker. 
84 
 
Campbell's (2013) study regarding mate preferences for humour. They hypothesize that women's 
choice for humorous men explains why women, but not men, prefer humour in a mate, and that 
men, but not women, prefer mates who find them humorous. Interestingly, at no point in their 
study do they make any mention of the potential role for social or environmental factors in 
shaping men's and women's valuations of humour in a partner. I suggest that such oversight is 
highly inappropriate given the obvious relevancy of social factors in their topic of study, in 
particular, the relevance of socially enforced gender roles. Some of the psychological qualities 
that humour signals, such as creative intelligence and mischievousness, are qualities that for a 
long time have been socially condoned in men but discouraged in women. A patriarchal social 
structure would have it that men would feel threatened by women who express creative 
intelligence and mischievousness. Such behaviours in women would make them seem 
unpredictable and capable of challenging rules that keep them in subordinate positions. Women, 
on the other hand, according to this account, should be free to find humor in a partner attractive. 
Because women do not have the same pressure to be more intelligent and creative than men, they 
need not find these qualities threatening, and can even enjoy them in a partner. Wilbur and 
Campbell lose out when they focus narrowly on sexual selection theory and fail to entertain other 
relevant and obvious explanations like the one I offer. Other FEP scholars who neglect entirely 
to entertain competing explanations for conclusions about human behaviour include Betzig 
(2013), Coe and Palmer (2013), Liesen (2013), Oberzaucher (2013). 
 The BTP paradigm’s focus on genetics and adaptations markedly limits its scope, 
especially in regards to human behaviour. Human behaviours are complex and shaped by a 
multiplicity of factors. Especially behaviours like mating behaviour should be expected to be 
deeply influenced by social norms and individual circumstances. Psychology is burgeoning with 
85 
 
data which suggest that human sexual preferences are highly influenced by perceptions about 
social norms, and especially gender norms (e.g., Finkel and Eastwick 2009; Hundhammer and 
Musswiler 2012; Pedersen, Putcha-Bhagavatula, Miller 2011; Perrin et al. 2011; see also Brown, 
Laland, Mulder 2009 for a meta-review of studies that indicate a lack of universality in mate 
preferences across cultures). It is surprising that feminist evolutionary psychologists do not 
acknowledge or make use of such insights, especially when they come from within their own 
discipline.  
 
4.4 Recommendations  
 
For a long time, a focus on adaptations due to sexual selection—as sexual selection is 
characterized in the BTP paradigm—was standard for studying sex and sex differences in 
evolutionary biology. As I have discussed in this chapter, however, there are problems with this 
standard approach. As critics have pointed out, the paradigm has limited usefulness for 
predicting or explaining animal mating behaviour since so many species have complex and 
highly flexible behavioural repertoires. The BTP paradigm, because it frames mating behaviour 
almost exclusively in terms of universal, highly specified traits, is not equipped to deal with the 
kinds of complexity and flexibility related to reproduction and mating that has been observed in 
so many species.  
FEP scholars present themselves as experts on the evolution of human behaviour and so 
should be cautious to engage theoretical platforms that are highly problematic like the BTP 
paradigm. Throughout this chapter I discussed how FEP’s use of the BTP paradigm has resulted 
in problems that mirror those talked about by critics of EP. First, I pointed out how FEP 
applications of the BTP paradigm to women's mating strategies has led FEP scholars to overlook 
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important aspects of human reproduction. FEP expectations that women have evolved to prefer 
(older) men with resources, or men with "good genes," are not flexible enough to account for the 
fact that women also need to be able to detect fertile men, for instance. Second, I talked about the 
ways in which FEP adherence to the BTP paradigm leads to confusing and illogical 
interpretations of data. Finally, third, I showed that when FEP scholars avoid or are ignorant of 
non-adaptive causal mechanisms of behaviour, they do science a disfavour since they miss out 
on offering more complete explanations of the phenomena they study. 
 By taking on the role of expert, FEP scholars have an obligation to be up to date on the 
theoretical accounts of the phenomena they are interested in. In this vein, I would recommend 
FEP scholars familiarize themselves with the critiques of the BTP paradigm that I have cited and 
built on in this chapter. As well, I suggest FEP would do well to adopt as part of its program 
alternative theories for studying sex from an evolutionary perspective that are not vulnerable to 
the criticisms above. I provide three of these below. These platforms provide compelling models 
of flexible sexual strategies, so are not limited by the assumption that sexual strategies are fixed 
across the sexes (pertaining to criticism 1). They also have considerations of multiple types of 
causes of behaviour (besides natural and sexual selection) built right into them. Thus, while the 
models are evolutionary models they do not exclude consideration of canonically non-
evolutionary causes (e.g., learning, environmental) as the BTP paradigm does (pertaining to 
criticism 3). Adopting these models would give FEP scholars a broader range of causal 
phenomena to consider in their studies of the evolution of behaviour. Moreover, FEP theory 
would be better suited to anticipate and explain human variation in their studies including within-
sex variation, variation across temporalities, environments, development, and individual 
differences more generally (pertaining to criticism 2).        
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 1. Sex as a Reaction Norm. Work by Sutherland, Johnson, Patricia Gowaty, Hubbell, and 
Malin Ah-King suggest that because demographic environments vary stochastically, selection 
should inevitably select against fixed sexual strategies and favour instead flexible individuals 
who are able to adaptively modify their strategies as their circumstances change (Ah-King and 
Gowaty 2015; Gowaty 2013; Gowaty and Hubbell 2005; 2009; Hubbell and Johnson 1987; 
Sutherland 1985). Hence, they propose the "adaptive flexibility" of individuals which is the idea 
that "selection acted so that all individuals sense and respond to the changing environmental and 
social circumstances that affect their options for reproduction and survival" (Gowaty 2013, 93). 
Assuming this set of initial conditions is to largely reject the idea that males, as a category, 
evolved in response to male-specific environmental challenges, and females, as another category, 
evolved in response to female-specific environmental challenges. Thus, when one observes a 
female being "choosey," one should not assume she is being choosey because the size of her 
gametes make it so, but because she has sensed from her environment that such behaviour is 
beneficial. If her environment were to change, she might very well choose to be "promiscuous." 
Gowaty and colleagues have tested this model extensively using computer simulations. Their 
tests show that random factors (e.g., encounters with potential mates, predation risk, disease risk, 
access to resources) can sufficiently account for differences in mating success variance between 
the sexes, as opposed to fixed sex-specific strategies. Ah-King and Gowaty (2015) also give 
empirical evidence for the model. I mentioned earlier in the chapter that in their review of over 
100 non-human animal studies conducted between 2000 and 2015, they found that individuals 
across many species often switch from choosey to random mating when their social or 
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environmental circumstances change. This undermines the idea that one sex is inherently overall 
more choosey than the other.18  
Worth noting, Gowaty (2013) is a chapter in Evolution’s Empress, the anthology from 
which much of the FEP research in my literature sample comes from. Gowaty’s discussion of her 
work on sex as a reaction norm makes her chapter stand out in the anthology as it is one of just 
two chapters in the book that offers extensive meta-theoretical critique of the BTP paradigm. 
 2. Social Selection. Quoting Darwin, Joan Roughgarden points out that the “chief service 
rendered” by reproductive social behaviour is to fashion a social infrastructure that produces an 
increased number of offspring (2015, 95). Following this, she develops what she calls "social 
selection" which is intended to be an alternative to sexual selection that better takes into account 
the role sociality plays in animal reproduction and evolution. Whereas sexual selection begins 
with gene pool dynamics (evolved sex differences e.g., coy, indiscriminate) to explain behaviour, 
social selection begins with behaviour to explain gene pool dynamics. Two starting 
considerations are taken into account. First, the ecological conditions into which the offspring 
are released, and the types of survival/fitness enhancing actions within this environment that the 
offspring are able to express, are considered. Second, the types of ornaments, signals and 
negotiation that are needed to bring about those actions during courtship are considered. Once 
these fitness solutions are anticipated, one can then "play the predictions forward and observe the 
optimal courtship followed by the optimal parental care" (Roughgarden 2015, 96). To 
Roughgarden, thinking about sex roles in terms of social selection helps highlight the importance 
                                                          
18 Disappointingly, however, Gowaty 2013 notes that the authors of many of these studies often "erect ad hoc, 
usually correlational hypotheses to tack onto [Bateman-Trivers] hypotheses to explain observations" (88). 
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of negotiation. She says, because parenting roles need to be negotiated, sex roles cannot be 
explained in terms of fixed sex-specific traits. Thus, she says,  
Rather than thinking of the phenotype as a static product of the genotype, in social 
selection the phenotype is assumed to have its own dynamic, not only the solitary 
dynamic realized during development and morphogenesis, but also a social dynamic 
carried out within the lifespans of the interacting individuals. This interactive phenotypic 
dynamic shapes the properties and capabilities of the animals just as surely as 
morphogenesis shapes anatomy. (2015, 98)  
 3. The Extended Synthesis. Leslie Heywood, an English Professor at Binghampton 
University, is interested in developing research perspectives that integrate theoretical insights 
from humanities topics such as representation and social construction with evolutionary 
approaches. Perhaps unsurprisingly, she has affiliations with feminist evolutionary psychologists 
and even has a chapter in Evolution’s Empress. Her chapter in Evolution’s Empress stands out 
for a similar reason that Gowaty’s (mentioned above) does. Like Gowaty’s, her chapter offers a 
critical, meta-theoretic discussion of BTP evolutionary theory and offers alternative ways to 
understand and study sex and gender from an evolutionary perspective. She provides what she 
calls the "extended synthesis" for human evolutionary study. This proposed theoretical paradigm 
incorporates insights from neuroscience, genetics, developmental psychology, and paleoecology. 
It is built on the assumption that "biology and culture are inextricable" (Heywood 2013, 456). 
Heywood proposes niche construction and evolutionary developmental biology as important 
theoretical sources for the evolutionary study of sex roles. Niche construction is concerned with 
the ways in which organisms engineer their environments to enhance their survival. An organism 
can engineer its environment within its own life such that the changes made affect the 
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development of and how selection acts on its descendants. Humans rely on a variety of 
inheritance systems for the passing down of niche construction including genetic, epigenetic, 
behavioural, and symbolic systems. Heywood explains that niche construction has implications 
for some of the novel sex, gender, and reproductive patterns emerging in humans. She says,  
technological advancement has so altered the human environment that resource 
acquisition and provisioning have changed profoundly, and 'fast' evolution shows that 
there has in fact been time to alter patterns such as those claimed by [parental investment 
theory]. (Jablonka and Lamb 2005, as cited in Heywood 203, 456) 
Adding to this, Heywood points to research from evolutionary developmental biology, which 
draws on recent trends in developmental biology and cognitive neuroscience, that shows how 
extensively individual and social learning shape the brain and behaviour. Taken together, 
insights from niche construction and evolutionary developmental biology have major 
implications for sexual selection research. They undermine attempts to explain even widespread 
patterns of sex differences by appeals to sexual selection. If key causal processes of sexual 
behaviour primarily occur at the developmental and social levels, then pondering the specific 
conditions of ancestral times is unhelpful as these conditions would have led to very different 
behavioural outcomes than the ones emerging today.  
 FEP research ought to explore the suitability of new developing theoretical frameworks, 
such as the ones I have just provided. Adopting any one of these models would benefit FEP 
research. Each have fewer preconceived expectations about sexual strategies because they 
anticipate that organisms will develop their strategies based on a variety of inputs including 
genetic, epigenetic, developmental, and social. Employing these models would also give FEP 
research more breathing room to explore aspects of sex research that are not accessible through a 
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sexual selection lens, such as variation within the sexes and across individuals, social and 
























Chapter 5  




In the last chapter, I looked at problems associated with the Bateman-Trivers-Parker (BTP) 
paradigm that is the predominant theoretical paradigm FEP scholars employ in their research. I 
brought attention to the criticisms of the paradigm and showed how these criticisms apply to FEP 
research. In this chapter, I focus my analysis on the appropriateness of the data feminist 
evolutionary psychologists offer for their adaptationist hypotheses. In the first part of the chapter, 
I point out ways FEP scholars offer the wrong data. In the second part, I point out how FEP 
scholars do not offer enough of the right kinds of data. To make my assessments, I draw on past 
philosophical criticisms of the appropriateness of EP data, but also develop an additional 
category of critique. This new category concerns the success of feminist evolutionary 
psychologists’ attempts to operationalize evolutionary terms in the context of human study. I call 
this focus of critique the OEP check (OEP stands for operationalization of evolutionary 
phenomena). While my criticisms in this regard are specific to FEP in this chapter, the OEP 
check is an important tool for anyone who conducts or assesses human evolutionary research. I 
develop and apply this critique in the first section of this chapter. In the remaining sections, I 
show how past and well-known criticisms of EP data are relevant to FEP. This is concerning, I 
point out, as the mistakes regarding data the philosophers criticize are basic mistakes that should 
not be happening in scientific research at the rate that they do in EP. Feminist evolutionary 
psychologists would do well to pay attention to these criticisms. In each section of this chapter, I 
offer recommendations for how FEP scholars might address the weaknesses regarding their data 




5.2 The Wrong Data 
  
5.2.1 Problems Operationalizing Evolutionary Phenomena   
 
In this section, I develop a novel critical concern regarding appropriateness of data in human 
evolutionary research. I address the problems FEP scholars face when they try to operationalize 
evolutionary phenomena with observable human behaviours. I argue FEP scholars should be 
more rigorous when they operationalize the evolutionary terms they borrow from evolutionary 
biology as they are frequently unsuccessful at demonstrating an adequate link between the 
evolutionary phenomenon they are attempting to measure and the proxy phenomenon they are 
actually assessing. As a result, they end up collecting data that is not relevant to the evolutionary 
phenomenon they are studying. While I apply this critique to FEP scholarship only in this 
chapter, it is a concern that should be relevant to any research on human evolution, especially 
human evolutionary research that borrows terms from non-human animal research. More on this 
later. 
  Operationalization is the process of defining the measurement of a phenomenon that is 
not directly measurable, though its existence is indicated by other phenomena. In other words, it 
is the attempt to measure a phenomenon that is highly complex or elusive by measuring a more 
accessible phenomenon that is assumed to be related to it. An example would be the medical 
industry’s attempts to measure the very elusive and complex phenomenon ‘health’ with BMI, an 
easy-to-measure feature of people that some think is indicative of overall health. There are many 
phenomena in evolutionary biology that are elusive or very complex (e.g., evolution itself, mate 
quality, parental investment, adaptation). Those who study evolutionary biology are tasked with 
the job of quantifying and measuring these hard-to-measure phenomena by finding and 
94 
 
measuring their more accessible proxy phenomena. For instance, evolutionary biologists who 
measure male ‘parental investment’ in reed buntings will assess the rate at which a male will 
feed his young. A male who is less invested in his young would probably spend less time 
foraging for his young, and more time for himself, than a male who is highly invested. 
Investment in feeding has direct fitness consequences and it is one of only a few ways a male 
reed bunting can invest. Thus, how much food a male reed bunting feeds his offspring is a good 
indication of his parental investment (Dixon et al. 1994, but also see Dickinson 2003 for critique 
of generalizing this tendency to other species).  
Evolutionary psychologists must do the same with humans. And because they borrow 
theories and terminology directly from evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychologists must 
find human equivalents for the proxy phenomena evolutionary biologists study. This, however, is 
not easy. Evolutionary psychologists face a number of disadvantages relative to researchers who 
study non-human animals. Factors such as the human lifespan, limits to and ethical limits on 
human observation, and the type of culture humans have make the evolutionary study of humans 
quite difficult and unique from much non-human study. Returning to ‘parental investment,’ for 
example, this concept is far more difficult to operationalize in humans. There are countless ways 
human fathers can invest in their children and not all of these ways are obviously fitness 
enhancing (this would in fact be quite hard to determine). Assessing men on one or even five 
aspects of "investment" would be insufficient since a father who demonstrates low investment in 
these aspects could demonstrate high investment in unknown or unobserved others. What is 
more, how or why a father invests in his children is very culturally and historically determined. 
A picture of "paternal investment" in Canadian society today may look very different from how 
it looks in other cultures or would have looked 100 years ago. Such a study would at the very 
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least have to compare fathering investment behaviours across multiple domains of investment, 
and across cultures and time periods to be representative. 
There is evidence in FEP that FEP scholars need to be more rigorous when they attempt 
to operationalize evolutionary phenomena with measurable human behaviours. Too frequently 
they fail to develop an adequate link between the evolutionary phenomenon they are attempting 
to measure and the proxy phenomenon they are proposing is indicative of it. Below are three 
examples of FEP scholars falling short in this way. 
Example 1: “mating power” as “social power”  
 Recall from my discussions in Chapter 1 Julie Seaman’s (2013) application of sexual 
selection theory and female choice to human gendered power dynamics surrounding dress codes. 
In her paper, Seaman operationalizes an evolutionary sense of "power," however I argue she has 
difficulty establishing its link with observable human behaviour.  
Seaman points to a phenomenon in nature where the most elaborately ornamented sex 
(e.g., the most colorful plumage) is often the sex with the least amount of "power," where power 
specifically refers to choice in mating. This observation comes out of the BTP paradigm which 
posits that elaborate dress in males is usually the result of female choice. That is, because 
females in many species, but not the males, can freely choose their mates,, the "dress" of the 
male will become honed to cater to her preferences. Accordingly, the female in this scenario 
holds the power since she has the control in the mating arena.  
 Seaman the goes on to suggest that this feature of sexual selection theory can inform how 
we understand and deal with the human gendered power dynamics that result from dress codes in 
the workplace.  She notes that  Because men have the power to demand it of them, women are 
usually the more elaborately dressed. As a result, women’s choices are constrained, and this has 
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consequences for their reproduction and fitness.  She concludes by explaining how, when we  
view cultural dress through this evolutionary lens, it becomes clear that enforced dress codes in 
the workplace reinforces gender stereotypes, violates women’s autonomy, and leads to sex 
discrimination.  
 While I certainly do not disagree with Seaman that gendered dress norms are harmful, I 
am concerned that the path by which she arrives at this conclusion is unhelpful because it merely 
conflates two very different notions of "power." In the non-human context, the evolutionary 
sense of power refers to choice of mates. But in the human context, Seaman indicates the word 
takes on a host of other, very different references—none of which have to do with actually 
choosing a mate. This is made more confusing when we consider the canonical view in 
evolutionary psychology which states that it is women who supposedly have the most mating 
power since they are choosey and men are less discriminate. Seaman cites some of the EP 
research that puts forward this view, so she is aware that mating power has been applied to 
humans in this sense. Seaman's operationalizing "power" by using the proxy “human dress” does 
not track what she defines as evolutionary "power" since the former has nothing to do with what 
the latter indicates, choice of mates. As a result, I argue that Seaman is unsuccessful in 
establishing an ontological relationship between "power" in the evolutionary sense and "power" 
in the political sense because the two are just the same word but for very different phenomena.  
Example 2: parenting strategies 
 Nicole Cameron and Justin Garcia (2013) apply the evolutionary terms "qualitative" and 
"quantitative" parenting strategies in the context of humans. Theory from non-human animal 
studies on these strategies suggests that parents who experience favorable environmental 
conditions will sacrifice an emphasis on mating and opt for "qualitative" parenting which yields 
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a high investment for each individual offspring (also called the "K strategy"). Parents who 
experience adverse environmental conditions where risk for mortality is high, on the other hand, 
will switch their focus to mating and "quantitative" parenting in which the goal is to maximize 
number of offspring to increase the chances that at least a few will survive (a strategy referred to 
as the "r strategy").  
 Cameron and Garcia find evidence for their application of this theory to humans in the 
data which suggests "environmental adversity is associated with a decreased quality of parental 
care," such that, "[i]nsecure attachment, child neglect, and child abuse are more prevalent in 
populations living under impoverished conditions" (e.g., Belsky 2010 as cited in Cameron and 
Garcia 2013, 141). They also cite evidence which suggests that females who grow up in "an 
impoverished family environment" experience early menarche and earlier onset of sexual 
activity" (e.g., Griffin and Harlow 1966 as cited in Cameron and Garcia 2013, 141).  
I would, however, like to draw attention to the important difference between having lots of 
children (or having a propensity to focus on mating) and raising your children badly. What is not 
clear in Cameron and Garcia's presentation of both the human and non-human animal literature 
on K and r strategies is that quantitative parenting is equivalent to non-qualitative parenting. 
Employing a strategy to maximize one's offspring does not entail that one will mistreat them 
once they are born. There might be factors associated with an "adverse environment" such as 
stress, ill health, mental illness, and substance abuse that contribute to the incidence of child 
abuse, but these factors are not equivalent to a quantitative mating strategy. All a quantitative 
strategy entails, proximately speaking, is a preoccupation with mating. Thus, Cameron and 
Garcia fail to appropriately operationalize quantitative mating when they choose to focus on bad 
parenting as a proxy. 
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Example 3: “good genes” as “humour” 
      Wilbur and Campbell (2013) engage the sexual selection literature that emphasizes the 
significance of female choice. This literature suggests that female preferences in many species 
track good genes in potential mates, where the features females find most attractive happen to be 
features that signal fitness enhancing traits. Recall, Wilbur and Campbell are interested in 
women's preferences for humorous men since humour is hypothesized to signal skills that 
indicate mate quality: cognitive flexibility, theory of mind, and social adroitness. Based on their 
findings, they suggest that, as is the case in other species like the peacock, women's mate 
preferences, through sexual selection, can shape the physiologies and psychologies of their 
mates. Wilbur and Campbell conclude that women's preferences for humorous men have led to a 
general tendency among men, but not women, to strive to be funny when trying to attract a mate. 
 Focusing on the operationalization of "mate quality," Wilbur and Campbell have chosen 
to measure this known evolutionary phenomenon with "humor," so let's look at their justification 
for that link. "Mate quality" refers to those features of an organism that could affect the 
reproductive success of its mates. In order to link "humor" to "mate quality," Wilbur and 
Campbell go through the following steps (see pages 337-340): (1) they cite G. F. Miller (2007) 
who conjectures that humour evolved as a fitness indicator because it requires adaptive skills 
such as cognitive flexibility, theory of mind, and social adroitness. (2) They suggest that, to 
females (but not to males), humor is an honest signal because it "tacitly" conveys qualities such 
as "intelligence" and "warmth" which are "highly valued traits in romantic partners" (338). The 
emphasis on "tacit" is important because humor is supposed to demonstrate intelligence and 
warmth which is much more reliable than testimony (hence why it is an honest signal). (3) 
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Wilbur and Campbell found a link between "intelligence" and "humor" because men on a dating 
website who advertised that they were intelligent also tended to advertise that they were funny.  
 One major problem with Wilbur and Campbell's link between mate quality and humor is 
that they do not give us an account for how the cognitive traits associated with humor (cognitive 
flexibility, social adroitness, theory of mind) can lead to reproductive benefits for women 
through their association with humor. It is plausible to imagine how cognitive flexibility, social 
adroitness, and theory of mind could have fitness benefits, but it is not clear that their affiliation 
with humor is a good vehicle for their being passed along. For example, the kind of cognitive 
flexibility needed to make a play on words might not be the kind of cognitive flexibility that 
someone needs to raise a child or build a shelter. Likewise, while social adroitness seems 
necessary for cooperative living, it isn’t clear that the adroitness associated with entertaining 
people is inherently cooperative. In fact, some research indicates that comedians have a high 
incidence of depression and anxiety—two disorders that complicate social relationships (e.g., 
Janus 1975; McBride 2004). Comedians also score low on extroversion and agreeableness 
which, according to Greegross and Miller (2009), indicates that comedians prefer to keep to 
themselves and are distrustful of others. Regarding theory of mind, again, it is not clear why 
humor is an especially good indicator of this. Other non-human animal species possess theory of 
mind (see Keefner 2016), but they don't need humor to facilitate its selection. Given the presence 
of theory of mind in other species, I suggest it seems more likely that the proxy traits that are 
responsible for the fixation of theory of mind in humans came long before humour. In sum, 
because Wilbur and Campbell do not develop an adequate link between humor and its alleged 
fitness enhancing traits, their attempt to operationalize mate quality with humor is unsuccessful.  
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In sum, FEP scholars are frequently unsuccessful at demonstrating an adequate link 
between the evolutionary phenomenon they are attempting to measure and the proxy 
phenomenon they are actually assessing. As a result, it is unclear whether they are collecting the 
right data to support their evolutionary hypotheses. I suggest FEP scholars be more vigilant 
about this aspect of their research. I recommend they dedicate more space in their papers to 
explaining and establishing the link that they perceive exists between the evolutionary 
phenomenon they wish to assess and the accessible human phenomenon they are measuring. 
Spending more time thinking about this link would save FEP scholars from pursuing data that is 
irrelevant to their hypothesis.  
I also recommend FEP scholars be more cautious when they operationalize terms that 
they borrow from non-human animal research. As I mentioned previously, evolutionary 
psychologists face challenges studying evolution in humans that other evolutionary biologists do 
not. As a result, they should be extra careful when they are defining the human equivalents of the 
proxy phenomena evolutionary biologists study. For instance, as we saw in Seaman’s (2013) and 
Cameron and Garcia’s (2013) cases, the kinds of behaviours non-human animals display that are 
indicative of “mating power” and “K and r strategies,” respectively, are not clearly mirrored in 
humans. Zoomorphizing is when researchers wrongfully attribute characteristics that are specific 
to certain non-human animal species to humans. FEP scholars need to take this type of problem 
seriously. Because the terms and concepts in much evolutionary research have been developed in 
the context of non-human animal studies, they might not be appropriate for the study of humans. 
If researchers of human evolution cannot secure a research environment and methodology that 
can yield as effective a measure of the evolutionary concept they mean to study, then they should 
consider abandoning the concept and adopting or inventing one that is more conducive to human 
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study. This avoids confusion and the unwarranted epistemic credibility that sometimes comes 
along with borrowing familiar successful terminology that might not be obviously context 
dependent. 
In the next section, I discuss a second issue in FEP that regards FEP scholars collecting 
the wrong kinds of data for adaptationist hypotheses. For this critique, I draw on past 
philosophical criticisms of EP.  
 
5.2.2 Just-So Stories 
 
Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979) took issue with a kind of data evolutionary 
psychologists sometimes offer, a kind Gould and Lewontin call “just-so stories.” A just-so story 
is an attempt to establish an evolutionary function of a trait by telling a plausible story about 
what problem the trait needed to solve in an ancestral past. The problem with this, according to 
philosophers, is that a just-so story is not the right kind of data needed to support a claim 
regarding evolution by natural selection.  For instance, Gould (1997b) criticizes Robert Wright, 
an evolutionary psychologist who offers a just-so story to support an adaptive claim about the 
“sweet tooth.” Wright (1994) explains, “The classic example of an adaptation that has outlived 
its logic is the sweet tooth. Our fondness for sweetness was designed for an environment in 
which fruit existed but candy didn’t” (as cited in Gould 1997b, n.p.). Gould responds to Wright’s 
reasoning by pointing out how it, 
ranks as pure guesswork in the cocktail party mode; Wright presents no neurological 
evidence of a brain module for sweetness, and no paleontological data about ancestral 
feeding. This ‘just-so story’ therefore cannot stand as a ‘classic example of an adaptation’ 
in any sense deserving the name of science. (1997b, n.p.)  
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A number of the FEP scholars in my literature sample use just-so stories as data to 
support their evolutionary claims, and I can criticize their attempts for similar reasons Gould 
does. Consider (1) Coe and Palmer’s (2013) just-so story about the function of ancestral names, 
and (2) Pridmore-Brown’s (2013) just-so story about the evolution of patriarchy: 
1. We suggest that a key benefit to traditions sometime between 100,000 years ago and 
40,000 years ago was the identification of kin, through such things as ancestral names 
(e.g., clan and tribal names) and other identifiers of common ancestry, such as tribal 
dress and or other body decoration. This identification, when combined with 
traditional behaviour that encourages cooperation among those identified as kin, had 
the crucial advantage of producing cooperation between second and perhaps even 
third cousins, and thus larger cooperating sets of allies. (118) 
2. ...while patriarchy may well be socially constructed, its condition of possibility is the 
gendered reproductive clock, which has been instrumental in stabilizing patriarchal 
institutions—precisely because it created an amplified valuation of youth in women 
and not men, and in turn early childbearing typically rendered women dependent on 
men and kin for resources. The gendered clock also implied accelerated social aging 
for women as compared to men insofar as social roles were tied to reproduction...It 
may be that the gendered clock in Homo sapiens, coupled with the cooperative 
breeding backdrop (which enables experienced 'helpers at the nest' to make up for the 
inexperienced young mother), accounts for what anthropologists see as the 'universal' 
gut-level valuation among humans of nubile young females—and the discount 
valuation of slightly older ones. (425) 
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While neither of these stories are implausible per se, they include significant, 
unsupported assumptions. For instance, Coe and Palmer do not provide any references to 
research that might support their assumption that early humans had clan names; that tribal names 
preceded cooperation with second and third cousins, and that it wasn't the other way around; that 
identification through names facilitates further cooperation. Likewise, Pridmore-Browne's 
account has a number of unsupported assumptions. For instance, it remains unclear how she 
knows older women in early human populations were undervalued compared to older men. What 
if early human populations were matrilocal? In such cultures, would women still be undervalued 
compared to older men? And if early populations were matrilocal, would women still have been 
so dependent on men? Alternatively, what if early humans lived in small groups. Would the 
"inexperienced young mother" still be valuable if she did not have helpers? Because Coe and 
Palmer and Pridmore-Brown’s evolutionary stories do not offer any real evidence that the stories 
they are telling actually depict historical events, they are just stories. But like myths, stories are 
not legitimate kinds of data for explaining what happened in the past. 
One way to avoid telling unsupported stories about the human ancestral past would be for 
FEP scholars to keep up to date with and engage scholarship from disciplines that study ancestral 
conditions and ways of life. For instance, FEP and EP scholars should regularly be checking and 
engaging research from especially paleoanthropology and human evolutionary biology. While it 
is true that behaviours themselves cannot be fossilized, there are all kinds of ways that ancestral 
human behaviours can be uncovered through physical evidence. Researchers from 
paleoanthropology and human evolutionary biology are regularly showcasing breakthroughs in 
their finds—discoveries they argue can shed light on how ancestral humans and other hominids 
once behaved. Importantly, these finds often challenge common beliefs about ancestral human 
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behaviour (e.g., see Cieri et al. 2014; Dyble et a. 2015, also see Gopnik 2014 for critical review), 
which is one good reason FEP and EP scholars should not rely on their general or tacit 
knowledge about early human life. Staying up to date on this research saves FEP scholars from 
having to reason hypothetically about phenomena that might already have been studied in 
physical terms.  
 
5.3 Not enough of the right Data 
 
In this section, I focus my critiques on FEP scholarship that does not necessarily offer the wrong 
kinds of data, but rather not enough of the right kinds of data for adaptationist hypotheses. For 
this I get into philosophical scholarship that outlines the standard types of data that are needed 
for successful adaptation explanations. I also discuss some problems FEP scholars have 
regarding the populations of humans they choose to study. 
 
5.3.1 Data from too few Sources 
    
Philosophers have criticized evolutionary psychologists for failing to provide any or enough of 
the right kind of data that are needed, according to standards in evolutionary biology, to support 
adaptationist claims. In his critique, Robert Richardson lays out the necessary kinds of 
information that would be needed to support a reliable explanation for an adaptation. He draws 
on Robert Brandon’s (1990) list of five conditions of “adaption explanations.” First, he says, the 
explanation must provide evidence of selection which would require, among other things, 
information about the character and extent of variation among ancestral forms, and differential 
survivorship and reproductive success among ancestral forms. Second, there needs to be 
information about the ancestral ecological factors that could explain the presence and the 
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strength of selection. Third, it needs to be shown that the supposed adaptive trait in question is 
heritable. Fourth, there must be information regarding population structures such as, aspects of 
the ancestral populations such as gene flow, mutation rates, population size, interbreeding. All of 
these aspects can affect the rate of evolution. Finally, there needs to be information about trait 
polarity, that is, whether the trait is primitive or derived. A trait that is inherited from distant 
ancestral lineages is not an adaptation, even if it appears to have function. For example, the 
sutures in the human skull have adaptive function as their flexibility facilitates a human baby’s 
safe passage through the birth canal (Richardson 2007). However, they are not adaptations since 
they are present in birds and reptiles as well, and birds and reptiles do not have to pass through 
birth canals. Skull sutures, then, are a primitive trait that we have inherited from an ancestral 
line. Richardson holds this list of five conditions up to some adaptation explanations in 
evolutionary psychology and explains how they fall short in each category. At the end of his 
discussion, he criticizes more generally some evolutionary psychologists’ tendency to rely on 
information regarding trait function as sufficient for adaptation explanations: 
The standards more typically embraced within the collection of views that is called 
“evolutionary psychology” are much less limiting [than those in evolutionary biology]. 
The approach is one that depends on what Tooby and Cosmides [two evolutionary 
psychologists] call “functional analysis.” It begins with an analysis of what constitutes 
successful performance of a trait, relative to the presumed ancestral conditions in which it 
evolved. The central question is then taken to be whether some proposed design would, in 
those circumstances, have proven to be adaptive. My question is not whether some design 
might have been, or even would have been adaptive, but whether the right explanation for 
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the presence of the proposed design, for example, human language and reasoning, is that 
it is an adaptation and how it should be explained. (137) 
In summary, Richardson criticizes evolutionary psychologists for being ignorant of the kinds of 
information that are required to offer a robust adaptation explanation. Adaptations are 
multifaceted and so should be explained by investigating a variety of appropriate data sources. 
While adaptations often have functions, function alone is not a sufficient indicator that a feature 
is an adaptation. 
Lloyd (1999; 2001; 2002) also argues that evolutionary psychologists do not provide the 
rights kinds of data to support their claims about human adaptations. For instance, in Lloyd 
(2001), she criticizes the types of data Thornhill and Palmer (2001) use to demonstrate that rape 
evolved in men as an adaptive reproductive strategy. She goes through a number of research 
avenues that Thornhill and Palmer would need to take to demonstrate this alleged evolutionary 
function of rape: inheritance studies to first establish that rape is a heritable trait; a comparison of 
the reproductive success of rapists and non-rapists to test whether rape is in fact adaptive; the use 
of comparative methods to see if the trait exists elsewhere in the lineage; an examination of past 
social structures, population sizes, migration rates, and material culture to determine if there 
really was a plausible set of circumstances that could lead to the evolution of rape as an 
adaptation. She explains, however, that Thornhill and Palmer fail to engage any of these 
adequately. For instance, she says, they try to get out of having to demonstrate that rape is a 
heritable trait by claiming that it is a “fixed” trait, i.e., that all men (and women) already have the 
genes that could lead to raping behaviour. But, she points out, this move is left undefended and 
does not exempt them from having to fulfill the other standards of evidence listed above. She 
notes that “nowhere in the book do the authors present evidence regarding either relevant details 
107 
 
of the past evolutionary environment or comparisons with our closest relatives. Nor do they 
discuss seriously the possibility that rape itself is not a single trait” (which would complicate its 
selection) (1542). Moreover, she goes on, most of the data Thornhill and Palmer offer concerns 
current statistics surrounding rape and rape victims, statistics that could lend support to the 
possibility that rape in humans is an advantageous reproductive strategy. But to this she says, 
This could be relevant evidence if they showed the relative reproductive success of 
rapists and nonrapists, but they do not. Thus, according to the usual evolutionary 
standards of evidence regarding demonstration that a trait is an adaptation, Thornhill and 
Palmer fail rather spectacularly. (1542)   
So, for Lloyd as well, evolutionary psychologists fall short in offering the kinds of data needed to 
adequately explain a given feature as an adaptation. Like Richardson, she penalizes evolutionary 
psychologists for underestimating or being ignorant of the required standards surrounding 
adaptation explanations in evolutionary biology.   
There are FEP researchers in my sample who neglect entirely to provide the kinds of 
information (that Richardson and Lloyd discuss) that are needed to support to adaptationist 
claims (i.e., Coe and Palmer 2013; Betzig 2013; Wilbur and Campbell 2013; Meredith 2013; 
Easterlin 2013; Sylwester and Powlowski 2011). A prevailing assumption across these articles is 
that noticeable patterns in current single-cultural populations that match predictions made by 
natural and sexual selection hypotheses are enough to support those hypotheses. The problem 
with this move, however, is that there are extraneous reasons why observations of current 
populations, and especially current populations of a single culture, might support adaptationist 
predictions. Ecological conditions, for example, could be triggering a particular expression of 
“phenotypic plasticity.” Phenotypic plasticity is an organism's ability to alter its phenotype to 
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meet environmental demands. This includes changes that occur at the genetic level to changes 
that can result from learning. When phenotypic characteristics are plastic like this, it is very hard 
to know how they will be expressed from one period or environment to the next. Genetic drift, 
phylogenetic inertia, and epigenetic factors are other factors (other than selection) that can also 
cause phenotypic patterns in populations. Processes such as higher-level population structures 
(e.g., population density), socialization, development, and learning can also lead to phenotypic 
patterns but which are not genetically based, and so could not be the result of selection. Along 
these lines, recall Wilbur and Campbell's study that I talked about in Chapter 4. I pointed out 
how social and cultural factors easily explain the differences between men's and women's mate 
preferences involving humour that they found. Wilbur and Campbell, as well as the other 
researchers referenced at the start of this paragraph, therefore need to do a lot more work to show 
that such preferences are not socially contingent; that there were specific conditions in an 
ancestral past that led to the preferences being selected for. To do so, they would do well to test 
their predictions cross-culturally, and do what they could to determine if the “trait” they are 
interested in is heritable or has fitness benefits. I also recommend FEP scholars familiarize 
themselves with the standards in evolutionary biology that lay out what the appropriate criteria 
are for establishing an adaptation explanation. Robert Brandon’s (1990) work as well as Lloyd’s 
(1999; 2001; 2002) and Richardson’s (2007) critiques are great places to start for becoming 
familiar with these standards. 
 
5.3.2 Sample Unrepresentativeness  
      
Evolutionary psychology occupies a challenging corner of the human sciences considering that 
many of the human subjects it studies (i.e., human ancestors from the Pleistocene) no longer 
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exist. This, of course, complicates finding a representative sample of human subjects to study—
perhaps to the point that no sample at all from current human populations may really be 
appropriate. Nevertheless, there are better and worse samples that one can collect data from in 
order to try to answer questions about humans from a distant ancestral past. Leading 
evolutionary psychologists themselves caution other EP researchers about using appropriate 
samples. David Buss (2007), for example, encourages evolutionary psychologists to make use of 
data from a variety of human populations (including archeological records and data from hunter-
gatherer societies). Along similar lines, Anne Campbell (2006) recognizes the importance of 
cross-cultural and developmental data.    
 Despite this stated conscientiousness about samples on the part of evolutionary 
psychologists, philosophers have pointed out many problems with sample representativeness in 
EP. Specific issues include problems with studying only undergraduate students (Buller 2006), 
problems with studying people from just one culture (Dupré 2001), and issues generalizing 
conclusions about non-humans to humans (Dupré 2001; Buller 2006; Richardson 2007; Meynell 
2012; Rosser 2003). The relative homogeneity of undergraduate students makes them 
unrepresentative of the broader population. Undergraduates, are often similar in age, have similar 
values and interests (especially if the students being measured all have a similar major like 
psychology), and often have similar socioeconomic statuses and backgrounds. Samples from one 
culture are also very limited in the context of evolutionary research. Because human behaviour 
and cognition are so highly influenced by social and cultural factors, one can't be sure that 
patterns within a culture are evolutionarily caused. Cross-cultural comparisons are needed to 
tease out the effects of a culture. Finally, regarding the study of non-human animals, some EP 
researchers have been accused of "cherry picking" species based on how well they meet the 
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researchers' predictions about alleged universal evolutionary causes. For instance, feminist 
scholars have critiqued evolutionary researchers for choosing to focus on chimpanzees and 
baboons for their comparative research on male competition and control (Lloyd 2001). 
Chimpanzees and baboons have especially male dominated social structures relative to other 
primates so are not representative of primates as a whole. Making universal claims about 
primates, therefore, based on these species, sends the false message that primate males (including 
humans) in general are highly aggressive, competitive and controlling of females. The limitations 
surrounding samples with these three types of issues are well known in psychology and 
comparative studies. Researchers are expected to control as best they can for these limitations or 
to at least acknowledge them in their discussions.  
 Samples in FEP are vulnerable to these same criticisms. Almost a third of the articles 
from my sample literature have acute limitations with regard to sample representativeness. 
Easterlin (2013), for example, derives the data for her research from three fictional characters 
from the story Jane Eyre. She uses the characters from this story to test evolutionary 
psychological predictions regarding male control of and proprietary attitudes toward women in 
the late nineteenth century. However, any information about these characters should not be taken 
as representative of individuals from that time period, or any time period. The characters were 
invented by the author. The character’s attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours may deviate 
significantly from non-fictional persons of the time period of focus.  
 Other FEP researchers from my sample are also incautious regarding how liberally they 
generalize their findings from non-representative samples (Betzig 2013; Coe and Palmer 2013; 
Johow et al. 2013; Seaman 2013; Sylwester and Pawlowski 2011; Wilbur and Campbell 2013). 
For example, referring to women as the "empresses of the kitchen," Kathryn Coe and Craig 
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Palmer (2013) claim that selection on women's instructional cooking activities in the Stone Age 
enabled the development of human traditions, which they suggest are adaptive. Their evidence 
for the ubiquity of cooking as a woman's role is taken from data from 39 African cultures dating 
back a few decades (HRAF 2016). However, why these particular cultures were chosen is not 
discussed. Perhaps taking data from a sample in a Western culture would be problematic given 
the commonality of men's roles as cooks, both at home and especially professionally (the vast 
majority of cooks/chefs in the restaurant industry are men). But this is a problem Coe and Palmer 
should contend with not sidestep by focusing on a non-random selection of cultures where men 
happen to do little cooking. Along similar lines, perhaps Coe and Palmer chose to study these 
African cultures because they think they are closer in kind to ancestral cultures, for instance 
because they are hunter-gatherer cultures, or because there is evidence to suggest ancestral 
cultures had strict divisions of labour that required women to do all the cooking. But Coe and 
Palmer do not establish either of these. They do not specify if the cultures in their sample are 
hunter-gatherer, and it is unlikely that they are since very few hunter-gatherer societies actually 
still exist. Nor do they provide any evidence (e.g., paleoanthropological) that could indicate that 
women predominantly cooked in ancestral populations. To guard against charges of cherry 
picking their data (and racism),19 Coe and Palmer should offer a rationale for why they have 
chosen to study the particular populations they focus on. 
                                                          
19 Because Coe and Palmer don’t explain why they chose to use data from African cultures, they leave it open to 
interpretation that perhaps they think African cultures are somehow more primitive, and this is why data from 
African cultures are especially relevant to the study of human evolution. But this is deeply racist. African cultures 
have been around for just as long—if not longer—than other cultures throughout the world. This means they have 
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 These other FEP scholars have issues with their sample representativeness as well. Betzig 
(2013), Seaman (2013), Sylwester and Pawlowski (2011), and Wilbur and Campbell (2013) take 
their samples from just a single culture. Betzig (2013), Easterlin (2013), Sylwester and 
Pawlowski (2011) take their data from just a subsection of a single culture—i.e., undergraduate 
students from an American university, the queens of England, and a few characters from the 
story Jane Eyre, respectively. In all of these cases, the authors do little to no work to defend why 
they think data from these samples is representative of humans at large. 
I recommend FEP scholars pay more attention to the representativeness of their samples. 
If EP is as evolutionary psychologists say, a "science of human nature," then studies conducted 
on undergraduate students, the queens of England, or characters from a fictitious novel should be 
a very last resort and their results discussed with the utmost caution. As I mentioned earlier, 
because EP makes claims about all current and past humans, the research subject pool of EP is 
the largest in the human sciences. In principle, then, evolutionary psychologists, including FEP 
scholars, should have some of the most stringent criteria for where they get their human data 
from. Cross cultural samples, inheritance and fitness studies, and references to historical 




This chapter accomplished two things. I developed a novel philosophical critique for 
operationalization practices in human evolutionary research, and offered a critical assessment of 
the kinds of data FEP scholars use to support their adaptationist hypotheses. Regarding the first, I 
                                                          
been subject to as much, if not more, evolutionary and cultural change. There is no reason to think African cultures 
are more similar to ancestral cultures, especially if they are not even hunter-gatherer.  
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showed that FEP scholars are often unsuccessful at establishing an adequate link between the 
evolutionary phenomena they purport to be assessing and the proxy phenomenon they are 
measuring. I pointed out that it is crucial that FEP scholars, but also other human evolutionary 
scholars, be vigilant about this step in their research. Spending more time establishing and 
explaining the link might catch inadequate links and therefore save them from collecting data 
that is irrelevant to the evolutionary phenomenon they are interested in. Regarding the second, I 
demonstrated that past philosophical critiques of the kinds of data evolutionary psychologists use 
are still relevant to FEP. This is concerning. Not adhering to standards for adaptation 
explanations, telling just-so stories, and conducting their research on strikingly unrepresentative 
samples are basic mistakes that have been pointed out to evolutionary psychologists time and 
again. Mistakes like these indicate to many that, as an institution, EP has unacceptably low 
standards of practice. If FEP scholars would like to see their discipline rise above this reputation, 
and to be recognized for their successful practices, they would do well to learn from the critiques 
of EP that could help fix such mistakes. The recommendations I have offered in this chapter and 
the last would be a good place for them to start.  
EP and FEP are not just the business of their practitioners. Like any publicly available 
and publicly-funded science, EP is located within a network of interconnected epistemic 
communities. The knowledge it produces affects and is affected by many other epistemic bodies. 
What is more, EP is a human science that makes explicit attempts to inform policy and to inform 
how people understand one another. The quality of its research therefore has an important 
bearing both on other scientific communities as well as social ones. In the next chapter, I turn my 
focus to the social impact of and values in FEP. FEP research is both implicitly and explicitly 
political. It is implicitly political because it makes claims about the “nature” of women and thus 
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demarcates who counts as a woman, and what the “normal” characteristics of women are. It is, 
however, also explicitly political as it calls itself feminist and purports to promote gender 
equality. My next set of analyses look closely at the political dimensions of FEP, its values and 
social impact. I offer further recommendations for how FEP scholars might better scrutinize their 





















Critical Analysis of FEP Values 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter engages the second prong of the social-dimensional approach to science criticism 
that I developed in Chapter 2 and Weaver (forthcoming). In this chapter, I consider the 
problematic ways in which certain social values lend to the production of some FEP knowledge 
claims and risk harm to women20 (social impact). I reveal how these social values guide FEP 
research in terms of how FEP scholars understand the relationship between feminism and 
evolutionary psychology, their topics of study, and how they interpret data. I argue these values 
(1) compromise the quality of FEP research, and (2) jeopardize FEP’s feminist aims. The chapter 
is divided into two parts. In the first part, I identify and discuss the consequences of FEP values 
of Authority. Recall that to value Authority is to value one’s own or one’s group’s positions as 
positions of far-reaching epistemic influence. The scope of one’s influence ought to be bounded 
by one’s resources (tools, data, methods, theory, etc.), expertise, knowledge, and 
professional/social position. Problems can arise if one either underestimates (wimpiness, unused 
expertise) or over estimates (imperialism, false confidence) the scope of their influence. In this 
chapter, I argue that FEP has problems with Authority because (a) there is a theme in FEP 
scholarship in which they seek to advise feminists on how to conduct their research but lack the 
knowledge and expertise to do so, and (b) FEP scholars depend on an unjustified expectation of 
the unity of science to argue feminists should incorporate EP research into their work. I 
recommend FEP scholars take a more pluralistic approach to the study and understanding of 
feminist issues. 
                                                          
20 And harm to persons from other marginalized groups, though my main focus is on women in this chapter. 
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In the second part of this chapter, I identify and discuss the consequences of FEP values 
of Social Order. To value Social Order is to value an organization of people into social roles that 
are conducive to a certain end state of society. One can have progressive values of Social Order 
such that the social roles you advocate for are conducive to an egalitarian end state. However, 
one can also have non-progressive or harmful values of Social Order if the social roles you 
advocate for promote an end state of society in which certain groups of persons are oppressed or 
otherwise systematically mistreated (e.g., racial or class hierarchies, patriarchy). In this section 
of the chapter, I uncover in FEP values of Social Order that promote social roles that are 
conducive to a patriarchal society. These values appear to be guiding FEP choices of study, 
focus, and interpretations of data. FEP values of Social Order are harmful but also run counter to 
FEP’s feminist aims. I recommend FEP scholars incorporate structures into their research that 
help them scrutinize their values of Social Order. 
 
6.2 Part 1: Authority 
 
Recall from Chapter 2, FEP scholars aim to supplement extant feminist research with EP 
research so that a broader understanding of women more generally might be gained. To FEP 
scholars, this broader understanding of women can help in social efforts to eliminate gender 
inequality since such knowledge could be useful for finding solutions to the social and political 
problems women face. For example, remember Easterlin’s (2013) suggestion that understanding 
sex inequality from an EP perspective provides a more accurate picture of how differences 
between the sexes promote inequality and why this is harmful. Or Buss and Schmitt’s (2011) 
argument that a consideration of EP accounts of rape "would aid intervention efforts to reduce 
the frequency of sexual assault by focusing attention on the subset of males most prone to rape 
and to commit serial rapes" (779). Also recall Singh and Singh’s (2011) EP account of cultural 
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expectations of beauty, that the waist-to-hip ratio that men find most attractive is also a signal of 
health. Singh and Singh suggest understanding this link between beauty and health can be 
empowering for women: 
If women were made aware of the link between health and beauty, such awareness could 
potentially minimize the oppressive search for becoming beautiful. Instead of seeing 
beauty as a tool of oppression, understanding how health and beauty overlap can, in fact, 
be empowering to women. (729)     
I argue, however, that FEP ideas for how to supplement extant feminist research with EP are 
imperialistic and so represent inappropriate values of Authority. Particularly, I argue that (a) 
there is a theme in FEP scholarship in which FEP scholars offer advice to feminists but lack 
adequate knowledge and expertise to do so. I also show that (b) the argument FEP scholars put 
forward (i.e., the “amalgamationist argument,” see below) for why feminists should integrate 
their work with EP depends on an unjustified expectation of the unity of science. In 
consequence, they are mistaken to extend the epistemic scope of EP as far as they do into other 
feminist domains. These problems with FEP values of Authority risk negative social impact as 
they jeopardize the feminist aim in FEP to help resolve inequality issues women face. FEP 
scholars are not experts on feminism, broadly speaking. The perspectives on women and how to 
resolve women’s issues that they have to offer are narrow and limited. A widespread adoption of 
their perspectives across feminisms would hinder rather than help the very pluralistic and far-




6.2.1 The Amalgamationist Argument 
 
Some FEP scholars purport that, in order for feminists to be successful in their social justice 
projects, they need to understand the phenomena they study from an EP perspective. One can see 
this in FEP researchers' emphasis on what they see to be the importance of understanding 
biological phenomena in terms of their "ultimate" and "proximate" causes. The model of ultimate 
and proximate causation, as it is characterized in FEP, distinguishes between ultimate, or 
evolutionary causes of a trait or behaviour, and the more immediate or proximate causes of that 
same trait or behaviour that are apparent in an organism's life time (Fisher et al. 2013; Reiber 
2013; Vandermassen 2011).21 FEP scholars explain that studying proximate causes is to answer 
the “how” questions about organisms. For instance, how do birds fly south without maps? In this 
area of study, such answers would be found by studying things like genes, hormones, brain 
mechanisms, individual life experiences, and sociocultural influences. On the other hand, one 
might wonder why birds fly south, or why they have the genes, hormones, brain mechanisms, etc. 
to begin with that facilitate migration behaviour. These "why" questions, according to 
evolutionary psychologists, are attributable to the ultimate level of causality, the level of 
evolutionary explanation. In this area of study, such answers would be found by studying things 
like natural and sexual selection. Parsing the causes of phenomena in this way leads FEP 
researchers to insist that because biological processes have both types of causes, they ought to be 
studied from both proximate and ultimate research. For instance, Buss and Schmitt (2011) argue 
that “scientific progress” can only be “facilitated by the recognition that all social scientists 
should make their underlying assumptions explicit, and that all psychological hypotheses are 
                                                          
21 The ultimate/proximate distinction is commonly attributed to Ernst Mayr’s characterization (e.g., see Mayr 
1993). While it is arguable that the FEP scholars I cite in this discussion do not capture the distinction as Mayr 
would have it, that is not my concern here. I am simply bringing up the distinction as FEP scholars lay it out since 
this is a feature of the amalgamationist argument.   
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implicitly or explicitly evolutionary in nature” (782). Reiber (2013) echoes something similar 
when he insists that an understanding of women’s health “will not be complete until the 
evolutionary level is also mastered, because evolutionary biology is the primary science 
underlying all of medicine” 208). FEP scholars who make this argument reason that because 
most feminist research is proximate research (as feminists are often interested in mental, 
behavioural, and social processes that are relevant to social issues), they ought to integrate their 
studies with EP research (i.e., research that studies ultimate causes of human behaviour and 
psychology). That way feminists can offer a fuller causal picture of the phenomena they study.  
Let’s call this the amalgamationist argument for the integration of feminism with evolutionary 
psychology (I take these arguments from Buss and Schmitt 2011; Easterlin 2013; Seaman 2013; 
Fisher et al. 2013; Reiber 2013; Vandermassen 2011).  
Importantly, these particular amalgamationist arguments require feminists to act. 
Feminist scholars are chastised for their resistance to evolutionary accounts of the phenomena 
they study, and are asked to change their research strategies such that they are more open to, or 
incorporate, EP research, theories, or methods. For example, Easterlin (2013) says,  
Feminism’s animus to evolutionary psychology has been particularly pronounced in the 
academic humanities, where a prevailing constructionist viewpoint has dominated since 
the advent of postructuralism, generally dated to Jaques Derrida’s 1968 landmark lecture 
“Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (Derrida, 1968). The 
dogmatic insistence on constructionism, the perspective that differences are socially 
produced rather than the result of innate predispositions, assumes a misguided correlation 
between difference and inequality. …In this chapter, I claim, first, that feminism—a 
movement that eschews social and other forms of bias against women, seeking to bring 
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its causes to consciousness and thus lead to the elimination of sexual discrimination—
ignores research on evolved sex differences to its peril. (Easterlin 2013, 390-391) 
Seaman (2013) says something similar. She claims that in response to one evolutionary 
psychology account of rape, despite the researcher’s attempts to explain why his account did not 
imply genetic determinism, many feminists were nonetheless “outraged by the suggestion that 
rape was not a wholly ‘socially constructed’ behaviour and that biology might be invoked to 
justify male sexual aggression” (409). To this Seaman responds,  
But a refusal to engage with—or even to acknowledge as legitimate—the vibrant and 
diverse fields that make up contemporary evolutionary studies risks throwing out the 
genuine insights with the invidious stereotypes. (Seaman 2013, 409) 
Vandermassen (2011) also warns feminists that their close-mindedness about EP is to their 
disadvantage. On the feminist reception of A Natural History of Rape, she says, 
 The book’s reception attested to a state of affairs condemned strongly in the book itself: 
the strong hostility of many feminists and social scientists to the possibility that biology 
or the evolutionary sciences might contribute to our understanding of the human mind 
and behavior. As I have acknowledged elsewhere, this hostility is to some extent 
understandable, given the history of male bias in science and given the danger that 
appeals to biology might be used as justification for repressive policies, as they often 
have. Yet, as I have argued, feminism will have to forsake this hostility if it wants to 
retain its intellectual credibility. The evidence is overwhelming that we are not born as 
blank slates or psychosexually neutral. (Vandermassen 2011, 733) 
Taken together, these FEP scholars are offering advice to feminists regarding where they 
think feminists go wrong. Feminists are criticized for being “dogmatic,” “hostile,” and negligent 
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for ignoring EP insights about phenomena relevant to feminist research. The implication is that 
they need to change and become more open to EP accounts of the specific phenomena (e.g., sex 
differences, rape). In what’s next, however, I argue that this advice is motivated by a 
misunderstanding of feminist resistance to EP, and that the alleged problems with feminism they 
point out are not problems at all. Their advice to feminists therefore lacks appropriate expertise 
and is misguided.     
 
6.2.2 Misappropriated Feminist Expertise 
 
To begin, it is unclear who the target feminists are that FEP scholars take issue with, so it is 
impossible to know exactly what theory or theories they are attacking. Talking about “the 
feminists” or “feminism” so broadly, and without citing anyone, is a recipe for a straw person 
argument. FEP scholars are claiming to be experts on feminism and its contents, but give their 
reader no opportunity to verify their claims. As such, they have free rein to characterize 
feminism in a way that suits their argument. And, indeed, they do this. For example, according 
Vandermassen (2011), feminists are “hostile” to the idea that “biology or the evolutionary 
sciences might contribute to our understanding of the human mind and behavior” (733; also see 
Seaman 2013, 409). To Fisher et al. (2013), feminists are not “sophisticated” because they 
assume feminists embrace a “nature versus nurture” divide (Fisher et al. 2013, 10). And to 
Easterlin (2013) feminists hold a “dogmatic insistence on constructionism, the perspective that 
differences are socially produced rather than the result of innate predispositions (390). 
Characterizing feminism in this way makes it easy to criticize.  
 FEP scholars are not off base when they indicate that feminists have been very critical of 
EP. Indeed, many feminists have been so openly (e.g., Dupré 2001, 2012; Drea and Wallen 
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2003; Fausto-Sterling 2000; Fausto-Sterling et al. 1997; Gannon 2002; Lloyd 2001, 2003; Lloyd 
and Feldman 2002; Martin 2003; Meynell 2012; Rose 2000; Rosser 1997; Sork 1997; also see 
discussions in Fehr 2011). These scholars have conducted extensive critical work on the political 
dimensions of EP, but have also combed through EP studies to see how they measure up to the 
standards of evolutionary biology. Many of them have applied rigorous feminist analyses to the 
inappropriate assumptions evolutionary psychologists make, and have offered superior methods, 
theory, and data that evolutionary psychologists can and should make use of. Oddly, however, 
FEP scholars do not cite these works. Yet if they are interested in undermining feminist 
resistance to EP, these are precisely the arguments FEP scholars should be concerned about. The 
feminist authors of these works articulate very specifically why they are resistant to EP claims. 
An analysis of these feminist papers shows that the characterization of the feminist stance 
described by FEP scholars is mistaken. None of these feminists indicate any “hostility” toward 
biology or even the evolutionary sciences. (Note, too, that EP is not one and the same with 
biology or the evolutionary sciences. Expressing hostility towards EP should not be equated with 
expressing hostility towards biology or the evolutionary sciences.) In fact, most of these 
feminists are well versed in biological and evolutionary research on a variety of relevant topics 
to EP. They even recommend to evolutionary psychologists how they might make better use of 
or expand their knowledge of, specifically, evolutionary biology (see especially Dupré 2001; 
2012; Fausto-Sterling et al. 1997; Gannon 2002; Lloyd 2001; 2003). These scholars are also 
acutely aware of the problems with the “nature/nurture” divide and make efforts to explain why 
evolutionary psychologists are wrong to assume social scientists, including feminist social 
scientists, are stuck in this debate (e.g., Rose 2000).  
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 Altogether, FEP scholars do not demonstrate sufficient familiarity and engagement with 
relevant feminist scholarship to credibly critique feminist projects. As a result, their valuation of 
their own Authority in the context of offering feminists advice on how to conduct their research 
is inappropriate.  
 
6.2.3 Exaggeration of EP’s Scope and Usefulness 
 
Returning to the amalgamationist argument, in this section I show how it depends on an 
unjustified expectation of the unity of science. In consequence, FEP scholars are mistaken to 
extend the epistemic scope of EP as far as they do into other feminist domains.   
 Setting aside FEP mischaracterization of feminism and failure to address feminist 
concerns with EP, a question still remains: are FEP scholars right that incorporating EP 
perspectives would benefit feminism in the ways they claim? To answer this, let’s look in a little 
more detail at the benefits FEP scholars think EP offers feminism. The underlying claim in the 
amalgamationist argument is the claim that feminism, a domain of so-called proximate research, 
is deeply lacking evolutionary psychological, or ultimate, explanations for the phenomena 
studied. Embedded in this claim, is the assumption that every, or at least the vast majority of 
biological or behavioural phenomena that feminists are interested in has a so-called ultimate 
cause. Buss and Schmitt (2011) make this assumption explicit:  
More generally, it is important to recognize that, at some level, all psychological 
hypotheses are implicitly or explicitly evolutionary psychological hypotheses. First, no 
other known causal process has been discovered, other than evolution by selection, that is 
capable in principle of producing whatever complex psychological mechanisms humans 
possess. Second, those who do not explicitly invoke evolutionary psychology implicitly 
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assume, unless they are creationists, that selection has fashioned evolved domain-general 
learning mechanisms (e.g., those that are capable of adopting whatever social role one’s 
culture hands out). One virtue of evolutionary psychology is that these underlying 
assumptions are made explicit. Scientific progress will be facilitated by the recognition 
that all social scientists should make their underlying assumptions explicit, and that all 
psychological hypotheses are implicitly or explicitly evolutionary in nature. (Buss and 
Schmitt 2011, 782) 
To these FEP scholars, human behaviours and cognition just are caused by both proximate and 
ultimate (i.e., “evolution by selection”) causes, and that to fully explain behaviours and 
cognition, one must be able to give an amalgamated account of both types of causes.  
To explain what is wrong with the amalgamationist claim, I will return to my discussion 
in Chapter 3 of John Dupré’s (2001; 2012) critique of reductionistic scientific imperialism. 
Recall, Dupré problematizes the pervasive monistic assumption that explanations of phenomena 
across scientific disciplines are organized along hierarchical levels such that phenomena at 
higher levels can be explained in terms of phenomena at lower levels. So, for example, this 
would be to assume that neuroscience and psychology can be unified because the human 
behaviours psychologists study can be reduced to the neurological processes that are the subject 
of neuroscience. Part and parcel with assumptions of such scientific unity is the assumption that 
explanations at the lower levels are superior—i.e., they explain more about a given 
phenomena—to higher-level explanations. According to Dupré (2012), evolutionary 
psychologists are keen to emphasize the superiority of their discipline given where in the 
hierarchy of scientific explanations they take their own explanations to occupy. For example, he 
(2001, 2012) cites evolutionary psychologists Barkow et al. (1995) doing just this. Propounding 
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a version of physical reductionism, these evolutionary psychologists emphasize the importance 
of scientific explanations that appeal to the internal structural properties of phenomena, as 
opposed to explanations that highlight context and environment. This is meant to epitomize EP 
(a science of genetics and “mind modules”) as a hyper-scientific account of human behaviour, 
over and above the more traditional human behavioural disciplines that must contend with 
“chaotic” phenomena like culture (as cited in Dupré 2001, p. 73). 
In Chapter 3 I explained how Dupré’s discussion of the ideology of reductionistic 
scientific unity and how evolutionary psychologists can gain from this ideology sheds valuable 
light on the ways in which inappropriate values of Authority permeate EP research. By assuming 
a reductionistic unity of science and claiming to occupy a crucial part of this unity, evolutionary 
psychologists enhance the epistemic scope of their discipline. This is then used to discredit other 
disciplines’ theories of human behaviour (especially those disciplines that do not appeal to the 
supremacy of endogenous causes) that they claim do not fit as tightly within the science unity 
that evolutionary psychology allegedly does. 
 FEP scholars appeal to a very similar type of reductionistic scientific unity. To them, 
higher level cultural and social phenomena can and even must also be explained in terms of their 
lower level, evolved psychological mechanisms. FEP scholars then use this unity requirement to 
discredit certain feminist explanations. They chastise feminists who resist the reduction of social 
and cultural phenomena to evolved mechanisms, claiming such feminists are out of touch with 
science and so are doing their discipline a disservice.  
FEP’s use of the Authority of scientific unity, however, is problematic given the 
untenability of this kind of scientific unity. There is much philosophical scholarship on the 
problems associated with efforts to unify theories or the phenomenological contents of theories 
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across disciplines that study different levels of organization (Bechtel 2007; Cartwright 1999; 
Dupré 1995; Fehr 2006; Hochstein 2016; Longino 2006; 2013; Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). 
For example, Bechtel (2007), who argues against the idea that psychological hypotheses are 
always reducible to neuroscientific hypotheses, points out that the capabilities of higher level 
psychological mechanisms cannot always be predicted based on knowledge of lower level 
mechanisms. He says, 
Especially when organization [of mechanisms across levels] is non-linear, it can enable 
mechanisms to generate phenomena that are quite surprising given the operations of the 
components taken in isolation. Such organization must be discovered—it cannot simply 
be derived from knowledge of lower-level parts and their operations. (172).  
He uses this to argue that higher level studies therefore make autonomous, as opposed to 
reducible, contributions to the understanding of psychological mechanisms. Eric Hochstein 
(2016) makes a different but related point about the irreducibility of psychology to neuroscience. 
He notes that scientists in both disciplines necessarily need to idealize the phenomena they study, 
but that the idealizations required for the higher-level discipline often render the phenomena 
unintelligible in the context of the lower-level discipline. He uses the example of psychological 
theories that make reference to emotions and specific emotions like “anger.” He notes that some 
have argued that because emotions under the same category (e.g., anger) often subsume disparate 
and unrelated neurological mechanisms and processes, they therefore “have no place in a correct 
theory of the mechanisms responsible for behavior” (e.g., Griffiths 1997, 2004). However, 
Hochstein explains,  
if we think of these emotion categories as idealizations, as simplified categories used to 
mitigate the complexity of the system in order to better characterize its overall 
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behavioural capabilities, then there is evidence that psychological theories which employ 
such categories played an essential role in our study of cognitive behaviours. (139-140)  
If psychological theories always had to appeal to neuroscientific theories as a basis for 
characterizing the cognitive behaviours, they would get bogged down by having to account for 
the causal influences of those theories plus the causal influences at the cognitive level. So, 
sometimes it is better that psychological theories posit idealized states and causes that, albeit 
may not have a place in neuroscientific theories, can mitigate complexity and allow for the 
creation of useful testable hypotheses about the behavioural capacities and patterns of the 
cognitive system as a whole. 
 Carla Fehr (2006) makes similar points as Hochstein but in the context of the 
evolutionary study of sex. She discusses the varying theories explaining the evolution of sex and 
addresses the common expectation that the theories will one day be amalgamated into a unified 
account. She argues that such a unified account is not possible “without loss of content or 
explanatory information” (168). She draws on Helen Longino (2002) who argues that various 
assumptions made in different epistemological communities create specific  
intellectual architecture[s] on which explanations hang. These include substantive 
assumptions about what the world is constituted of and the processes in the world that 
need to be explained, as well as methodological assumptions about how knowledge is 
created. (as cited in Fehr 2006, 177) 
Fehr applies this insight to the case of the evolutionary study of sex and reveals incommensurate 
sets of theoretical and methodological assumptions across the different epistemological 
communities that study sex. For instance, she talks about how the different communities have 
different assumptions about what sex is (e.g., meiosis, outcrossing, fertilization). They have 
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different assumptions about which fundamental processes render sex intelligible (e.g., 
biochemical processes vs. selection processes). And they rely on different kinds of abstract 
individuals (e.g., models of cellular processes vs. models of ecology and population) to study 
sex. Here Fehr notes how the different models in the accounts must necessarily abstract away 
many of the phenomena studied by the other accounts in order to arrive at the idealized 
individuals that they do. It becomes a serious question, then, how these accounts could be unified 
if the different phenomena that the accounts study actually get in the way of each other. 
 These philosophical insights shed light on the complexities of knowledge production 
within different epistemic domains. How knowledge is produced in one context is not a good 
indication of how knowledge is or ought to be produced in another. FEP scholars oversimplify 
the knowledge producing practices in different disciplines when they insist that feminists 
amalgamate their production practices with FEP’s. Some feminists may, depending on what they 
are studying, have to render evolutionary processes invisible or operationalize the phenomena 
they study differently than evolutionary psychologists do in order to make the phenomena they 
study intelligible. For instance, feminists who are interested in studying variation within groups 
(e.g., sex, race) necessarily cannot abstract variation away in the same way evolutionary 
psychologists do. Evolutionary psychologists make claims about universal adaptations, and so 
often ignore variation within the groups of people they study. Also, how evolutionary 
psychologists define or parse the groups they study render phenomena that some feminists study 
unintelligible. Evolutionary psychologists, for example, define sex according to parental 
investment. Males are those individuals with cheap, small gametes, while females are those with 
the larger, more costly gametes. But this is just one way to define sex. There are other 
physiological and psychological features that are related to sex, but not all of these correlate with 
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gamete size. In other words, these additional features of sex complicate the dichotomy that 
characterizes evolutionary psychology sex research. Yet many feminists may need this more 
“messy” characterization of sex because such features affect the lived experiences of those 
people feminist scholars study. 
 The points just made apply most obviously to feminist evolutionary psychologists who 
have particularly broad sweeping amalgamationist views, like Buss and Easterlin. For Buss and 
Easterlin, there are almost no corners of the study of human psychology and behaviour that are 
beyond the purview of EP. So, to them, all areas of feminism that touch on the study of human 
behaviour and psychology ought to incorporate EP hypotheses. The anti-unity of science 
arguments above undermine this strong type of amalgamationism because they undermine the 
idea that theories across disciplines and their contents can be amalgamated wholesale. But what 
about those feminist evolutionary psychologists who argue for amalgamation in very specific 
contexts (e.g., Vandermassen on rape)? Most philosophers concede that at least some theory 
interdependence/integration across disciplines is possible, desirable even (Dupré 1993; Fehr 
2006; Hochstein 2016; Wylie 2002). So, it remains to be asked, could the FEP scholars who 
propose amalgamation between “feminism” and EP in highly specific contexts be justified? 
 No, I think even in the specific cases, for instance where FEP scholars have done some 
leg work to explain why EP is relevant to some specific topic X, FEP scholars are still unjustified 
to demand amalgamation from feminists who also study X. I argue this on the grounds that 
feminist evolutionary psychologists still might not know what X looks like from the other 
discipline’s perspective. Philosophical criticisms of EP research on rape make this point salient. 
Feminist and non-feminist philosophers have criticized EP theories of rape on the basis that EP 
theories of rape have an overly-narrow definition of rape (Lloyd 2001), consider rape of only 
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women by men (Koss 2003; Lloyd 2001), and do not consider the many different motivations 
behind rape (Koss 2003; Travis 2003). What these criticisms show is that different disciplines 
(e.g., philosophy and EP) categorize and attend to this phenomenon differently. What might 
seem relevant or important to a topic in one discipline might be unintelligible, impractical, 
irrelevant, or banal to the study of that same topic in another discipline (recall Fehr’s analysis of 
the different theories of the evolution of sex). Hence, in principle, even in highly specific areas 
of study, FEP scholars should not assume their theories will “fill in the gaps,” or what have you, 
in the theories of other disciplines. Combining theories across disciplines is a highly complex 
affair that, to be done right, should require intercommunication and collaboration between the 
various disciplines involved.  
In review so far, FEP scholars’ valuation of their Authority on the shortcomings with 
“feminism” and the scope and usefulness of EP are overextended. FEP scholars have not 
demonstrated knowledge of feminist concerns with EP. They are therefore in no position to 
chastise feminist researchers, or to offer feminists advice on how they ought to better their 
disciplines. FEP scholars are also mistaken to insist that feminism and EP be broadly integrated, 
or even integrated in specific topic areas. FEP scholars do not have adequate access to the 
epistemological platforms that various feminisms work from, so they cannot say with any 
confidence that EP approaches and methods would complement them.  
These problems with FEP imperialist Authority jeopardize the feminist aim in FEP to 
help resolve inequality issues women face. The various feminisms that tackle social issues 
related to gender inequality are many, and for good reason. There are over 3 billion women in 
this world who vary by age, race, wealth, sexual orientation, physiology, lived experiences, 
personality, education, and so on. How gender inequality affects women is in many respects 
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going to vary according to these differences. This is why we need so many feminisms. No one 
feminism can possibly understand “women,” whatever this term entails, or their social plights 
when the complexity of the class of women is fully appreciated. FEP scholars demonstrate 
ignorance of this complexity when they insist feminists need to take an EP perspective, and this 
ignorance is damaging. Homogenizing feminism in the way FEP scholars envision would narrow 
feminist focus and limit the ways in which feminists try to understand and solve social problems. 
For instance, imagine someone working in trans feminism trying to work through social issues 
related to trans individuals but being required to work with the definition of “sex” that 
evolutionary psychologists use. This definition would render their subject group invisible or 
problematic. This would be catastrophic. If FEP scholars are serious about contributing to 
eliminating gender inequality, it is important that they do not lose sight of the importance of 
pluralism in feminism. Being pluralistic about the study of feminist issues, and understanding the 
limits of their own discipline, will help FEP scholars embrace the complexities of the issues they 
study and are concerned about. To better understand the limits of their discipline, I recommend 
FEP scholars begin by acquainting themselves with the feminist critiques of EP that I cited 
above. I also suggest FEP scholars consider pursuing collaborative projects, or organizing joint 
scholarly meetings with feminists from areas that are critical to EP. These ventures could lead to 
mutually open integrative projects and, at the same time, fruitfully elucidate points of 
compatibility/incompatibility between FEP and other feminist disciplines.  
 
6.3 Part 2: Social Order 
 
A patriarchal ordering of society would have it that men are authority figures and public leaders, 
and women are subjugated to men and domestic caregivers. People who live in societies that 
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value this kind of ordering are taught to believe that such ordering is natural and necessary for 
successful social life. Scientists are not exempt from holding such beliefs, and may hold them 
without knowing. These beliefs may influence what they choose to study (e.g., sex differences as 
opposed to similarities), what they focus on in their studies (e.g., cherry-picked data that 
confirms the naturalness of gender or class norms), and what they see in their data (e.g., seeing 
confirmation where there is none). In this section, I reveal some instances in FEP research in 
which a patriarchal ordering of sex roles and stereotypes appear to be guiding FEP choices of 
focus and/or data interpretations. In the first section, I discuss instances in which a valuation of 
the Social Order that men are social leaders and women are caretakers leads FEP scholars to hold 
implicit but unsupported assumptions about women’s evolutionary role as nurturers, women’s 
dependence on men, and women’s social and physical inferiority to men. The particular values 
relating to Social Order that are built into FEP research compromise the quality of FEP study and 
impede FEP aims to produce literature that can contribute a positive social impact by lending to 
the elimination gender inequality. Values of Social Order that see women as followers of men, 
rather than as their equals or even as leaders, lead to scholarship that reinforces beliefs about 
gender inequality. If FEP scholars are serious about using their research to help resolve issues of 
gender inequality, they need to be made aware of the values that are sabotaging this goal, and 
make efforts to adopt new ones.     
 
6.3.1 Women as Nurturers 
 
FEP scholars are apt to point out that nurturing is important for human survival. Human infants 
are helpless due to their premature birth and require a lot of nutrients. FEP scholars therefore 
postulate that women’s ability to nurture infants is an important target for natural selection. The 
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female role as nurturer is focused on extensively in FEP (i.e., 13 out of 29 papers in my sample). 
While women have likely contributed to human evolution in many other ways, FEP scholars 
predominantly choose to study women as nurturers. Note, however, that this focus on nurturing 
is not guided by any known facts about human evolution as the study of women’s contributions 
to evolution has only just begun. Hence, FEP scholars can only assume that women’s main role 
in evolution is nurturance. This assumption leads FEP scholars to be hyper-focused on studying 
women as nurturers. This, in turn, leads to more data on women as nurturers. And the 
overabundance of data on women’s role as nurturers artificially confirms the assumption in FEP 
that women are primarily nurturers.  
Social values surrounding women’s role as nurturers fill in gaps between actual evidence 
provided and conclusions drawn. In the instances below, FEP scholars use problematic data, or 
interpret their data in problematic ways, in order to make claims about the evolutionary 
significance of women’s roles as mothers. 
In more than one instance, Nicole Cameron and Justin Garcia (2013) attempt to present 
evidence for “maternal effect” in humans. However, looking at the evidence they actually offer, 
it seems they frequently conflate maternal effect with what would better be characterized as 
parental effect. Consider these two examples: 
Mothers are generally the principal caregiver for their children, and the quality of the 
mother-child dyad influences the organization of secure-based attachment and behavior 
in the infant (Coall, & Chisholm, 2003) (143)    
 
Maternal investment during childhood often translates to the amount of time spent 
supervising offspring. For instance, in most developed countries accidental injury is the 
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primary cause of death in children over 1 year of age (Belsky et al., 2010). Child 
supervision is a critical determinant of child injury in both preschool age children (Bredy, 
Humpartzoomian, Cain, & Meaney, 2003) and those 7 – 10 years old (Fish et al., 2004). 
Mothers reporting less supervision raise children who sustain more injuries.  
In both excerpts the authors make the claim that specifically maternal care has certain direct 
effects on child well being and behaviour, however the actual evidence they present rather 
supports that parental care has these effects. In the first excerpt, the paper cited at the end (Coall, 
& Chisholm, 2003) makes no claims about the importance of the mother-child dyad on secure-
based attachment. All discussions about attachment in Coall and Chisholm (2003) are unspecific 
to mothers. In the second excerpt, Cameron and Garcia are using data about child supervision 
that is, again, not mother-specific to support the claim that maternal investment determines 
amount of injuries in children. I should point out as well that the latter two references in this 
second excerpt actually say nothing about the significance of parental supervision on child 
injuries. Bredy et al. (2003) is actually a study on maternal effects in rats and does not discuss 
human (or rat) parental supervision in any way. Fish et al. (2004) do discuss the significance of 
rat studies (and studies from other species including some plants) for thinking about human 
parenting, but they in no way address the topic of parental supervision. A charitable 
interpretation is that both of these are referencing mistakes. In any case, the final sentence of the 
excerpt, “Mothers reporting less supervision raise children who sustain more injuries,” is not at 
all supported by the evidence the authors provide.  
 There are similar issues with Elizabeth Oberzaucher’s (2013) uses of neuroscience data to 
support claims about women’s brains being “more emotional” than men’s. Oberzaucher 
promotes the hypothesis that women evolved to be more emotional than men as high 
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emotionality is an asset for caretaking and getting others to help with caretaking. Emotionality 
leads to sociality which helps women establish long-lasting relationships with mates and others 
who, in turn, can help raise their offspring. Oberzaucher presents data from neuroscience to 
support the idea that men and women’s brains are wired differently such that women are more 
emotional. On this she says the following:    
Modern techniques like fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) and EEG 
(electroencephalogram) allow us to watch the brain while it is preoccupied with specific 
tasks. This research shows that female brains seem to be more emotional—that is, 
emotional activations are more intense and involve larger areas (Wildgruber, Pihan, 
Ackermann, Erb, & Grodd, 2002). Mapping such activation patterns onto task 
performance (for example, attributing the correct emotional state to a facial expression) 
allows us to understand the physiological aspects of sex differences in cognition (Baxter, 
Jackson, & Bain, 2003; Baxter, Sykin, et al., 2003). The development of the brain seems 
to be affected by testosterone (Knickmeyer et al., 2006), which modulates the differential 
growth of brain areas toward a masculinization of the brain. The human brain shows 
plasticity throughout one’s lifespan, and hormonal environments continue to affect its 
functioning. A dramatic change in testosterone and estradiol levels in adult life can 
modify the physiology and cognitive processing, such that testosterone shifts the 
processes toward a masculinized brain and estradiol toward a feminized brain, in terms of 
distribution of activations (Schoning et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2007). (Oberzaucher 
2013, 356) 
There are serious problems with Oberzaucher citing five out of the six articles she does to 
support the claims she is making. Starting with the first reference (Wildgruber et al. 2002), 
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Oberzaucher implies the reference supports the possibility that “emotional activations are more 
intense and involve larger areas” in women’s brains than in men’s. This particular interpretation 
of the findings is, however, quite mistaken. The article is in fact not looking at “emotional 
activations” in participants. It is investigating where in the brain acoustic emotional intonation in 
human voice is processed. Participants in the study, while being scanned in an fMRI, listened to 
a recording of a woman actor who was trained and instructed to speak four sentences in three 
different emotional tones. The only sex difference discussed in the study pertained to where in 
the brain men versus women process emotional speech. The authors suggest their findings 
support the possibility that men have more “prominent lateralization of language representation” 
than women (p. 867). Mind you, they only suggest this cautiously as other similar studies do not 
corroborate this. There is no discussion of whether or to what extent the activations observed are 
“emotional” activations. There is also no actual discussion of the significance of the activations 
observed in women’s brains taking place over a “larger area.” While the numerical data do 
indicate that this is the case, the authors do not draw attention to it nor do they suggest that such 
a result could translate into women’s brains being “more emotional.” 
 Oberzaucher’s choice to cite the two articles by Baxter and colleagues in support of the 
claim that mapping activation patterns onto task performance helps us understand the 
physiological aspects of sex differences in cognition is also a bit confusing. The first article 
(Baxter, Jackson et al. 2003) is not a neuroimaging study. It’s a questionnaire study looking at 
how an interviewer’s interviewing style can interact with an interviewee’s self-esteem. The paper 
does not even discuss sex differences in any way. It seems to have been cited by mistake. Why 
she cited the second study (Baxter, Seykin et al. 2003) is also unclear. While it is an fMRI study, 
and does look at sex differences in cognition, it does not make any claim regarding the 
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significance of neuroimaging data for understanding the physiological aspects of sex differences 
in cognition. In fact, at one point the authors of the study state,  
Further investigation is needed to understand the mechanism underlying the sex 
difference observed on fMRI studies. Presumably future studies will determine if these 
results represent a sexual dimorphism of structures associated with language ..., possible 
factors associated with circulating estrogen..., or other, as yet unknown, mechanisms 
(270).  
In other words, the authors seem to be saying the opposite of what Oberzuacher cites them to 
say. Far from claiming that their fMRI study sheds any light on the physiological aspects of sex 
differences in cognition, they are emphasizing that more research, and more research from 
outside fMRI studies, is still needed before any conclusions about the mechanisms underlying 
sex differences found in fMRI can be determined. 
 Regarding the final two articles Oberzaucher cites, the most important thing to note is 
that neither of the articles engages the highly gendered language Oberzaucher uses in her final 
claim. Oberzaucher cites them to support the claim that testosterone in adult life shifts cognitive 
processes toward a “masculinized brain” and estradiol toward a “feminized brain.” While both 
articles do discuss the effects of sex hormones on activation patterns, neither goes so far as to 
suggest such patterns reflect “masculinized” and “feminized” brains. This might be especially 
because the articles are each only looking at the effects of sex hormones on very specific types of 
brain function (i.e., mental rotation and verbal fluency). Even if the studies found testosterone 
and estradiol levels affect activation patterns in robust ways (which neither study really did), 
conclusions about men’s and women’s brains tout court would be highly inappropriate. Again, 
then, it is unclear why Oberzaucher has cited these particular articles for the reason she does.     
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There are other instances in which FEP scholars make claims about the natural role of 
women as nurturers in the absence of any data at all. For instance, see these excerpts: 
Before there was any division of labor and specialization sufficient for anyone to qualify 
as a professional anything, mothers telling stories to their descendants, and telling those 
descendants to repeat the stories to their own descendants, was crucial to human 
existence. (Coe and Palmer 2013, 124) 
 
Why would the Soviet Union use women [for combat in World War II] more than other 
countries, and why would women so readily engage in combat? The answer, we believe, 
is in the location of the conflict. The forces of the United States, Canada, England, Japan, 
and Germany were predominantly fighting in foreign countries whereas in the Soviet 
Union, the conflict was taking place on Soviet soil. Soviet women were fighting in 
defense of their homes and families, and consequently were motivated differently in 
comparison, for example, to a 21-year-old American soldier heading off to fight in 
Europe. We propose that women tend to shun military service when they are asked to 
leave their homes and families to fight for political and abstract nationalistic purposes. 
(Meredith 2013, 376) 
In both excerpts above, claims about women’s nurturance are made in the absence of evidence. 
In the first, Coe and Palmer posit that women have been the primary storytellers to children since 
ancestral times. But this is an unsupported claim. Coe and Palmer do not cite any anthropological 
data that could indicate this, nor do they provide any argument as to why it is unlikely that men 
could have also told children stories. In the second excerpt, Meredith also fails to provide any 
real evidence to support her claim that “women tend to shun military service when they are asked 
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to leave their homes and families to fight for political and abstract nationalistic purposes.” 
Women were simply not allowed to take on combative roles in World War II in the countries 
listed. The Soviet Union was unique in this respect. As such, Meredith cannot know one way or 
another if women would have served in combat for these other countries. Additionally, Meredith 
has done no work to rule out the possibility that, if given the choice, men might also be more 
motivated to fight for homes and families, in which case such a motivation would not be sex-
specific. 
 Taken together, there are numerous striking instances in FEP research in which 
biologically-deterministic claims about women’s nurturance are left inadequately supported. I 
argue social values surrounding women’s nurturance could be partly responsible for this. In the 
instances where FEP scholars, i.e. Cameron and Garcia (2013) and Oberzaucher (2013), cite 
inappropriate studies to support their claims, it is possible that social values are influencing what 
they see in these studies such that they see support where there isn’t any. In the instances where 
FEP scholars, i.e. Coe and Palmer (2013) and Meredith (2013), do not cite any studies to support 
their claims, it is possible that social values are helping them see their claims as “intuitive” and 
not in need of any evidence. While both of these possibilities are certainly only speculative (I 
cannot assess FEP scholars’ beliefs), my main intention with this discussion is to raise the 
possibility that values are playing a role. I think this is a more responsible move than passing off 
the instances just discussed as mere mistakes. As I argue in Chapter 3, calling attention to mere 
mistakes in research does not address the possible negative role values might be playing. This 
would allow the values to remain unchecked and to perhaps influence future research. By 
drawing attention to them, even if it is speculative, I provide an opportunity for FEP scholars to 




6.3.2 Women’s Natural Dependence on Men 
 
In this section, I highlight research in FEP that is meant to explore how and why women are 
competitive. I show, however, that values of a patriarchal Social Order may be guiding this 
research as well. FEP scholarship on women and competition focuses almost exclusively on how 
women compete over (wealthy) men. This focus on women as competitive only over men 
suggests an assumption that women are dependent on men. Whereas men are expected to 
compete over resources and social status, women are only expected to compete over men who 
are then assumed to obtain wealth and status for them. These assumptions are challenged, 
however, by the actual ubiquity of women’s competitions outside domestic contexts. 
 In her research on women’s competition, Fisher (2013) makes the unsupported claim that 
women primarily compete over men. She defines competition as, "when two or more individuals 
are in pursuit of the same resource and that resource is perceived to be insufficient in quantity." 
And with regard to women’s competition she says, "I propose that the scarce resource is 'good 
men'" (21). By “good men,” Fisher means men who either (a) “are good providers and possess 
the physical ability to serve as protectors, or (b) have “high gene quality” (24). She says women 
will compete over these types of men depending on whether they are seeking a long- or short-
term mate respectively. Importantly, however, she proposes that women’s competitions will only 
rarely ever be over short-term mates because such men are not in short supply:  
I should note that another possibility exists; women seeking a short-term relationship 
simply might not need to compete as much as women seeking a longer relationship. This 
prediction is based on the findings of Kenrick, Groth, Trost, and Sadalla (1993), who 
reported that, when considering women for relationships of various durations, men place 
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more importance on female attractiveness as the expected duration increases. In other 
words, men have lower standards for a woman’s attractiveness (which is an important 
element of male mate preference) when seeking a mate for a one-night stand, as opposed 
to steady dating or marriage. Subsequently, perhaps not the form but instead the quantity 
of competition changes in parallel to the length of the relationship. (24)   
Piecing this together, then, Fisher’s hypothesis surrounding female intrasexual competition is 
that women compete with each other primarily over men, and specifically over men who can 
provide for and protect them. 
 One salient problem with Fisher’s paper, however, concerns the lack of evidence she 
actually presents to support her hypothesis. Throughout her article, she presents a variety of 
studies that purport to demonstrate how women compete over men, but these studies do not 
appear to make claims about whether women compete over men primarily. She cites one study 
that shows women in a single society in Zambia primarily compete over men, but Fisher notes 
that the women in the society live under extreme circumstances such that they are uniquely 
dependent on men for their livelihood. She also mistakenly cites Burbank’s (1987) famous cross-
cultural study of women’s aggression to say that women in the cultures studied typically fight 
other women over men. However, in a footnote, Burbank (1987) herself makes clear that her 
research is strictly looking at what she calls “domestic aggression,” which she defines as 
"female-initiated aggression that is found in the context of the home or neighborhood and is 
motivated by domestic concerns" (71). Thus, she says, women's aggressive behaviours "such as 
rioting or the torture of prisoners of war" were excluded from her study (71). This narrow focus 
on domestic aggression could be one reason why competitions over men make such a prominent 
appearance in Burbank’s observations.  
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I suggest this focus on domestic types of aggression and competition is one reason why 
Fisher believes that the main resource women compete over is “good men.” Absent from her 
discussion entirely is a consideration of women’s competitions in professional contexts such as 
work or school. But why is this so? It certainly isn’t the case that such competitions would be 
irrelevant from an evolutionary perspective. Women in such contexts are competing over 
resources such as wealth, status, experience, recognition, and opportunity. These are resources 
that could certainly have fitness consequences if acquired. It also isn’t the case that only few 
women compete in such contexts. Women make up 40% of the world’s work force, 22 and they 
are typically overrepresented in university enrollments in 32 out of the 34 countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.23 It seems very 
possible, then, that stereotypes about women’s domesticity are influencing the focus of women’s 
competitions over men in this research. If women are understood to be primarily domestic and 
dependent on men, it might explain the lack of research attention on women’s professional 
activities.    
 Meredith’s (2013) and Liesen’s (2013) research also focuses on women’s competitive 
behaviours in domestic contexts. In Meredith’s discussion of women’s intrasexual competition 
she, like Fisher, explores how women compete over men. At one point she mentions that, “Other 
examples of women competing [other than competitions over men] are numerous” (380). Here 
she mentions women’s competitions for dominance within peer groups, bargaining when 
shopping, competitions in sports, and competitions for access to educational resources for 
children. It is striking, though, that among these “numerous” examples, only one is from an 
                                                          
22 As reported by The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS). 
23 As reported by the Economist (http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/09/female-graduation-rates). 
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explicitly professional context (i.e., competitions in sports). And, importantly, this is not because 
there is a dearth of studies on women’s competitions in professional contexts (e.g., Beaudoin 
2006; Gneezy et al. 2009; Mahmood and Hanafi 2013; Lallemand et al. 2008). There are plenty 
to be found, especially relating to sports. Thus, like Fisher, Meredith’s lack of consideration of 
women’s competitions in professional contexts requires explanation.  
 Liesen’s (2013) research explicitly focuses on domestic contexts for the study of 
women’s competition. She argues that theorists who suggest women are uninterested in 
competing over resources, like status, do so because they are engaging a male-biased 
understanding of competition. She suggests that if theorists re-define words like ‘status-seeking’ 
and ‘politics,’ then women’s competitions should become more apparent. For example she 
writes,  
When one disconnects status from the socioeconomic measures, it helps to see that girls 
and women seek status too. (53) 
She also says, 
…when politics is defined as the management of conflicts of interests, it is easy to see 
how women are engaged in political struggles every day, starting at a very young age" 
(58).  
She then goes on to suggest that women have different types of dominance hierarchies than men. 
She proposes that girls and women “organize themselves in webs of peer groups in which there 
are high status individuals in the center and lower status members in the periphery” (56). She 
bases this on literature that suggests females in primate troops have non-linear dominance 
structures, and research on adolescent girls that suggests the most popular girl (the “queen bee”) 
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is usually the “center of attention” (56-57). Thus, for Liesen, focusing on women in domestic, as 
opposed to “socioeconomic,” contexts is necessary in order to better observe women competing. 
 Again, however, her theory, like Fisher’s and Meredith’s, is surprising. Given that most 
women work for a living and/or go to school, and both contexts can be highly competitive, it is 
not clear what is so mysterious about women’s competition. Liesen goes so far as to suggest that 
words like ‘politics’ and ‘status-seeking’ need to be redefined in order for them to be applied to 
women. But is this necessary? Liesen gives almost no data to support this. Her suggestion to 
redefine status-seeking is given in response to Anne Campbell’s research on women’s competition. 
She summarizes Campbell (2002; 2004; 2006) to be arguing that “women compete for resources, 
but not status, by using indirect aggression to avoid injuries,” and that women “have little to gain, 
if not more to lose, by engaging in risky, physical aggression for status” (Liesen 2013, 52). It is to 
this that Liesen offers her alternative definition of status-seeking: 
…Campbell’s argument that women are indifferent to status is based on males’ experiences 
of competing for status. When one disconnects status from the socioeconomic measures, it 
helps us to see that girls and women seek status too. (53) 
But there are a couple problems with Liesen’s response to Campbell. First, it is hard to know if 
Campbell really claims that “women are indifferent to status” since Liesen does not indicate where 
in the two books and one article she cites of Campbell’s that this is said. It’s worth pointing out 
too that this is at least not Campbell’s (2004) position. In this article, Campbell is focused on 
aggression, and argues specifically that women are less interested than men in using physical 
forms of aggression to compete. She only briefly mentions women’s competitions over status:  
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men more than women should be concerned with publicly visible dominance rank (and 
threats to it through affronts and humiliation), since this has considerable implications for 
their mating strategy and is a trait that affects female choice. (23) 
Notice, though, that this is a statement of sex differences. Campbell is not claiming that women 
are indifferent to status, just that they might be more so than men. Second, Liesen is unclear 
about what she is redefining ‘political’ and ‘status-seeking’ from, so it is hard to know just what 
it is about these terms that she thinks is so inapplicable to women’s competitions. For instance, 
she does not explain what she means by “socioeconomic measures.” Does she mean to say that it 
is rare that women compete for wealth, so it is better to think about women’s status-seeking in 
other terms, e.g., reputation, popularity? But this is confusing since women directly compete for 
wealth all the time when they compete for jobs, promotions, or acceptances to university 
programs. Though perhaps Liesen would not consider these types of competitions 
“socioeconomic.” It is hard to say.  
She offers even less in the way of what she means by ‘political.’ She only states that 
politics needs to be redefined to mean “management of conflicts of interest” (58). But this is 
unsatisfactory. Given that women occupy most corners of the professional sphere, including 
leadership, management, and politics itself, Liesen needs to do more to explain what she thinks 
the canonical meaning of ‘political’ is and why such a term is inapplicable to women.   
 Subsequently, there seems to be room in Liesen’s reasoning for the influence of values. 
Many of her claims about women’s competitions support stereotypes of women as domestic and 
apolitical but are unsupported by data. And some of her interpretations of data present women to 
be more disconnected from political and economic contexts than they actually are. Like Fisher 
and Meredith, Liesen’s conclusions are consistent with cultural presuppositions about women’s 
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natural place in the domestic sphere. As with the other two scholars, prominent aspects of 
women’s lives (e.g., work, school) are not addressed in this work.        
 
6.3.3 Powerful for a woman 
 
Values that see men as socially and physically superior to women also appear to be guiding FEP 
research. In this section, I highlight examples in which FEP scholars attempt to portray women 
as powerful, or at least equal with men, but instead end up reinforcing harmful stereotypes of 
women that support beliefs about women’s inferiority to men. Hence, buried in these FEP 
scholars’ praise of women lies the inadvertent message, “powerful for a woman. 
As a first example, recall the following quote by Liesen’s from the previous section.  
…when politics is defined as the management of conflicts of interests, it is easy to see 
how women are engaged in political struggles every day, starting at a very young age” 
(Liesen 2013, 58).  
What is noteworthy about this quote in the context of the present section is that the brand of 
‘political’ that Liesen associates with women is rather unremarkable. Being able to “manage 
conflicts of interest” sounds a bit like settling quarrels among friends and family. This is a far cry 
from the types of politics that men are assumed capable of (i.e., all of the rest of politics): 
leadership, control of resources and territory, diplomacy, activism, political deliberation. And as 
I mentioned in the previous section, it is not clear why Liesen’s alternative brand of political is 
better suited to women when women commonly and actively engage so many other types of 
politics. Hence, according to Liesen, women are only political like men when politics is divorced 
from leadership.    
147 
 
As a second example, Kathryn Coe and Craig Palmer (2013) try to empower women by 
referring to them as “empresses of the kitchen” (122). Recall, these scholars hypothesize that 
human traditions evolved primarily as the result of women’s instructional activities, namely 
those regarding cooking and storey telling. In other words, they are claiming that women’s place 
has been in the kitchen since the dawn of humanity but that this is a good thing. Because women 
were exceptional at teaching crucial activities such as cooking, they could ensure such skills 
were passed on. Thus, Coe and Palmer attribute the evolution of traditions to women.  
I argue, however, that it in fact does not empower women to tell them that they are the 
empresses of the kitchen when, for most of history, women have been forced to cook and clean 
for their families without pay or rights. Add to this the fact that, even today, women are highly 
underrepresented in the restaurant industry and face severe forms of discrimination that thwart 
their breaking into the top tiers of culinary practice (e.g., see Bielski 2015; Jackson 2011). For 
while women’s “place is in the kitchen,” it certainly isn’t in the commercial kitchen.  
 My third example comes from Wilbur and Campbell’s (2013) study on women’s 
alleged evolutionary preference for humorous men. The language the authors use to 
describe what they see to be the importance of this preference expresses admiration; 
women are said to hve a “powerful” influence in the mating arena because of the 
preference: The females of several species choose their reproductive mates, based on 
assessing reliable cues of mate quality. Human females appear to be no different, 
typically seeking evidence of long-term commitment, but strategically adjusting their 
preferences and their behavior when obtaining mates of high genetic quality becomes 
paramount. In contrast to how they are commonly depicted in classic fairy tales and 
contemporary media, women clearly exert a powerful influence in the realm of 
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reproduction, a realm at the core of the evolutionary process. (Wilbur and Campbell 
2013, 341)  
So, according to Wilbur and Campbell, it is praiseworthy that women prefer to date funny men 
because it shows that women have created sites of selection among men that have led to 
cognitive advancements in humans associated with humour. But it is quite difficult to see how 
this is a compliment to women. There is nothing particularly impressive about someone who has 
the mere capacity to decide that a witty, entertaining person would make a good mate. On the 
contrary, the person who has the capacity to charm and entertain someone seems far more active, 
intelligent. Of course, men and women have both capacities. But this gets lost in Wilbur and 
Campbell’s portrayal of humour as a male strategy, and choice of a humorous mate as a female 
strategy. 
 Newson and Richerson (2013) give an example of women’s economic independence, but 
also end up harmfully stereotyping women. In their paper, they use their theory of “flexible 
parenting” to explain why cultural events such as economic change can bring about changes in 
attitudes about gender roles. A large part of their project is to argue against the idea that 
parenting roles are genetically determined. It is unfortunate, however, that the one example they 
provide to demonstrate how economic change can lead to women’s economic independence is 
one that depicts women gaining the freedom to work only so that they can “buy fashionable 
clothing”:  
As a population undergoes economic development its members increasingly identify with 
social groups other than their families and are influenced mostly by people who have no 
interest in their reproductive success. Within families, the importance of marriage and 
motherhood may still be discussed. But at work, in school, in the streets of towns, and in 
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the media, other options get talked about. For example, women may learn about the 
benefits of getting a job and earning money to buy fashionable clothes rather than helping 
at home or earning money to help their family. Reproductive norms do not change 
immediately but they gradually diverge from that which encourages reproductive success. 
(Newson and Richerson 2013, 162) 
The authors here seem guided by infantilized beliefs about women. Out of all of the things that 
women might do with their economic freedom (e.g., open a business, buy a house, go to 
university), the authors’ example of choice is a trip to the mall. 
 So far, the above examples demonstrate that the assumptions in this FEP scholarship are 
consistent with the basic definition of patriarchy that men, not women, hold positions of power 
and authority. Even when women are to be praised for their “power,” the instances in women’s 
behaviours chosen are decidedly not powerful. Dressing up these behaviours as powerful 
succeeds at little more than sending the message that such behaviours are powerful for women. It 
would be hard to imagine very many men feeling a sense of pride if they were told that their 
greatness resided in their skills in forced, unpaid and underappreciated domestic work, their 
capacities to appreciate witty people, their abilities to manage conflicts of interest, or their 
independent choices to buy “fashionable clothing.” But these are stereotypes of women, and, 
specifically, stereotypes that characterize women as unintelligent and unsuited for social 
leadership. They are not empirically-informed assumptions.  
In one last example, beliefs about women’s social but also physical inferiorities surface in 
Sylwester and Pawlowski (2011). In their evolutionary account of risk taking in men and women, 
women’s risk taking is presented to be both physically and morally inferior to men’s. Sylwester 
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and Pawlowski start out hypothesizing that risk-taking behaviour is an attractive signal in both 
men and women because it signals good genes:   
The focus of this study was risk taking as a consequence of intersexual selection. By 
voluntarily engaging in risky activities individuals are able to advertise their physical 
fitness, health, status, resources and desirable personality traits to peers and potential 
mates. At an evolutionary level, risk taking can be a signal of “good genes”, that is genes 
promoting offspring’s survival and reproductive success. (696) 
As the article goes on, however, this hypothesis gets confused. It becomes apparent that risk-
taking behaviour, according to Sylwester and Pawlowski’s account, does not actually signal good 
genes in women, but rather promiscuity. Consider these quotes on the next page. Regarding how 
women interpret risk taking in men, they say, 
Short-term [male] partners are not likely to become long-term resource providers, but if 
they have good genes, these will be inherited by the women’s offspring who will be more 
attractive to future sexual partners (Weatherhead and Robertson 1979). Hence, if risk 
taking can be seen as a signal of good genes in mate choice, women who pursue a short-
term strategy should be sensitive to this cue and should favour risk-taking men. (697) 
However, contrast this to what they say about how men interpret risk taking in women. 
From an evolutionary perspective, men’s preference for risk-taking women as casual 
partners may be dictated by smaller mating effort necessary to court a mate. Women, 
usually more sexually restricted than men (Schmitt 2005), may demand long and costly 
courtship. A woman who exhibits a liberal approach to social norms or relaxes her social 
behaviour by consuming alcohol [a risky behaviour] could be an easier and less costly 
target in terms of sexual availability for men pursuing short-term relationships. (697) 
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Sylwester and Pawlowski do not explain this switch. And, importantly, the switch does not make 
a lot of sense according to the good genes hypothesis in evolutionary biology. If risk taking is a 
signal for good genes, then men will benefit from being attracted to female risk takers because of 
their good genes. For instance, some reproductive benefits that would come along with being 
attracted to someone with good genes include, having more offspring (because your partner is 
healthy and/or has physical abilities to secure sufficient resources), having healthy offspring 
(because your partner passes on their healthy genes or is a good caretaker), or having offspring 
who themselves have high reproductive success (because they are healthy, or can acquire 
resources, or can attract mates). It is not clear where promiscuity fits in here. Do Sylwester and 
Pawlowsky mean to say that risk taking is a signal for promiscuity which is, in turn, a signal for 
good genes? If so, this would need to be spelled out. Otherwise, if Sylwester and Pawlowski 
want to say that men have evolved abilities to detect women’s promiscuity through women’s risk 
taking, then this would have to be a separate hypothesis.  
To explain this mistake, patriarchal gender beliefs might be doing some work here. The 
traits Sylwester and Pawlowksi attribute to good genes include, “physical fitness, health, status, 
resources and desirable personality traits to peers and potential mates” (696). Patriarchal 
stereotypes would more readily attribute most of these kinds of traits to men given that the traits 
are indicators of leadership. In line with these stereotypes, these traits are readily applied to men 
in the article but not to women. Almost the only type of risk taking behaviour attributed to 
women is substance abuse. Only when they are citing secondary studies on risk taking in women 
do Sylwester and Pawlowski briefly mention other types (e.g., two different articles cited 
mention aggression and sports). This is curious indeed for, on the face of it, these other types of 
risk taking fit better (than binge drinking) with the hypothesis that risk taking signals good genes.   
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The language that is used to describe male versus female risk takers also fits gender 
stereotypes in that women’s risk taking is presented as morally inferior to men’s. On a few 
occasions, the authors borrow gendered language from the articles they cite to characterize male 
risk takers as “heroic,” “daredevils,” or “brave,” but they do not use this language for women:  
Kelly and Dunbar (2001) looked at female preferences for altruistic versus nonaltruistic 
bravery in men. The results…indicated that women preferred daredevils who took risks 
without the altruistic component as short-term partners over risk-averse men and men 
who took heroic risks. (697) 
Also, 
Our results…support Kelly and Dunbar’s finding (2001) that for women, non-heroic 
physical risk taking is a favourable trait in short- but not in long-term partners. (702) 
Finally,  
Our finding of female preferences for risk taking is consistent with the notion of “cad” 
and “dad” mating strategies (Belsky et al. 1991). A number of studies reported that for 
short-term sexual liaisons women desire competitive, dominant and brave cads who can 
provide them with genetic contribution likely to result in sons of similar characteristics 
(Gangestad and Simpson 2000). (702-703) 
On only one occasion is such language used to describe physical risk taking in women:  
Men’s choices deviate from our prediction in the sense that, although financially and 
socially risk-avoiding partners were frequently chosen, so was the physical risk taker. 
Like women, men might seek long-term mates who are brave enough to take risks in 
order to protect their offspring. (emphasis added 704)  
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All other descriptions of women’s risk taking, however, pertain to alcohol consumption and do 
not implicate any admiration. In one instance, risk taking in women is even described in morally 
pejorative terms: 
It pays for men to court a specific type of women for a short-term relationship. First, if 
men find a mate who easily agrees to a casual relationship they reduce their mating effort. 
Women under the influence of alcohol and drugs (physical risk takers) were shown to 
engage in short-term liaisons more often than sober women (Grello et al. 2006). In 
another study, the amount of money spent on alcohol was a good predictor of 
unrestrictiveness in sexual behaviour (Clark 2004). Social risk taking, as we defined it, 
involves immoral behaviour that is in conflict with commonly accepted norms.  
Unrestricted female sexual behaviour easily falls into this definition. Again, if a man 
chooses an unrestricted woman as a short-term partner he will reduce the time and energy 
spent on courtship. The results obtained from the second task also support our hypothesis 
with almost 70% of men choosing either physical or social risk taker as a short-term 
partner. (Sylwester and Pawlowski 2011, 703) 
Accordingly, to Sylwester and Pawlowski, physical risk taking in women amounts to binge 
drinking which leads to “unrestricted female sexual behaviour,” which is “immoral.” This is a far 
cry from “daredevil” or “brave.” I should point out as well that Sylwester and Pawlowski did not 
define social risk taking in the way they claim in this passage. In particular, the word ‘immoral’ 
was not used in the definition. The definition they provided is as follows:  
We defined social risk taking as any behaviour which can lead to a decrease in reputation, 
ostracism or social punishment. In some circumstances, social risk taking can also signal 
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dominance, as only individuals of high status can afford to behave in an uncompromising 
way. (699)  
This definition of social risk taking does not require the experimenter to make a moral judgment 
about the behaviour in question. It only requires them to make a judgment about whether the 
behaviour violates social norms or is dominant. It also isn’t the case that all behaviours that lead 
to “decrease in reputation, ostracism or social punishment” are necessarily immoral, but this is 
what the later alternative definition of social risk taking that they attribute to women’s binge 
drinking implies. Hence, whatever the authors’ reason is for doing so, it is gratuitous for them to 
make a moral judgment about women’s sexual behaviour. (Note as well that social risk taking as 
a signal of “dominance” drops out of the definition when Sylwester and Pawlowski define it in 
the context of women’s behaviour.) 
 Taken together, despite Sylwester and Pawlowski’s proposition to discuss why and how 
risk taking is a signal for good genes in both men and women, they end up only doing so for 
men. For reasons unknown, the authors only discuss the significance of binge drinking in 
women, and even in this regard do not attribute the behaviour to good genes but rather to a 
seemingly unrelated quality, promiscuity. Risk taking behaviours are described differently in 
men and women. Men who take risks are “brave,” “daredevils,” and “heroic,” whereas women 
are “less costly,” “immoral,” and “unrestricted.” Beliefs about women’s social physical 
inferiorities might be preventing Sylwester and Pawlowski from seeing women as possessors of 
the kinds of qualities associated with “good genes,” or capable of taking physical risks beyond 
alcohol consumption.  
 As my analysis in this second part of the chapter demonstrates, FEP research portrays 
women primarily as caretakers and dependent on men. FEP scholars also portray women as 
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socially and physically inferior to men when they attempt to praise women for decidedly 
unimpressive leadership or social attributes or unremarkable risk-taking behaviour. Based on my 
analysis, I argue that (1) patriarchal values of Social Order undermine the quality of FEP 
research, and (2) jeopardize FEP scholars’ feminist aim to contribute to resolving social issues of 
gender inequality. Regarding my first argument, my analysis demonstrates that patriarchal values 
bias in problematic ways what FEP scholars choose to research (e.g., women in limited contexts 
like domestic contexts), what they see in their own as well as others’ data (e.g., confirmation of 
gender stereotypes that isn’t actually there), and their choice of language (e.g., morally-charged 
language in characterizing men’s and women’s risk taking). Regarding my second argument, the 
implicit and explicit claims about women in FEP scholarship reinforce beliefs that women are 
most suited for caring and domestic roles and unsuited for leadership. It is hard to see how these 
kinds of claims could generate any kind of positive social impact especially in the way of helping 
eliminate gender inequality.  
I recommend FEP scholars put structures in place that help them scrutinize their values. I 
give three structures that could help them do so here. First, FEP scholars could engage a wider 
range of feminist literature and scholars. The FEP scholars in my literature sample cite few 
feminists. More integration into other feminist communities would help broaden their feminist 
perspectives and help them better understand the complexities of women’s issues and how 
scientific research can be harmful to women.  
Second, I suggest FEP scholars specifically engage feminist scholarship on values in 
science. This scholarship explores the different ways prejudicial values can influence a 
scientist’s research, the real harms of such values, and what good replacement values are (e.g., 
see Bleier 1984; Dotson 2011; Fehr 2004; 2011; Fricker 2007; Grasswick 2004; Haraway 1988; 
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Harding 1986; Melo-Martin and Intemann 2012; Longino 1990; 2002; 2006; Longino and Doell 
1983; Tuana 1989). Reading this scholarship can help FEP scholars know where to look for 
harmful values in their own research and how to correct for them.  
Third, as an exercise, FEP scholars could consider asking themselves a series of 
questions that I have put together that is designed to help one scrutinize harmful values of Social 
Order specifically. The series of questions would require FEP scholars to first consider if they 
themselves hold essentialist views about certain people groups. To hold an essentialist view 
about a group of people is to believe that there are sets of attributes that apply to all or most 
members of that group, and that these attributes determine membership in that group. The 
questions then guide FEP scholars to consider whether or how these essentialist beliefs make 
their way into their research. They then require FEP scholars to consider if these essentialist 
beliefs are warranted. If the beliefs are warranted, they must consider if the beliefs indicate a 
harmful Social Order. If so, FEP scholars should consider if the benefits of producing scientific 
scholarship that reinforces this Social Order are worth such harm. If they believe that they are, 
they should make this explicit in the research itself so that readers are aware of the harms, and 
can consider for themselves if accepting the research is worth it to them. Here are the questions: 
Seven Steps for Scrutinizing Harmful Values of Social Order  
(1) When I think of people group P, do I see a particular paradigm person, R? 
(2) Does the language I use in my research give away that I mean R when I say P? 
(3) If so, am I warranted to portray P as R, or is it important in any way that the people in 
P who are not R also be represented? 
(4) If I am warranted, does my presentation of R indicate a harmful Social Order? For 
instance, do I associate R with qualities that are mainly inconsistent with social 
leadership? 
(5) If R indicates a harmful Social Order, is it necessary for my research that I present P 
as R, or is there an alternate version of R (e.g., R’), that is also representative of P, 




(6) If there is no alternate version of R, is producing the research worth the harms of 
associating P with R? 
(7) If the research is worth the harms, explain your reasoning to your readers.      
 
I should, however, caution about an important limitation to this set of questions: the problem of 
implicit bias. Implicit biases are those biases that persist below our level of awareness. 
Psychological research on implicit bias teaches us that we are not always aware of our 
prejudices, or the kinds of qualities that we associate with certain people groups.  
Brownstein (2017) gives the following example: 
imagine Frank, who explicitly believes that women and men are equally suited for careers 
outside the home. Despite his explicitly egalitarian belief, Frank might nevertheless 
implicitly associate women with the home, and this implicit association might lead him to 
behave in any number of biased ways, from trusting feedback from female co-workers 
less to hiring equally qualified men over women. (n.p) 
The problem with implicit bias, then, in regards to my set of questions, is that scholars who use 
the questions might unjustifiably answer “no” to questions 1 and 4 because they simply are not 
aware of their beliefs about the people groups they are studying. This would defeat the purpose 
of the questions. Because of this, the set of questions should only be used as a helpful exercise 
for now. Future social psychological research could test whether the questions are effective for 
investigating one’s beliefs about the people groups they study, and perhaps help determine how 
the questions could be re-written so that implicit bias is minimized. Until then, I would 
emphasize that FEP scholars use the questions in conjunction with especially my first 
recommendation, that FEP scholars engage a wider range of feminist literature and scholars. 
Where a FEP researcher might hold an implicit bias about the people group they are studying, 






My analysis of FEP reveals that problematic values of Authority and Social Order guide FEP 
scholars’ interpretative judgments of their data as well as their choices of study. As a result, such 
values compromise the quality of their research and thwart their stated feminist aims. I showed 
how FEP scholars’ imperialist values of Authority may be playing a part in their 
mischaracterization and dismissal of feminist concerns about EP. I also showed that because FEP 
scholars buy into an untenable vision of scientific unity, and one that prioritizes EP explanations 
over non-EP explanations, they miscalculate how important it is that non-EP feminists 
incorporate EP into their accounts of human behaviour/psychology. With regards to FEP values 
of Social Order, I revealed the problematic ways in which FEP valuation of women’s roles as 
nurturers and subordinates, and men’s roles as leaders likely influenced FEP choices of study, 
focus, language use, and data interpretations. FEP scholars highlight the importance of nurturing 
behaviour in women at the expense of focusing on other types of behaviours. Values of the 
importance of caretaking in women appear to be filling in gaps between FEP conclusions and 
actual evidence provided, and even leading FEP scholars to see evidence for the importance of 
women’s nurturance when it is not there (e.g., misunderstanding/misreading secondary 
literature). Values of men’s leadership and women’s dependence likely lead FEP scholars to 
highlight how women are only competitive in domestic contexts or over men. Values that see 
men as physically and socially superior to women lead FEP scholars to credit women with 
underwhelming examples of leadership, power, independence, or risk-taking tendencies. 
According to my analysis, then, eliminating these problematic values in FEP could contribute to 
better quality research and help FEP better achieve its feminist aims. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I developed the social-dimensional approach as a method for the 
philosophical critique of morally relevant science. I applied the social-dimensional approach to a 
new branch of evolutionary psychology called feminist evolutionary psychology (FEP). I showed 
that this new science has serious epistemic and ethical flaws. I addressed the implications of 
these flaws and offered recommendations for how feminist evolutionary psychologists can 
address them. In this final chapter, I summarize the contents of this dissertation and discuss 
future directions for philosophical work using the social-dimensional approach. 
 
7.1 Dissertation Summary: Applying the Social-Dimensional Approach to FEP 
 
In Chapter 3, I developed the social-dimensional approach from my analysis of the philosophy of 
biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of 
human psychology and behaviour. From this literature, I teased out two different methods of 
scientific critique. The first I called the “truth-detectional” approach. Those who take this 
approach are first and foremost concerned about the truth of EP claims as that truth can be 
determined by evidence. The second I called the “social-dimensional” approach. Those who take 
this approach talk about the production and truth of EP claims but within a social framework. On 
this account, the legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of EP claims are not separate from the 
institutional and social processes and values that lend to their production. I showed that the truth-
detectional approach risks harms to society and to the philosophy of science, but that the social-
dimensional approach avoids these harms. Because of this, I argued that philosophers of science 
should take the social-dimensional approach to the assessment of morally-relevant science.  
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 In Chapters 4 and 5, I applied the social-dimensional approach to feminist evolutionary 
psychology. I mentioned several reasons (see Chapter 1) regarding why FEP should be assessed 
using the social-dimensional approach. First, I explained that because feminist evolutionary 
psychologists still conduct their research broadly within the disciplinary framework of EP, their 
epistemic practices (e.g., theories, assumptions, data practices) may be flawed in similar ways 
that EP practices are. My assessment of FEP, using the social-dimensional approach confirmed 
that FEP epistemic practices (e.g., theories, assumptions, data practices) are flawed in similar 
ways that EP practices are. In Chapters 4 and 5, I found evidence that FEP scholars make many 
of the same mistakes in their epistemic practices as evolutionary psychologists have in the past, 
as well as new ones. Some of these old mistakes include, using an outdated and thoroughly 
criticized theoretical paradigm (the BTP paradigm), and not adhering to standards in 
evolutionary biology regarding the appropriate kinds of data needed for supporting adaptationist 
hypotheses. I developed the OEP check and discovered FEP scholars also fail to properly 
operationalize the phenomena they study for the purposes of adaptationist research.  
Second, I pointed out that because feminist evolutionary psychologists still operate within 
an EP framework, the sexism embedded in EP might also be present in FEP. In EP research, men 
are often attributed qualities and roles that pertain to leadership and selfishness, and women 
qualities and roles that pertain to servitude and nurturance. These qualities are often claimed by 
evolutionary psychologists to be innate and hard to change. My assessment of FEP in this regard 
in Chapter 6 uncovered patriarchal values of Social Order. I found evidence that beliefs in FEP 
about men and women mirrored unjustified stereotypes of men and women. Without adequate 
evidence, women’s nurturance was presented in FEP to be their predominant contribution to 
evolution. Without adequate evidence, women were also presented to be naturally dependent on 
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men, and socially, politically, and physically inferior to men. I showed how patriarchal values of 
Social Order in FEP were partly to blame for these false and harmful claims about women. I also 
uncovered imperialist values of Authority. I argued that FEP has problems with Authority 
because (a) there is a theme in FEP scholarship in which FEP scholars seek to advise feminists 
on how to conduct their research but lack the knowledge and expertise to do so, and (b) FEP 
scholars depend on an unjustified expectation of the unity of science to argue feminists should 
incorporate EP research into their work. I demonstrated that FEP’s values of Social Order and 
Authority compromise the quality of FEP research and its feminist aims. Patriarchal values of 
Social Order bias in problematic ways what FEP scholars choose to research (e.g., women in 
limited contexts like domestic contexts), what they see in their own as well as others’ data (e.g., 
confirmation of gender stereotypes that isn’t actually there), and their choice of language (e.g., 
morally-charged language in characterizing men’s and women’s risk taking). Patriarchal values 
of Social Order in FEP research also lend to the production of claims about women that they are 
most suited for caring and domestic roles and unsuited for leadership. It is hard to see how these 
kinds of claims could generate any kind of positive social impact especially in the way of helping 
eliminate gender inequality. Imperialist values of Authority in FEP promote a homogenization of 
feminism in a way that would narrow feminist focus and limit the ways in which feminists could 
understand and solve social problems. 
A third reason to assess FEP, as I pointed out in Chapter 1, is because the discipline has 
the potential to produce science that is both socially progressive and epistemically rigorous if its 
epistemic and ethical weaknesses are addressed. FEP scholars bring new perspectives, theories, 
and methods to the evolutionary study of humans in general and women in particular. They are 
also conscious of the ethical dimensions of their discipline as is evident in their efforts to apply a 
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feminist perspective to their studies of women. A critical assessment of FEP can therefore help 
further its development. Throughout Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I provided recommendations for how 
FEP scholars might improve their research by addressing the criticisms I’ve laid out. In Chapter 
4, I provided FEP with alternative theories in evolutionary biology that are relevant to FEP 
research but not susceptible to the same problems that the BTP paradigm is. In Chapter 5, I made 
a case for the importance of properly operationalizing the phenomena one studies. I 
demonstrated, using examples from FEP scholarship, how this can be done poorly, and I offered 
suggestions for how FEP scholars might be more vigilant about their operationalizations. I also 
provided FEP scholars with references to literature in philosophy of biology that outlines the 
appropriate standards for evidence that FEP scholars need to support their adaptationist 
hypotheses. I also recommended better data collection and interpretive practices. Finally, In 
Chapter 6, I provided FEP with recommendations for how they can better scrutinize their values 
such that they can avoid the influence of the problematic and harmful values of Authority and 
Social Order that currently guide their research. I suggested ways they can be more pluralist in 
their feminist approach to the study of women (to address imperialist values of Authority), and 
offered pointers for how they might build in critical structures in their research that could help to 
catch unjustified essentialist beliefs about people groups (to address harmful values of Social 
Order).  
 
7.2 Future Directions: Broader Application of the Social-Dimensional Approach 
 
In this dissertation I demonstrated the applicability of the social-dimensional approach to 
evolutionary psychology (Chapter 3) and to a new branch of evolutionary psychology, feminist 
evolutionary psychology (Chapters 4, 5, & 6). In future work of mine I will apply the social-
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dimensional approach to two morally relevant sciences outside EP, the neuroendocrinology of 
human paternal care and the epigenetics of sexual orientation. The neuroendocrinology of human 
paternal care answers questions about the relationship between caring behaviour in human 
fathers and underlying neuralhormones (e.g., testosterone, vassopressin, prolactin) and brain 
circuits. Past research on the neural correlates of parental care was heavily focused on women; 
recently, however, some neuroendocrinologists have seen the need to study the neural correlates 
of human fathering. Discussions in these papers focus explicitly on social justice issues such as 
gender equality in parenting (e.g., Gettler et al. 2011a) and how the exclusion of men from 
neuroendocrinological studies on parenting (e.g. postpartum depression) has a negative impact 
on men, their partners, and the children they raise (e.g., Swain et al. 2014). The researchers who 
study the epigenetics of sexual orientation consider whether and how epigenetic mechanisms 
(e.g., nucleosome repositioning, DNA methylation, and/or modification of histone tails) 
contribute to the development of specifically lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) orientations. 
Researchers in this programme teach an awareness that "historical, social and religious norms 
have interfered with a full appreciation of the scope and diversity of the homosexual phenotype 
in nature" (Rice et al. 2012, 769). They point out how the epigenetics of sexual orientation better 
captures the rich variation that exists across LGB individuals because it highlights the complex 
interplay between genomic mechanisms and the environment (e.g., Ngun and Vilain 2014).  
Despite the attention to morally relevant issues in these scientific domains, I expect that 
my social-dimensional analyses of them will uncover persistent and hidden prejudicial 
assumptions and values. For example, I have already found heteronormative assumptions in the 
epigenetics of human paternal care about the complementariness of a genetically male man and a 
genetically female woman for adequate parenting. I have also found instances of language use 
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that indicate prejudicial assumptions about men and women. For instance, in one study the 
authors (Gettler et al. 2011b) refer to women as the "females" that "humans" mate with (16194), 
casting men as paradigm humans and women as oppositional to this paradigm. Similarly, in the 
epigenetics of sexual orientation there are assumptions that LGB orientations are the result of 
“dysfunctions,” and that those who identify as LGB can be treated as a homogenous class of 
people.  
As a social-dimensional analysis of sciences like FEP, the neuroendocrinology of human 
paternal care, and the epigenetics of sexual orientation demonstrates, science is not separate from 
the social and moral. Scientific claims can have serious social impact, and social values can 
guide how research is conducted, interpreted, and assessed. Given their training and opportunity 
for engagement, philosophers of science are opportunely situated to assess the social and moral 
dimensions of science. My development and application of the social-dimensional approach in 
this dissertation provides a valuable tool for philosophers of science to adequately engage the 
social and moral dimensions of science. The social-dimensional approach is designed to assess 
specific social and moral dimensions a science (i.e., social values and impact) and to consider 
what role those dimensions play, or should play, in that science’s production of knowledge. In 
regards to FEP, I showed how FEP’s feminist ethical considerations of women have led to novel 
developments in evolutionary theory and the study of women (see Chapters 1 and 2). I also 
showed how harmful values of Social Order and Authority in FEP compromise the quality of 
their research. Future work of mine will demonstrate how the social-dimensional approach can 
be used to make similarly valuable assessments of the neuroendocrinology of human paternal 
care and the epigenetics of sexual orientation. I encourage other philosophers of science to 
further broaden the social-dimensional approach’s applicability by applying it to the morally 
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relevant sciences they study. I also encourage philosophers to expand the approach itself. For 
instance, philosophers might want to add considerations of other types of social dimensions to 
their assessments such as, for example, considerations about how scientists’ social positions or 
memberships in social groups (race, ethnicity, sexual orientation) affect how they produce 
knowledge (see Harding 1986; Wylie 2003 for discussions about how the situatedness of 
knowers matters in the production of knowledge). As I argued in Chapter 3, developing and 
applying philosophical tools like the social-dimensional approach provides an important 
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